José M. Méndez (mendez-jm)
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Bibliography
Méndez, José M. 1986. “Una crı́tica inmanente de la lógica de la relevancia.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 18(52): 61–94.
Méndez, José M. 1987. “A Routley-Meyer Semantics for Converse Ackermann Property.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 16(1): 65–76.
Méndez, José M. 1988a. “A Note on the Semantics of Minimal Intuitionism.” Logique et Analyse 31(123–124): 371–377.
Méndez, José M. 1988b. “The Compatibility of Relevance and Mingle.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 17(3): 279–297.
Méndez, José M. 2009. “A Routley-Meyer Semantics for Ackermann’s Logics of ‘Strenge Impli[k]ation’ .” Logic and Logical Philosophy 18(3/4): 191–219.
Méndez, José M., Robles, Gemma and Salto, Francisco. 2011. “Adding the Disjunctive Syllogism to Relevant Logics Including TW plus the Contraction and Reductio Rules.” Logique et Analyse 54(215): 343–358.
Méndez, José M., Robles, Gemma and Salto, Francisco. 2015. “Brady’s Deep Relevant Logic Dr Plus the Qualified Factorization Principles has the Depth Relevant Condition.” Logique et Analyse 58(232): 547–565.
Méndez, José M., Robles, Gemma and Salto, Francisco. 2016. “An Interpretation of Łukasiewicz’s 4-Valued Modal Logic.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 45(1): 73–87.
Méndez, José M. and Salto, Francisco. 1998. “A Natural Negation Completion of Urquhart’s Many-Valued Logic C.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 27(1): 75–84.
Méndez, José M., Salto, Francisco and Méndez, R. Pedro. 2002. “Four Kinds of Subminimal Negation within the Context of the Basic Positive Logic B+.” Logique et Analyse 45(177–178): 119–128.
Robles, Gemma and Méndez, José M. 2005. “Constructive Negation Defined with a Falsity Constant for Positive Logics with the Cap Defined with a Truth Constant.” Logique et Analyse 48(189–192): 87–100.