Michael Nelson

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The Dual Detector Argument against the Modal Theory

Bibliography

Fitch, Gregory W. and Nelson, Michael. 2007. “Singular Propositions.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2007/entries/propositions-singular/.

Fitch, Gregory W. and Nelson, Michael. 2013. “Singular Propositions.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/propositions-singular/.

Keller, Simon and Nelson, Michael. 2001. “Presentists should Believe in Time Travel.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79.

McKay, Thomas J. and Nelson, Michael. 2005. “Propositional Attitude Reports.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/prop-attitude-reports/.

McKay, Thomas J. and Nelson, Michael. 2010. “Propositional Attitude Reports.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/prop-attitude-reports/.

Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin and Nelson, Michael. 2016. “S5 for Aristotelian Actualists.” Philosophical Studies 173(6): 1537–1569.

Nelson, Michael. 2002a. “Puzzling Pairs.” Philosophical Studies 108(1–2): 109–119.

Nelson, Michael. 2002b. “Descriptivism Defended.” Noûs 36: 408–435.

Nelson, Michael. 2005. “The Problem of Puzzling Pairs.” Linguistics and Philosophy 28(2): 319–350.

Nelson, Michael. 2007. “Ways an actualist might be [on Stalnaker (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 133(3): 455–471.

Nelson, Michael. 2008. “Frege and the Paradox of Analysis.” Philosophical Studies 137(2): 159–181.

Nelson, Michael. 2009a. “A Problem for Conservatism.” Analysis 69(4): 620–630.

Nelson, Michael. 2009b. “The Contingency of Existence.” in Metaphysics and the Good. Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams, edited by Samuel Newlands and Larry M. Jorgensen, pp. 95–155. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542680.001.0001.

Nelson, Michael. 2009c. “Quantifying In and Anti-Essentialism.” in Russell vs. Meinong. The Legacy of “On Denoting” , edited by Nicholas Griffin and Dale Jacquette, pp. 297–342. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy n. 30. London: Routledge.

Nelson, Michael. 2012a. “Existence.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/existence/.

Nelson, Michael. 2012b. “An Uncompromising Connection Between Practical Reason and Morality.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume II, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 152–179. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662951.001.0001.

Nelson, Michael. 2012c. “Intensional Contexts.” in The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Manuel Garcı́a-Carpintero and Max Kölbel, pp. 125–152. London: Bloomsbury Academic. Second edition: Garcı́a-Carpintero and Kölbel (2014).

Nelson, Michael. 2013. “Contingently Existing Propositions.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43(5–6): 776–803.

Nelson, Michael. 2015. “Eternalist Tensism.” Inquiry 58(6): 590–605.

Nelson, Michael. 2019. “Propositional Attitude Reports.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/prop-attitude-reports/.

Nelson, Michael. 2020. “Existence.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/existence/.

Nelson, Michael. 2021. “The Case(s) against Descriptivism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference, edited by Stephen Biggs and Heimir Geirsson, pp. 73–81. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Nelson, Michael and Zalta, Edward N. 2009. “Bennett and ‘Proxy Actualism’ .” Philosophical Studies 142(2): 277–292.

Nelson, Michael and Zalta, Edward N. 2012. “A Defense of Contingent Logical Truths.” Philosophical Studies 157(1): 153–162.

Further References

Stalnaker, Robert C. 2003. Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251487.001.0001.