Gabriel M.A. Segal (segal-g)

Contributi a Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Block, Ned and Segal, Gabriel M. A. 1998. “The Philosophy of Psychology.” in Philosophy 2: Further through the Subject, edited by Anthony C. Grayling, pp. 1–71. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heather, Nick and Segal, Gabriel M. A., eds. 2016. Addiction and Choice: Rethinking the Relationship. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kotátko, Petr, Pagin, Peter and Segal, Gabriel M. A., eds. 2001. Interpreting Davidson. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Larson, Richard K. and Segal, Gabriel M. A. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Ludlow, Peter J. and Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2004. “On a Unitary Semantical Analysis for Definite and Indefinite Descriptions.” in Descriptions and Beyond, edited by Marga Reimer and Anne L. Bezuidenhout, pp. 420–435. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rothschild, Daniel and Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2009. “Indexical Predicates.” Mind and Language 24(4): 467–493.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 1989a. “Seeing What Is Not There.” The Philosophical Review 98: 189–214.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 1989b. “The Return of the Individual.” Mind 98(389): 39–57.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 1991a. “In the Mood for a Semantic Theory.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91: 103–118.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 1991b. “Defense of a Reasonable Individualism.” Mind 100: 485–494.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 1994. “Priorities in the Philosophy of Thought.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 68: 107–130.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 1995. “Truth and Sense.” in Frege, Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later, edited by John I. Biro and Petr Kotátko, pp. 15–24. Philosophical Studies Series n. 65. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 1996. “The Modularity of Theory of Mind.” in Theories of Theories of Mind, edited by Peter Carruthers and Peter K. Smith, pp. 141–157. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 1998. “Representing Representations.” in Language and Thought. Interdisciplinary Themes, edited by Peter Carruthers and Jill Boucher, pp. 146–161. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 1999. “How a Truth Theory Can Do Duty as a Theory of Meaning.” in Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning, and Knowledge, edited by Urszula M. Żegleń, pp. 54–52. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy n. 2. London: Routledge.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2000a. A Slim Book about Narrow Content. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2000b. “Four Arguments for the Indeterminacy of Translation.” in Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine, edited by Alex Orenstein and Petr Kotátko, pp. 131–140. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 210. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2002. “Two Theories of Names.” in Logic, Thought and Language, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 75–93. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2003. “Ignorance of Meaning.” in Epistemology of Language, edited by Alex Barber, pp. 415–430. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2004. “Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions and Unicorns.” in The Externalist Challenge, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 329–345. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 2. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110915273.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2005. “Intentionality.” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Frank Jackson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 283–309. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.001.0001.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2006. “Truth and Meaning.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest LePore and Barry C. Smith, pp. 189–212. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.001.0001.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2007. “Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions.” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, pp. 5–19. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 8. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. second edition: McLaughlin and Cohen (2023).
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2009. “Narrow Content.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 367–380. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2012. “Five Flies in the Ointment: Some Challenges for Traditional Semantic Theory.” in Prospects for Meaning, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 287–309. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 3. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2016a. “How an Addict’s Power of Choice is Lost and can be Regained.” in Addiction and Choice: Rethinking the Relationship, edited by Nick Heather and Gabriel M. A. Segal, pp. 365–384. New York: Oxford University Press.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. 2016b. “Ambiguous Terms and False Dichotomies.” in Addiction and Choice: Rethinking the Relationship, edited by Nick Heather and Gabriel M. A. Segal, pp. 449–462. New York: Oxford University Press.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. and Sober, Elliott R. 1991. “The Causal Efficacy of Content.” Philosophical Studies 63: 1–30.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. and Speas, Margaret. 1986. “On Saying ‘that’ .” Mind and Language 1(1): 124–132.
Segal, Gabriel M. A. and Textor, Mark. 2015. “Hope as a Primitive Mental State.” Ratio 28(2): 207–222.