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Gerard O'Brien

Bibliography

    O’Brien, Gerard. 1987. “Eliminative Materialism and our Psychological Self-Knowledge.” Philosophical Studies 52: 49–70.
    O’Brien, Gerard. 1991. “Is Connectionism Commonsense?” Philosophical Psychology 4: 165–178.
    O’Brien, Gerard. 1993a. “A Conflation of Folk Psychologies.” in Prospects for Intentionality, edited by Karen Neander and Ian Ravenscroft. Working Papers in Philosophy n. 3. Canberra: RSSS Australasian National University.
    O’Brien, Gerard. 1993b. “The Connectionist Vindication of Folk Psychology.” in Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Scott M. Christensen and Dale R. Turner, pp. 368–387. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
    O’Brien, Gerard. 1999. “Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content [on Horgan and Tienson (1996)].” Acta Analytica 13(22).
    O’Brien, Gerard. 2015. “How Does Mind Matter? Solving the Content Causation Problem.” in Open MIND, edited by Thomas Metzinger and Jennifer M. Windt. Frankfurt a.M.: MIND Group, Philosophisches Seminar der Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz.
    O’Brien, Gerard and Opie, Jonathan. 1997. “Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It.” Philosophical Psychology 10: 269–286.
    O’Brien, Gerard and Opie, Jonathan. 1998. “The Disunity of Consciousness.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76: 378–395.
    O’Brien, Gerard and Opie, Jonathan. 1999a. “A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20(1): 127–148.
    O’Brien, Gerard and Opie, Jonathan. 1999b. “A Defense of Cartesian Materialism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59(4): 939–963.
    O’Brien, Gerard and Opie, Jonathan. 2000. “Disunity Defended: A Reply to Bayne (2000).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78: 255–263.
    O’Brien, Gerard and Opie, Jonathan. 2015. “Intentionality Lite or Analog Content? [on Hutto and Satne (2015)].” Philosophia 43(3): 723–729.

Further References

    Bayne, Tim[othy John]. 2000. “The Unity of Consciousness: Clarification and Defence.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78: 248–254.
    Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L. 1996. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    Hutto, Daniel D. and Satne, Glenda. 2015. “The Natural Origins of Content.” Philosophia 43(3): 521–536.