Niko Kolodny

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Cité.e dans les articles suivants

When is Jealousy Appropriate? An Analysis of Fink's Argument in Favour of Normative Process-Requirements The Mental States First Theory of Promising Assumptions, Hypotheses, and Antecedents Consistency, Obligations, and Accuracy-Dominance Vindications

Bibliography

Bridges, Jason and Kolodny, Niko. 2012. “Introduction: The Quest to Understand Philosophy.” in The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding. Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud, edited by Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-hung Wong, pp. 3–14. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381658.001.0001.

Bridges, Jason, Kolodny, Niko and Wong, Wai-hung, eds. 2012. The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding. Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195381658.001.0001.

Kolodny, Niko. 2003. “Love as Valuing a Relationship.” The Philosophical Review 112(2): 135–189, doi:10.1215/00318108-112-2-135.

Kolodny, Niko. 2005a. “Why Be Rational?” Mind 114(455): 509–563, doi:10.1093/mind/fzi509.

Kolodny, Niko. 2005b. “Objectivity in Ethics.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kolodny, Niko. 2007a. “State or Process Requirements?” Mind 116(462): 371–385, doi:10.1093/mind/fzm371.

Kolodny, Niko. 2007b. “How Does Coherence Matter?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107: 229–263, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00220.x.

Kolodny, Niko. 2008. “The Myth of Practical Consistency.” European Journal of Philosophy 16(3): 366–402.

Kolodny, Niko. 2009. “Reply to Bridges (2009).” Mind 118(470): 369–376.

Kolodny, Niko. 2010. “The Explanation of Amour-Propre.” The Philosophical Review 119(2): 165–200.

Kolodny, Niko. 2011a. “Scanlon’s Investigation: The Relevance of Intent to Permissibility.” Analytic Philosophy 52(2): 100–123.

Kolodny, Niko. 2011b. “Aims as Reasons.” in Reasons and Recognition. Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon, edited by Richard Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman, pp. 43–78. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199753673.001.0001.

Kolodny, Niko. 2016. “Political Rule and Its Discontents.” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, volume II, edited by David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall, pp. 35–70. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198759621.001.0001.

Kolodny, Niko. 2017. “What Makes Threats Wrong?” Analytic Philosophy 58(2): 87–118.

Kolodny, Niko. 2018. “Instrumental Reasons.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 731–763. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.

Kolodny, Niko and Brunero, John. 2013. “Instrumental Rationality.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/rationality-instrumental/.

Kolodny, Niko and Brunero, John. 2023. “Instrumental Rationality.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/rationality-instrumental/.

Kolodny, Niko and MacFarlane, John. 2010. “Ifs and Oughts.” The Journal of Philosophy 107(3): 115–143, doi:10.5840/jphil2010107310.

Kolodny, Niko and Wallace, Richard Jay. 2003. “Promises and Practices Revisited.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31(2): 119–154, doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2003.00119.x.

Further References

Bridges, Jason. 2009. “Rationality, Normativity, and Transparency.” Mind 118(470): 353–367.