Jennifer Nagel

Auf folgenden Portalseiten erwähnt

Zitiert in den folgenden Artikeln

Avner Baz's Ordinary Language Challenge to the Philosophical Method of Cases

Bibliography

Boyd, Kenneth and Nagel, Jennifer. 2014. “The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions.” in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, edited by Edouard Machery and Elizabeth O’Neill, pp. 109–127. Current Controversies in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2005. “Contemporary Skepticism and the Cartesian God.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35(3).

Nagel, Jennifer. 2007. “Epistemic Intuitions.” Philosophy Compass 2(6): 792–819, doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00104.x.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2008. “Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(2): 279–294.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2010a. “Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking about Error.” The Philosophical Quarterly 60(239): 286–306.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2010b. “Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 24: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 407–435. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2011. “The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox.” Philosophers' imprint 11(5).

Nagel, Jennifer. 2012a. “Gendler on Alief.” Analysis 72(4): 774–788.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2012b. “Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases.” in Knowledge Ascriptions, edited by Jessica A. Brown and Mikkel Gerken, pp. 171–191. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693702.001.0001.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2012c. “Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85(3): 495–527, doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00634.x.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2013a. “Knowledge as a Mental State.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume IV, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 273–308. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.001.0001.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2013b. “Motivating Williamson’s Model Gettier Cases [on Williamson (2013)].” Inquiry 56(1): 54–62.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2014a. Knowledge. A Very Short Introduction. Very Short Introductions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2014b. “Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 88: 219–241.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2015. “The Social Value of Reasoning in Epistemic Justification.” Episteme 12(2): 297–308.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2016a. “Knowledge and Reliability.” in Goldman and His Critics, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith, pp. 237–258. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Nagel, Jennifer. 2016b. “Sensitive Knowledge: Locke on Skepticism and Sensation.” in A Companion to Locke, edited by Matthew Stuart, pp. 313–333. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118328705.

Nagel, Jennifer and Smith, Julia Jael. 2017. “The Psychological Context of Contextualism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, pp. 94–104. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.

Further References

Williamson, Timothy. 2013. “Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.” Inquiry 56(1): 1–14.