Daniel C. Burnston (burnston)

Adresse email : dburnsto(at)tulane.edu

Mentionné.e sur les pages du portail suivantes

Articles of Dialectica, Mixtures and Mass Terms, An Analysis of Fink's Argument in Favour of Normative Process-Requirements, The Dis-Unity of Humean Space, Boghossian, Bellarmine, and Galileo, Perspectivity and Rationality of Perception

Cité.e dans les articles suivants

Perceptual Learning, Categorical Perception, and Cognitive Permeation

Contributions à Philosophie.ch

Perceptual Learning, Categorical Perception, and Cognitive Permeation

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Bibliography

Burnston, Daniel C. 2016. “Computational Neuroscience and Localized Neural Function.” Synthese 193(12): 3741–3762.

Burnston, Daniel C. 2017a. “Cognitive Penetration and the Cognition-Perception Interface.” Synthese 194(9): 3645–3668, doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1116-y.

Burnston, Daniel C. 2017b. “Is Aesthetic Experience Evidence for Cognitive Permeation?” New Ideas in Psychology 47: 145–156, doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2017.03.012.

Burnston, Daniel C. 2020. “Fodor on Imagistic Mental Representation.” Rivista internazionale di filosofia e psicologia 11(1): 71–94, doi:10.4453/rifp.2020.0004.

Burnston, Daniel C. 2021. “Perceptual Learning, Categorical Perception, and Cognitive Permeation.” Dialectica 75(1), doi:10.48106/dial.v75.i1.03.

Burnston, Daniel C. 2023. “How to Think about Higher-Level Perceptual Contents.” Mind and Language 38(1): 1166–1186, doi:10.1111/mila.12446.

Burnston, Daniel C. and Cohen, Jonathan. 2015. “Perceptual Integration, Modularity, and Cognitive Penetration.” in The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by John Zeimbekis and Athanassios Raftopoulos, pp. 123–143. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738916.003.0005.