Garry Young (young-g)
Contributions to Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Young, Garry. 2004. “Bodily Knowing.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 7(1): 37–54.
Young, Garry. 2005. “Ecological Perception Affords an Explanation of Object Permanence.” Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action 8(2): 189–208.
Young, Garry. 2009. “Case Study Evidence for an Irreducible Form of Knowing How to: An Argument Against a Reductive Epistemology.” Philosophia 37(2): 341–360.
Young, Garry. 2016. “The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example.” Philosophia 44(3): 961–969.
Young, Garry. 2017. “Knowledge How, Ability, and the Type-Token Distinction.” Synthese 194(2): 593–607.