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Peter J.R. Millican (millican)

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Bibliography

    Clark, Andy and Millican, Peter J. R., eds. 1996. Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology. The Legacy of Alan Turing, Volume 2. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 1990. Content, Thoughts, and Definite Descriptions.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 64: 167–203.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 1993. Statements and Modality: Strawson, Quine and Wolfram.” International Journal of Moral and Social Sciences 8: 315–326.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 1996. Introduction.” in Machines and Thought. The Legacy of Alan Turing, Volume 1, edited by Peter J. R. Millican and Andy Clark, pp. 1–10. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 1998. Hume on Reason and Induction: Epistemology or Cognitive Science? [on Garrett (1997)].” Hume Studies 24(1): 141–159.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 2007a. Ontological Arguments and the Superiority of Existence: Reply to Nagasawa (2007).” Mind 116(464): 1041–1054.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 2007b. Humes Old and New: Four Fashionable Falsehoods, and One Unfashionable Truth.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 81: 163–199.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 2009. Hume, Causal Realism, and Causal Science.” Mind 118(471): 647–712.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 2011a. Twenty Questions about Hume’s ‘Of Miracles’ .” in Philosophy and Religion, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 151–192. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 2011b. Hume, Causal Realism, and Free Will.” in Causation and Modern Philosophy, edited by Keith Allen and Tom Stoneham, pp. 123–165. London: Routledge.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 2012. Hume’s ‘Scepticism’ about Induction.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Hume, edited by Alan Bailey and Dan O’Brien, pp. 57–103. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 2015. Locke on Substance and Our Ideas of Substances.” in Locke and Leibniz on Substance, edited by Paul Lodge and Tom Stoneham, pp. 8–27. Routledge Studies in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy n. 14. London: Routledge.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 2016. Hume’s Chief Argument.” in The Oxford Handbook of Hume, edited by Paul Russell, pp. 82–108. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199742844.001.0001.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 2017. Defending the Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: One Author’s Reply to Abram (2016), Heim (2016), Łukasiewicz (2017), Moser (2017), (oppy:2016b?), Salamon (2017), Senor (2016), Taliaferro and Porot (2016).” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9(3): 81–106.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 2020. The Relation between Hume’s Two Enquiries.” in Reading Hume on the Principles of Morals, edited by Jacqueline Taylor, pp. 273–299. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Millican, Peter J. R. 2021. Hume on Modality.” in The Routledge Handbook of Modality, edited by Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, pp. 364–377. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
    Millican, Peter J. R. and Clark, Andy, eds. 1996. Machines and Thought. The Legacy of Alan Turing, Volume 1. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Thornhill-Miller, Branden and Millican, Peter J. R. 2015. The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean Thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7(1): 1–49.

Further References

    Abram, Anna. 2016. ‘The Maxim of the Moon’ and the Lived Experience of Religious Belief: An Ethical Revision of Thornhill-Miller’s & Millican’s Second Order Religion [on Thornhill-Miller and Millican (2015)].” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8(1): 239–250.
    Garrett, Don. 1997. Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780195097214.001.0001.
    Heim, S. Mark. 2016. Diverse Religious Experiences and First Order Religious Beliefs: A Response to Thornhill-Miller and Millican (2015) and Salamon (2015).” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8(3): 237–255.
    Łukasiewicz, Dariusz. 2017. Agathological Rationalism and First-Order Religions.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9(2): 223–229.
    Moser, Paul K. 2017. First-Order Theistic Religion: Intentional Power Beyond Belief.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9(3): 31–48.
    Nagasawa, Yujin. 2007. Millican on the Ontological Argument.” Mind 116(464): 1027–1040.
    Salamon, Janusz. 2015. Atheism and Agatheism in the Global Ethical Discourse: Reply to Thornhill-Miller and Millican (2015).” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7(4): 197–245.
    Salamon, Janusz. 2017. In Defence of Agatheism: Clarifying a Godcentred Interpretation of Religious Pluralism.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9(3): 115–138.
    Senor, Thomas D. 2016. Common Core / Diversity Dilemma, Agatheism and the Epistemology of Religious Belief.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8(4): 213–226.
    Taliaferro, R. Charles and Porot, Christophe. 2016. A Defense of First[-] and Second-Order Theism: The Limits of Empirical Inquiry and the Rationality of Religious Belief.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8(3): 213–235.