Mark Kaplan (kaplan-m)

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Kaplan, Mark. 1983. “Practical and Scientific Rationality: A Bayesian Perspective on Levi’s Difficulty.” Synthese 57: 277–282.
Kaplan, Mark. 1985. “It’s Not What You Know That Counts.” The Journal of Philosophy 82(7): 350–363.
Kaplan, Mark. 1990. “Confessions of a Modest Bayesian.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20(suppl. 16): 315–337.
Kaplan, Mark. 1993. “Not by the Book.” Philosophical Topics 21(1): 153–171.
Kaplan, Mark. 1994. “Epistemology Denatured.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19: Philosophical Naturalism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 350–361. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Kaplan, Mark. 1995. “Believing the Improbable.” Philosophical Studies 77(1): 117–146.
Kaplan, Mark. 1996a. Decision Theory as Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kaplan, Mark. 1996b. “Skepticism and Pyrotechnics.” Acta Analytica 11(16–17): 157–169.
Kaplan, Mark. 2000. “To What Must an Epistemology Be True?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61(2): 279–304.
Kaplan, Mark. 2002. “Decision Theory and Epistemology.” in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, edited by Paul K. Moser, pp. 434–462. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195130057.001.0001.
Kaplan, Mark. 2006a. “If You Know, You Can’t Be Wrong.” in Epistemology Futures, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 180–198. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199273317.001.0001.
Kaplan, Mark. 2006b. “Deciding What You Know.” in Knowledge and Inquiry. Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, edited by Erik J. Olsson, pp. 225–240. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kaplan, Mark. 2008. “Austin’s Way with Skepticism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, edited by John Greco, pp. 348–371. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001.
Kaplan, Mark. 2009. “Williamson’s Casual Approach to Probabilism.” in Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 122–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.001.0001.
Kaplan, Mark. 2011. “John Langshaw Austin.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 798–810. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Kaplan, Mark. 2018. Austin’s Way with Skepticism. An Essay on Philosophical Method. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198824855.001.0001.