Nathaniel Sharadin

Sharadin, Nathaniel. 2015a. “Reasons and Promotion.” in Philosophical Issues 25: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 98–122. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.

Sharadin, Nathaniel. 2015b. “Problems for Pure Probabilism about Promotion (and a Disjunctive Alternative).” Philosophical Studies 172(5): 1371–1386.

Sharadin, Nathaniel. 2015c. “How You Can Reasonably Form Expectations When You’re Expecting [on Paul (2015)].” Res Philosophica 92(2): 441–452.

Sharadin, Nathaniel. 2016a. “Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94(2): 343–361.

Sharadin, Nathaniel. 2016b. “Reasons Wrong and Right.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97: 371–399.

Sharadin, Nathaniel. 2017. “A Partial Defense of Permissivism.” Ratio 30(1): 57–71.

Sharadin, Nathaniel. 2018. “Epistemic Consequentialism: Haters Gonna Hate.” in Metaepistemology. Realism and Anti-Realism, edited by Christos Kyriacou and Robin McKenna, pp. 121–144. Innovations in Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Paul, Laurie A. 2015. Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717959.001.0001.