Debbie Roberts

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Roberts, Debbie. 2013a. “Thick Concepts.” Philosophy Compass 8(8): 677–688. Reprinted in McPherson and Plunkett (2018, 211–225).
Roberts, Debbie. 2013b. “It’s Evaluation, Only Thicker.” in Thick Concepts, edited by Simon Kirchin, pp. 78–96. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672349.001.0001.
Roberts, Debbie. 2016. “Explanatory Indispensability Arguments in Metaethics and Philosophy of Mathematics.” in Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability, edited by Uri D. Leibowitz and Neil Sinclair, pp. 185–203. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198778592.001.0001.
Roberts, Debbie. 2018a. “Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XIII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 1–24. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198823841.001.0001.
Roberts, Debbie. 2018b. “Thick Epistemic Concepts.” in Metaepistemology, edited by Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting, pp. 159–178. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805366.001.0001.

Further References

McPherson, Tristram and Plunkett, David, eds. 2018. The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315213217.