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About

The *Journal of Didactics of Philosophy* is a peer-reviewed academic journal devoted to research on the teaching and learning of philosophy. It is published online twice a year. The access to all articles is free. Articles may be about any level of education. However, the main focus is on high school philosophy. We welcome work with a philosophical or normative approach as well as reports of results from empirical qualitative and quantitative research. The journal also publishes reviews of books, textbooks and other educational material of international interest as well as country reports. These reports present information about ways of teaching philosophy, its institutions and activities in different countries. It is an aim of the journal to promote the dialogue among researchers and practicing teachers across the world.

Call for Papers

www.philosophie.ch/jdph

- Volume 6 1/2022 -

We are issuing an open call for contributions. If you would like your article, country report or book review to be published in the next issue (March 2022; Volume 6, Number 1/2022), please follow the instructions on the website. Your text should reach one of the editors no later than 25th of January 2022 (but manuscripts are also welcome at any time).

Jonas Pfister – pfister.jonas@gmail.com
Philipp Richter – philipp.th.richter@gmail.com
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Dear readers!

The measures taken by states around the world against the further spread of the COVID-19 pandemic led to an acceleration of the digital transformation of education including philosophy education. For sure, the transformation was already taking place, as could be seen from the use of online resources by teachers in their classes as well as by students at home, especially educational videos. We take this opportunity to point out the excellent learning videos of the site Wireless Philosophy founded by Gaurav Vazirani in 2013 (https://www.wi-phi.com/). These videos combine the philosophical expertise of faculty members with the skills of designers, animators, illustrators, and developers. Learning videos and other online resources are of invaluable help to philosophy education both inside the setting of the schools as well as far beyond. However, the digital transformation is much more than that, as we all knew already some years ago, or anyhow have come to know during these past one and a half year of online teaching. It includes video calls, break-out rooms, virtual classrooms, social networking websites, and many more (and more to come). The effects on education are deep if not revolutionary. And it raises many didactical questions. Therefore, one year ago, we issued a call for articles about the broad topic of philosophy education and digital transformation. We received several submissions, and we welcome more in the future as we are convinced of the long-lasting impacts of the digital transformation.

In their contribution to this issue, Andreas Brenneis and Sonja Daum inquire how the dialogical aspect of teaching philosophy can be taken care of in online teaching. They present the conception of an online university course and report their experiences with it. From these experiences, they conclude that “digital environments are suitable for dialogical forms of doing philosophy”. As opposed to this, Peter Volek argues in his article against the view that philosophy teaching on the secondary level can entirely be done online without taking into account massive negative psychological effects on the students. It is possible that part of the seeming contradiction between the two views may be traced back to the different levels, university level, and secondary schools. However, the pedagogical debate is to be continued.

The third research article in this issue is a collaborative work by Anne Burkard, Henning Franzen, David Löwenstein, Donata Romizi and Annett Wienmeister that emerged from the scientific network Argumentieren in der Schule (Argumentation in Secondary Schools) funded by the DFG. The authors develop a framework for fostering argumentative skills systematically in philosophy and ethics classes in secondary schools. They call it the spiral-curricular model meaning that the argumentative abilities need to be analyzed into particular skills that can be acquired, practiced, and reflected upon.

In the country report section, two contributions refer to previous reports in this Journal. They each complement the previous report in their own way. Griet Galle reports about philosophy education in the Flemish Community in Belgium and thereby completes the previous report on French-speaking Belgium (Herla 2020) by the Flemish Community. Daryl Ooi starts from the previous report on the situation in Singapore (Burik et al. 2020) and argues that there are
reasons, based on recent developments, to be optimistic about philosophy education in Singapore.

We are very happy to be able to publish once again a small collection of diverse research articles and country reports and are looking forward to the next issue.

Finally, we would like to thank Kira Lewandowski (Bochum) for proofreading the whole manuscript of this issue.

We wish you good reading!

October 2021

The Editors
PHILOSOPHIZING DIALOGICALLY IN AN E-LEARNING SETUP

Andreas Brenneis, Sonja N. K. Daum
Technical University Darmstadt
andreas.brenneis@tu-darmstadt.de, sonja.daum@outlook.de

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Abstract

This article shows how digital teaching can be implemented in the subjects of ethics and philosophy. Philosophizing as a multifaceted dialogical process comes with specific challenges. We focus on teaching formats in digital-only situations and explore the question of how teaching will be impacted by virtual seminars. Based on this, the e-learning seminar developed in the winter semester 2020/2021 that serves as the introduction to didactics of philosophy and its philosophical problems will be presented, focusing on the specific advantages of the digital format for dialogical philosophizing.

Keywords: digital didactics, e-learning, dialogue, philosophizing

1. Characteristics and challenges of teaching philosophy: the concept of dialogue

A didactical concept is probably best characterized by its aims and methods. In this article, we want to present a seminar conception that we developed to implement dialogical forms of doing philosophy in a remote way as a reaction to the COVID-19 crisis. We first present a general understanding of doing and teaching philosophy as dialogical and then show, how we achieved to foster this form of dialogical philosophy in an online seminar. We want to argue, that the setup of our seminar helped our students to do philosophy, or in other words, philosophize about central principles concerning the profession of didactics. However, we do not claim that the concept is fully developed yet. We rather see this article as an invitation to a dialogue about the question, how digital environments can be used to do philosophy. The idea of doing philosophy as a process is central to us because classrooms as well as seminars are environments where collective and collaborative learning takes place. In the following sections, we argue that this kind of learning can be described as one form of dialogue, and we suggest some means on how to implement various ways of dialogue in an online setting.

In contrast to other university disciplines like engineering or the natural sciences and in contrast to teaching history of philosophy, we see knowledge transfer not as the primary aim in philosophical seminars. Knowledge is rather a vehicle for students to acquire the relevant attitudes and practices, which together constitute the process of doing philosophy. In this line of reasoning, we understand philosophy as a process in which participation is achieved by active reasoning in the realm of thoughts and arguments. Therefore, students should learn to orient themselves in processes of thinking. Part of this orientation process is to realize that the formulation of problems is the starting point of philosophical thinking and its ambiguities: “A philosophical problem has
the form: ‘I don’t know my way out’.” (Wittgenstein 1997: 49). Being involved or being trapped in a philosophical problem can lead to a feeling of astonishment, in which the need for reasoning starts: “[W]ondering in the first place at obvious perplexities” (Aristotle, 982b) means to be astonished about the boundaries and lack of one’s own knowledge. This astonishment is the starting point of the philosophical working process which begins with the formulation of a philosophical problem. This formulation is the first step in gaining theoretical insights, it opens the space and marks the corridor where conflicting concepts and arguments can be found. Doing philosophy means “thinking about [...] thinking about the world. Such results as there are, then, do not take the form of new facts but rather, at best, consist in a new clarity about what are and what aren’t the old facts, and about their modes of legitimization.” (Rosenberg 1996: 7) Not only the world can be the object of consideration, but also the process of cognition itself (“thinking about thinking”). To bring this basic understanding of the process of doing philosophy together: Practicing philosophy is based on uncertainty (Wittgenstein) and wondering (Aristotle) and constitutes itself by pondering on controversial arguments („thinking about the world”). Our first point is to argue that in this process, philosophy is inherently dialogical, and that this negotiation process can lead to the formation of a conclusion. Doing philosophy means to ponder about the world in the space of reasons (Brandom 2000). The negotiation process, i.e., the pondering and judging of reasons, can take place as an inner dialogue (monologue), in discussion with others (dialogue) or in the examination or production of philosophical texts (dialogical reading). In didactics of philosophy, all three possibilities have been discussed as a form of dialogue.

Philosophy is characterized as the dialogical practice of a problem-oriented process of understanding. (Martens 2019: 27). These dialogical negotiation processes then lead to “new clarity” and offer orientation in relation to the philosophical problem. Based on the three forms of dialogue several options arise for the arrangement of seminars. We can outline three corresponding ways to do philosophy:

1) In an argumentation with oneself, e.g., by reflecting own thoughts and following arguments to their very last consequences. Own attitudes must be reflected, and other perspectives should be taken to start a philosophical thinking process and proving own thoughts (verbalized or recorded in written form).

2) In an examination of written text (or other forms like podcasts), read dialogically. That means to question arguments and bring them in connection with arguments from other sources.

3) In confrontation with arguments and perspectives of other students and teaching staff.

These dialogical ways of philosophizing should not be confused with any form of trivial thinking, a normal conversation about any topic or simply reading literature. The process of philosophizing can be described as a hermeneutic spiral that never gets back to its starting point. Starting from own unreflected opinions, philosophical problems show up in confrontation with dialogue partners resulting in the dialogue taking the form of arguing about the problem, reformulating arguments, problematizing other perspectives, and pondering about the topics or formulating new philosophical problems. Subsequently, a long negotiation process takes place. The order of the
dialogue partners is not static but follows the inherent logic of the philosophical problem. It is possible that, for example, literature can offer a philosophical problem while being part of the solution or that in a different situation the consultation of literature is unnecessary.

To be clear: philosophical dialogue doesn’t mean mere interaction. Interaction as a social concept can be part of a philosophical dialogue, e.g., in confrontation with arguments of other students. But not every kind of interaction is a philosophical dialogue. It is more than just exchange. It is about developing and arguing philosophical questions. The character of the questions and the whole dialogue is not arbitrary. Dialogically reading and the dialogue with oneself should not be understood as unilateral. Questioning arguments about their suitability is a process of thinking. To understand a question and its possible solution as a mere list of thoughts is not enough. Instead, a coherent argumentation built on autonomous thinking is the aim. Philosophizing in the form of a dialogue takes place in the head of the person.

The dialogical character of doing philosophy creates multi-perspectivity and intrinsic motivation (astonishment) and promotes conducive learning conditions. In the following, we describe how the principles of doing philosophy dialogically can be implemented in fully digital courses.

The purpose of the course we present in this paper is to introduce didactics in the subjects of Ethics and Philosophy by focusing on philosophical problems. In a didactical double function, the seminar teaches the students basic concepts on how to do philosophy and aims at qualifying them to lead groups in doing philosophy themselves. The seminar is designed according to the principle of the Pädagogischer Doppeldecker (Wahl 2013) (pedagogical double-decker): The arrangement and presentation transfers topics from didactical theory into hands-on experience – for example, the central principle of focus on philosophical problems is discussed theoretically and then taken up with several tasks to formulate problems suitable for different groups. This double-decker setup allows many ways of comparison and dialogue including intense active participation by the students. Not least, the concept of the seminar itself can be under permanent supervision by the students; as teaching staff, we encourage discussions about it, as students are involved in the core problem of the course, namely the question of how to support learners in doing philosophy.

In order to promote discussions that improve the students’ own thinking, we create an environment in which all the students are initially accepted as independent, critical, and creative. This means getting in touch with different ways of thinking and examining if they are useful for their own (future) teaching practice. The hierarchy is supposed to be flat in discussions between teachers and learners to establish a level playing field between (prospective) colleagues with their different experiences, perspectives, levels of knowledge, and competencies. Stammering and struggling with own and external arguments, as well as “mistakes” can be productively used to make the philosophical problem clearer. According to this conception, students gain competencies (in doing philosophy and in teaching it) by dealing with questions and justifications for attempted solutions intersubjectively. A discussion like this is productive when most of the group are involved and participate in the different types of dialogue – in other words, when they commit to doing philosophy, in this case: together.

To achieve a sense of involvement, the seminar is referring to the student’s lifeworld in at least two dimensions: Students can reflect on the didactical frameworks of our seminar and other
philosophical seminars at their department. Furthermore, and in general, the prospective teachers are keen to find ways for their individual teaching of philosophy and ethics in their future careers. Thus, questions about how doing philosophy can be taught are central to the students. The individual experiences they have gained on these topics so far were usually not confronted with arguments from the didactics of philosophy. Therefore, we try to frame the seminar as a space, where they can apply a theoretical perspective on their own experiences.

If the seminar takes place in a non-digital way, these perspectives create lively discussions, in which individual experiences are compared with and enriched by suggestions from experts (e.g. literature). Most students have practical experience from their educational background (classes in ethics or philosophy at school) or school internships. Moreover, they can apply certain principles that are central to didactics of philosophy (focus on philosophical problems, developing competences, formation of judgements) to other seminars or lectures. Two inspiring factors intertwine, so that the practical relevance becomes tangible: On one hand, students can contrast arguments with their experiences. On the other hand, implications, benefits, and restrictions of theory manifest when students have to develop their own teaching concepts.

To achieve this intertwining of didactical theory and practice in an online-only seminar we propose a concept that focuses on digital collaboration. Based on the assumption that doing philosophy happens best by dialogue, which fosters autonomous thinking and lively discussions, we based the design of the seminar on several dialogical forms. Dialogues motivate participation and the general dialogical setup of the seminar provides the chance for the students to regulate their own learning process.

2. E-Learning-Concept: A Learning Management System with Workshops

The seminar’s basis is an online-only learning concept with two central elements that we implemented for the sake of teaching online after our university was closed due to pandemic restrictions. The first element is an extensively prepared classroom in Moodle (our university’s learning management system) which contains all information, learning materials, exercises, assessments, and several options for feedback. The online classroom serves as the centerpiece of the whole course by structuring communication, providing topics, literature, and assessments, documenting learning processes and feedback. It works as a guideline, reader, calendar, a place for interaction, portfolio for exams, and corresponding ratings. To boost orientation and motivation we implemented an attractive design concept using modern photography. Another asset for students working remotely is that Moodle is fit for working on mobile devices as well.

One major benefit is that the digital classroom allows for asynchronous learning: Students can work on the material provided and on the individual tasks in timeframes they set for themselves. Instead of replicating the number of weeks of the seminar, we present the content of the course in five thematically consecutive modules. The first module introduces the students to the setup of the classroom and the last one is an optional module with an additional topic. The introductory module and the three central modules correspond with live online meetings (that take place a couple of weeks apart from each other; live meetings will be discussed in detail in the following sections), of which the first has the main purpose to connect the group. For the last module, optional material is provided, and an assignment is offered so that missing points can be acquired to complete the
The asynchronous setup allows internal differentiation as it gives students the flexibility to work on literature and assignments at their own pace allowing flexible time management. Not only the timeframe is individually plannable, but also the level of difficulty can be chosen by the students. (More on this in the following parts).

The periods of self-organized (yet supervised) engagement with the seminar content are accompanied by collaborative (i.e.: highly dialogical) working sessions in the live meetings – the second central element. Here we transform topics from the theory concerned with didactics of philosophy to tasks that deal with practical challenges about the process of teaching philosophy in the classroom. This underlines the workshop character of the live meetings, which last five hours each, and where work results are presented and evaluated, questions discussed, and transfers made.

From a teacher’s point of view, live meetings fulfil the purpose to synchronize the learning processes of the students. This idea is based on Rolf Sistermann’s model for planning philosophy classes, where wider and more narrow phases alternate (Sistermann 2016: 209). In the wider phases, the students work rather individually, while in the narrow phases the instructors focus on central learning outcomes and put their central messages forward. An example of this would be leading the students to formulate a philosophical problem accurately. This means that the philosophical problem is formulated clearly, leads to an argumentation concerning general coherences and not individual opinions. A philosophical problem is always normative and reflexive and does not exist because of empiric deficits (Richter 2016: 63–69). Focusing on these criteria narrows the phase and gives the students the optionality to widen it in the following by arguing about the problem. The individual preparation of the topics of the seminars as philosophical problems in the form of assignments (due before the meetings) helps the students to go right into discussions – which is very helpful, as the main goal of the meetings is dialogical exchange.

Because of the generous planning with five hours per live session, it is possible to also implement demanding forms of group work, which build on the individual preparations concerning didactical theory and transfer them into exercises relevant for teaching philosophy at school. In these group works, intermediate results can be elaborated, reflected upon, and deepened. The fact that work results are not only recited but rather presented via shared screens and with diverse media formats involved (etherpads, presentations, diagrams, and others), leads to profound feedback and sharpens the terminological work. This gives the working sessions a strong sense of purpose. The learning materials, live meetings, and assignments as well as the feedback are coordinated and related to each other in a variety of ways. The following graphic schematically presents the basic elements of the seminar in relation to each other.
3. Dialogical Modules introducing didactics of philosophy

This dialogical learning concept is the core of the introductory course to teaching – or, as we think fits better, doing – philosophy with students. The pedagogical double-decker is implicitly guiding the whole setup of the seminar: In accordance with didactics of philosophy, we think that dialogue is a crucial concept for doing philosophy and we therefore implement many occasions for practical forms of dialogue. To show this implementation of didactical concepts into the arrangement of the course, we briefly summarize the contents of the five modules:

With the first live-meeting we intend to facilitate the students to get to know each other in general with a special focus on their interest in teaching ethics and philosophy. To achieve lively and substantiated opinions we ask the students to complete an expectations survey consisting of questions about what they think makes good Philosophy/Ethics classes in school. They are asked to answer the question out of the perspective of parents, students, and from their own point of view. Following their own perspective, they are asked what they expect from the seminar and what they would like to discuss. Since we can evaluate the answers before the meeting, we can cluster topics and thereby moderate the discussion by contrasting the three perspectives of expectation. From the answers, we can deduce how we can modify and complement our syllabus to address the student’s interests. We use the meeting to discuss why some requirements do not fit into the course concept and how we can implement other wishes. This discussion on the seminar’s outset aims to create a sense of involvement for the topics and legitimizes a common starting point by contrasting Philosophy/Ethics lessons as a dialogue about philosophical questions with an understanding of the lessons as a merely entertaining alternative for religious education, moral upbringing or similar conceptions. As we try to implement a dialogical setup, we make clear that active participation in the form of philosophizing is the key requirement in the course. Moreover, we discuss revisions...
of the syllabus and explain the general idea of the seminar and its rating system. Most importantly, the aim of this initial meeting is to open a space for reasoning and argumentation because this (so we think) sets the bar for the next sessions.

There are two main questions in the second meeting, i.e., the first of three workshops that take five hours each: What are the didactics of philosophy about and why should philosophy be practiced in school? A discussion of this is built on individual experiences, education policy guidelines, and arguments from didactics of philosophy. But as the focus is on doing philosophy in a group, we focus more on arguments than on mere guidelines (which of course contain arguments as well). In preparation for the seminar, all students have to read an overview of didactical theory by Jonas Pfister and list the key ideas for four different approaches to the didactics of philosophy (Pfister 2014: 177–200). Additionally, we ask our students to pick at least one out of four of the approaches to prepare a profound evaluation of it for the live-meeting with the help of an anthology (Peters/Peters 2019) and some guiding questions. A major part of the live-meeting is dedicated to a multi-step discussion (think-pair-share) of the advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches and whether they are suitable for teaching philosophy to students. The jointly developed results are documented in etherpads in Moodle.

To offer a joint base for further discussion we moreover offer a comprehensive introduction to the benefits of teaching philosophy at school that presents two main arguments: Philosophy as basic cultural technique and as a principle of education (Martens 2010). We ask the students to prepare the text and retrace and discuss the line of argumentation in the live meeting. After the meeting, the students subsequently finish two more assignments: The first is to give a comparison of at least two of the four approaches to didactics of philosophy, the second consists of a reflection of the question of what the purpose of doing philosophy in school might be by reconstructing Martens line of argument. We emphasize that active preparation of and participation in the discussions about the underlying philosophical problems in the live-meeting reduce the effort to complete these tasks.

Problem-oriented teaching is one of the basic principles in the didactics of philosophy (Tiedemann 2013) and the focus of the third module. Like in the last module we start with different theoretical considerations about what makes a philosophical problem. Here we provide passages from Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, and Jay Rosenberg, of which the students again pick one to prepare for the live-meeting (Russell 2017; Schlick 2016; Rosenberg 2009). There we ask them to fill in “placemats” together in groups of six and thereby relate the different aspects presented by the authors to each other. Placemats serve as an interesting method as they allow for individual considerations on the one hand and ask for a collective position on the other. The placemats require dialogical exchange out of different perspectives about the guiding question and facilitate a judgement of the arguments.

Building on the deepened understanding of the several conditions that define philosophical problems, the second part of the workshop is about an approach from the didactics of philosophy that proposes solutions on how to implement philosophical problems in teaching philosophy in general (Thein 2017) and concerning the moral boundaries of art (Thein 2019) as an example for this. While the students prepare these texts in advance with an assignment, they serve as mere background knowledge in the workshop. Here they work in groups to develop concepts for a lesson
series dealing with a problem where aesthetics and ethics meet: “Is art allowed to do that?” With the material provided we encourage the students to develop their own lines of reasoning by picking relevant objects of art, formulating inherent philosophical problems, and designing tasks for the classroom. The group’s results are presented online and as everyone is engaged with the same set of questions and supposed to be active in the group’s discussion, a wide range of praising as well as critical contributions and ideas for improvement of the lesson series can be expressed. Here two content levels, that are part of different dialogues, intertwine. First, the philosophical problems themselves, which are the topic of the planned lessons. Second, the didactical questions of how to plan lessons which are problem-oriented. With this combination, the students get involved in an intense dialogue with theoretical approaches from didactics of philosophy.

The fourth and last of the mandatory modules is about the question, how philosophical skills can be developed in the classroom. It is a shift from the discipline’s objective content in the form of problems to the subjective ability to deal with those problems philosophically. On the meta-level, this can also contain philosophical problems, like what is meant by “competencies”, which has to be discussed at first. Then once again we offer different positions in the discussion of why and how philosophical competencies should be taught (Tichy 2016; Dietrich 2007; Rösch 2012). For the live-meeting these three positions have to be prepared with an assignment while we offer additional controversial perspectives that are voluntary. In the first part of the live-meeting we discuss the approaches to competencies from the didactical literature, while in the second part the students design a lesson that focuses on developing philosophical skills. In the groupwork, they have to argue for certain principles in enhancing philosophical competencies and need to pick a small set that they want to focus on while considering which tasks are useful to fulfil this purpose. In order to guide the groups’ discussions and to allow for some kind of comparability, we narrow the topic and demand that caricatures and deriving problems should play a role. This also invites a dialogue about the difference of planning a lesson on the boundaries of art from a problem-orientated or a competence-orientated point of view.

Because of the change of perspective, from receiving input from didactical literature to implementing it in their own concept, the students work with the arguments provided intensively and see how they work when applied to the practice of teaching philosophy. This leads to productive discussions when the groups present their concepts at the end of the workshop or when they individually reflect on the benefits and trade-offs of developing competencies in the assignment concluding the module.

An optional module is offered that deals with the principle of moral neutrality and how it guides teaching – especially in teaching ethics. With an additional assignment, students can acquire bonus points in case they did not collect enough in the four prior modules.

4. Aspects of an E-Learning Setup Supporting Philosophical Dialogues
In the following section, we highlight some aspects that we think functioned well in the course setup. We use the following e-learning tools and didactical concepts to support dialogical philosophizing which we break down and present one by one, but that are used to work together to achieve a philosophical dialogue:

(1) Consistent structure: All five modules have the same structure; the elements of each topic
are arranged according to their logical (and chronological) order. Students are linearly guided through a topic (from beginning to end) to give orientation. Due to the consistent and asynchronous structure, students can view the workload at any time and align their efforts during their self-study time accordingly. Every module begins with a video in which we give an overview, then we present and describe the learning materials together with the tasks that are due before the live sessions. A forum provides opportunities for exchange and discussion amongst students at any time while serving as a communication element for instructors (e.g., for reminder messages). In the middle of the modules, we have a section dedicated to the corresponding live meeting with a detailed plan that makes our goals and our planned methods transparent. Every module is concluded by a section with assignments that reflect central questions and learning outcomes.

(2) Introductory videos: As previously mentioned, each module starts with a video sequence presenting the central philosophical questions. Additionally, we explain the modules’ structure and specify central elements such as learning material and tasks. The videos also introduce us as teaching staff on a personal level and thus contribute to an open and appreciative atmosphere in the live meetings. Another advantage of using videos is the opportunity to watch them multiple times - which is especially helpful for comments on theoretical issues. By reducing the occasions of “live contact” to four longer sessions, we provide an easy way to give theoretical and organizational inputs and create a friendly atmosphere. The videos initiate dialogical work as we outline introductory theoretical perspectives on the topics. They also work as an invitation to ask questions in the forum or the live meetings.

(3) High transparency: The videos and introductory comments on the teaching materials result in a high level of transparency. In written explanations accompanying all materials (literature and assignments) we highlight important aspects (from our point of view), such as how the acquisition of competencies should take place in the seminar, and how the assignments are embedded in the general learning goals of the academic training. This helps students to orient themselves in their own learning process and can lead to a (quite worthwhile) discussion about the interaction between teaching and examination: As prospective teachers, students can reflect on the content of the seminar as well as the didactical setup. This also transforms the idea of doing philosophy dialogically into practice.

(4) Consecutive tasks: Before live-meetings take place, the students prepare the modules’ topic through tasks that focus on conceptual questions and have rather low requirements: Here, students are asked to summarize the main ideas of the literature, reconstruct arguments, or identify the connection between different theoretical positions. During the live meetings, students share and compare the results of their individual work and transfer these collaboratively into a teaching situation. Collectively working on an everyday life problem and transforming it into a concept for teaching philosophy (e.g., Christian Thein’s suggestion for a problem-oriented unit on the question to what extent art may cross lines – “Darf Kunst das?” (Thein 2019)) increases the motivation to discuss (according to our experiences with groupwork) especially when creative solutions are welcome. Each module closes with a rather open task based on the learning products of the live meeting. This helps to evaluate what has been learned and concludes the topics of the module with the formulation of their own reflection in the form of an individual and independent argumentation or judgement. What we see as a benefit of this setup is that the tasks build on each other and
together frame each module: They prepare the collaborative live-meetings and conclude them with individual tasks but keep a focus on practical questions of how to teach doing philosophy that are debated by the students in group works together. Through this arrangement of tasks, students develop a portfolio of their exploration of the seminar’s topics across different dialogues (dialogical reading, dialogue, monologue).

(5) Effective internal differentiation: The digital learning management system allows to emphasize that individual learning paths are possible within the course. For example, this can mean that (a) only one out of three texts dealing with the question characterizing philosophical problems will be prepared in advance, (b) that groups prepare different solutions to the same task in the live sessions (concluding assignments can be built based on the solutions of the groupwork) or (c) the (voluntary) consultation of ambitious additional literature is possible. Especially the tasks that conclude a module are open to different approaches (e.g., recapitulating, structuring, reflecting, or discussing what has been learned), which the students can choose. Due to the different competence levels, we can address all students in the course at the same time. Digital learning environments make it easy to implement internal differentiation when creating a course – and students can find their individual learning way. What we want to highlight is that one benefit of online learning platforms lies in the possibility to arrange more material than necessary, where students can choose and discuss aspects that interest them the most. Introductory descriptions to the literature can also help the students to estimate the level of difficulty and plan their workload due to their own estimation of their level of competencies. In some cases (especially when students with very high or low levels of involvement attract attention) we can provide personal hints that one of the learning paths will fit better than another. In the live-meetings the different learning pathways converge and are condensed and combined once again to the philosophical problem.

(6) Iterative feedback: The dialogical conception of the seminar allows to give feedback at crucial points (to the students, amongst each other, and about the didactical setup of the seminar). The students can evaluate their performance with the help of a rating system, or, more specifically, through points, they get for their assignments. Additional extensive written feedback (especially for the assignment following the live sessions, where students are asked to recapitulate their understanding of the module’s main topics) by the teachers helps pointing out individual strengths and potential for development. They are furthermore an invitation to deepen and clarify dialogically the discussed philosophical problems a second (third, fourth, …) time. Frequent difficulties in understanding or mistakes can also be addressed via the forum and discussed there by the whole group. After the completion of each assignment and the preparation of the individual feedback, we highlight some flaws as well as some best practices in a post in the forum. By doing this we want to show that we examine the student’s solutions intensively and have developed an opinion on their results. The post itself can be seen as another invitation for a dialogue (for a more advanced approach on feedback loops cf. Roupa 2021). Another important component is peer feedback: The transfer tasks (performance level III) are worked out in groups and as the results are assessed reciprocally this process offers possibilities for constructive criticism and is a way to connect students to discuss their understanding of philosophical questions in the field of didactics. Finally, we ask the students for feedback on the didactical concept, chosen literature, topics, the learning atmosphere, and workload in general. Concluding the seminar, we have asked this from
the students and have received feedback which we deem as quite positive (more in the résumé section).

(7) Intensive workshops: The live meetings have a workshop character. In the syllabus for the five-hour meeting, which is communicated in advance, phases of groupwork alternate with inputs from the lecturers, presentations, plenary discussions, and breaks. The focus is on the students’ active participation, while we act as moderators and contribute our expertise when necessary or asked for. The workshop concept increases the intensity and the multifaceted dialogical character of the discussion of philosophical problems and helps to include several perspectives on the seminar’s topics. In general, we split the meetings into two segments. In the first, we discuss the general questions of the module and the answers or arguments from the literature provided. As instructors, we add a few lecture-like episodes to classify the arguments and elaborate on misunderstandings that occur to us when reading the assignments. As the students are well prepared for this part of the meeting by their preparatory assignments, vivid discussions are possible that go far beyond simple text- or argument-reconstructions and instead deal with comprehensive questions aiming at the core of the module’s topic. The second segment is about a practical transformation of the rather theoretical perspectives from the first one. Several practical challenges are possible: our students are supposed to work out problem formulations suitable for teaching philosophy, setting up tasks to establish certain competencies, or find and discuss material for a certain topic, to name a few. Based on our experience, most of the forms of social interaction used in classrooms can be integrated in digital sessions – and some even in an optimized way: Multi-step groupwork, for example, is hardly possible in usual seminar sessions or at least need a lot more planning effort. Regarding students in precarious circumstances (e.g., due to the pandemic) the digital learning environments offer advantages because participation can be handled with a lot of flexibility. Regarding the requirements to pass the course we decided to categorize the group works as pure learning tasks that are not part of the seminars rating system. We did so to facilitate open and creative working without any pressure. But since the results of the groupwork can be used as prework for individual conclusions on the modules topics, this creates an additional layer of interest in achieving the best possible results in the joint work.

(8) Additional tools: Working with a learning platform in combination with video conferencing systems permits the use of collaborative tools that didactically enrich seminar sessions. Surveys (answergarden), collaborative text work (etherpad), visualizations (mindmeister, placemats) etc. are appealing ways to enrich seminar discussions and bring new possibilities into the seminars’ multifaceted dialogues. Unfortunately, access is often limited by the need to register, or the costs involved, and in many cases, the protection of data privacy must be considered. Nevertheless, we experienced that some of these tools are useful in structuring discussions. We found etherpads very helpful, in which we had entered questions and headings before inviting our students to join in and enter their ideas (which is possible simultaneously for all students). This way of working helped them to structure their discussions and their findings likewise. And in difference to spoken words, the terminology has to be clearer, if it is necessary to write thoughts down. Another benefit of the online tools is that we can save the results of several groups easily and provide this material to all the students.

(9) Inviting atmosphere: Active participation in all three forms of dialogue is the key to
increasing knowledge and acquiring competencies – that was our starting point in arranging the course setup. Therefore, we found it important to create an atmosphere in which everyone participates in the joint seminar work, especially in the group sessions. As just mentioned in the paragraph above these are planned in detail with the help of guiding questions that are posted online in advance (in etherpads, mind maps, or other tools). Doing philosophy in dialogue can be an enlightening enterprise. We try to establish an atmosphere that is friendly and open to all contributions that serve the purpose to learn about how teaching philosophy can be achieved productively and where uncertainties or mistakes are welcome. Besides discussions about the literature on the philosophical topics, this of course includes criticism amongst the students as well as towards the instructors, if it is supported by arguments. To achieve this kind of discussion in the space of reason is the main goal that we focused on with our concept of a digital dialogue about the didactics of philosophy.

5. Conclusion
In this conclusive section, we want to discuss some aspects of our concept, where we see chances of improvement for future replications of the seminar. We want to do this with an emphasis on time, as we see the dimension of time as an inherent element of dialogical teaching. Even before the COVID-19 crisis, it was widely discussed that online teaching might lead to a loss of learning effects due to a reduced form of (nonverbal) communication. With last year’s measures to counter the spread of the virus, the discussion became lively as everyone involved in the educational system had to find ways of dealing with the rapid closure of the classrooms. With the question in mind on how to counterbalance the possible problem of reduced communication that might come along with online-only teaching, we tried to structure the timeframe in a way that supports dialogical moments to unfold. The importance of giving time as a part of educational theory has been emphasized by Max Horkheimer who, with a critical stance on society, points out that education is not a linear process that can be forced upon individuals:


The process of education has turned into processing. Processing – and this is the essence of the difference – allows no time for the object, time is getting reduced. But time stands for love; to the object to which I give time, I give love; violence is rapid. (Translation A.B./S.D.)

Following Horkheimer, Peter Euler, and (by reflecting digitalization) Hartmut Rosa attest society an enormous acceleration due to the economization of all areas of life in the last years (Euler 2012, Rosa 2017). Euler diagnoses a negative impact on education as a result of this acceleration, as all learning efforts are subjected to the goal of efficiency: high outcome in as little time as possible. This contradicts a traditional idea of education in opposition to “getting ready for the working world” and the job market. Because we wanted to focus on education in its strong sense of
understanding – where we relate philosophy – we invested a rather large amount of time on reflective learning processes, especially in the multi-step groupwork sessions and the follow-up discussions, due to the fact that autonomous thinking in dialogues needs time.

To analyze the success of the seminar, we can question if we achieved the aims we set for the course. Which understanding of education do we follow and has the seminar been in line with the idea of doing philosophy as a dialogical process? And how did the circumstance that we taught online-only concur with our concept?

Doing philosophy successfully by reducing pace is not trivial because this does not mean having unplanned spare time between different phases where you hope that philosophical thinking happens by itself. In our case, it meant to choose basic topics relevant to an introduction to the didactics of philosophy (like the question of what philosophical competencies are) (and to get an exemplary access to philosophize in a sustained and enduring way, so that the topic can open to the learners. In the case of the seminar, we decided to only work with three obligatory topics in one semester, for which we offered different types of dialogues to provide various perspectives. We think that this approach of philosophizing dialogically fits the requirements of providing time for autonomous thinking and can be adopted by the prospective teachers by implementing it into their teaching styles. Our idea was to not merely provide methods and guidelines but to philosophize about central issues from the didactics of philosophy.

When planning the seminar, we had this general idea of how teaching and learning dialogically could look like. To transfer this idea into Moodle and live meetings was quite a challenge. The construction of the online learning platform needed considerable amounts of time. From our point of view, this effort is worthwhile when the course is repeatedly taught (for example, every or every other semester). Then the basic structure can be adopted and new elements can easily get included to optimize the setup or provide more supplementary material.

Limitations to our approach have come along with this setup. The whole concept is built on the idea that philosophical problems are entangled and open to many different perspectives – and that the three forms of dialogue jointly help to understand them. As we let students complete assignments while preparing and reflecting on the workshops, we had a quite massive workload in providing them written feedback. As we conducted the seminar in team-teaching, we managed to give feedback to our almost thirty students in time – but it still was a challenge. Peer-Feedback might be an option to rearrange the setup here, especially as the prospective teachers will themselves have to provide feedback in their future profession. Moodle allows for such peer-feedback options, but developing a properly working mechanism would still be a task. Part of it would be to prepare a guideline that provides the requirements for feedback in general and for each assignment in particular. At the same time, this would offer a new way of dialogue between the students. One remaining difficulty is how to include peer feedback in a courses rating system. Another option is to voice-record the feedback and then upload it. This takes away the time-consuming part of writing and might even allow for subtones. That might be beneficial, as from a communications theory perspective up to 90% of communication is non-verbal. This finding has of course a major impact on discussions and groupworks in seminars.

Communication mishaps and problems can be found mostly in forms of dialogue between two or more persons. The request to turn on cameras is a desperate attempt to solve this problem that
entails digital forms of dialogue between human beings. There is a huge amount of communication which only takes place in face-to-face situations, and according to Rosa, there is a loss of resonance in a digital environment. Problems on the social interaction level of dialogues also affect the efficiency of the philosophical debate because of misunderstandings and personal feelings. Irony, to mention a well-known example, is harder to detect in a digital conversation without any facial expressions and gestures. The other forms of dialogue can take place in digital surroundings (or home office) like in the classical way. Chairing discussions worked well in the seminar where we combined individual perspectives and general questions and gave time for negotiation processes in smaller groups. Setting timeframes, offering guiding questions, and helping out when discussions get stuck helped to encourage dialogical exchange of arguments. To have the workshops as the central element between individual preparations and conclusions fostered a concentrated working atmosphere which we equipped with several different tools that the students used to collaboratively work on the tasks. To improve the concept of the course in the future we would consider to include annotation tools such as nb (Zyto, Karger, Ackermann, Mahajan 2012) in addition. These tools allow to show up how the individual dialogical reading takes place and offers an invitation to discuss the upcoming philosophical questions close to literature. It gives an opportunity to combine the different forms of dialogue and has proved itself in other seminars. We were satisfied with the communication in the workshops but would have hoped for more initiative on the student’s side concerning the use of forums. Those were mainly frequented only after we posed questions or gave extra information concerning the live meetings or feedback. The combination of asynchronous and synchronous elements in the seminar should actually motivate the use of forums for exchange.

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More room for improvement we see in the rating system we used for the course (we gave up to ten points per task and another ten bonus points for the additional topic and required that at least half of the 60 regularly possible points were achieved). When giving points for the assignments there is a danger that the dialogue is shortened, and the speed increased when students shift their focus from philosophizing to achieving the necessary points. One drawback of several consecutive assignments is the need for well-working feedback loops to keep the process of doing philosophy going.

Furthermore, overall qualitative feedback about the course has been requested from the students. We asked them to name positive and negative aspects as well as ideas for improvement. Contrary to our expectations, even the demanding five-hour sessions on Saturdays were perceived as positive because of their dialogical productivity and collaborative working climate. Also, the need to prepare the assignments in order to be able to collaborate in the meetings has been welcomed. The only negative feedback was that six assignments are a lot, especially when in pandemic times other seminars have a similar workload, which we can understand. In addition, for some students, the concept of the seminar was overwhelming in the sense that they sometimes lost their way within the materials. We did try to counter that with regular messages and friendly reminders, introduction videos, and a – in our opinion – well-structured course setup. Still, we nonetheless see room for improvement in getting our basic didactical conception across right from the start, e.g.: that dialogue demands a high level of and that the pedagogical double-decker combines theoretical and practical perspectives. Furthermore, it remains a challenge that
arguments must be proven right in the course of autonomous examinations. When repeating the seminar in the future we think to emphasize these points even more right from the beginning in the course description and in the general introductory video.

Concluding this article, we want to recapitulate some of the key findings we encountered during the preparation and the execution of the course. Planning the condensed workshops was engaging as we tried to transfer theory to praxis and had to find assignments that fit this challenge. The group works sparked intense discussions and lead to interesting results for the whole group. But individual reflection had its fair share of the course’s schedule as well. It was positive to see how the discussions from the live meetings influenced the individual assignments following up – that they deepened certain aspects or that they took a critical stance. Nonetheless, we think that dialogue in its various forms is a good principle when creating a teaching environment. And from our point of view, digital environments are suitable for dialogical forms of doing philosophy.

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TEACHING PHILOSOPHY ONLINE?

Peter Volek
Catholic University in Ružomberok
peter.volek@ku.sk

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Abstract
The article deals with the issue of the appropriateness of online philosophy teaching at the level of secondary schools. The author presents a thesis that online teaching of philosophy as an acceptable substitute for in-person classes should be used only as an exception under special circumstances, e.g. an endemic. Under normal circumstances, online teaching should preferably be used as a valuable supplement to in-person teaching. The thesis is elaborated through an analysis of several fundamental concepts (philosophy, the role of philosophy in the educational process, online teaching). Subsequently, the thesis is also supported by a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of online teaching of philosophy. The disadvantages of online philosophy teaching, as e.g. limited possibility to use dramatization, reading, play, and non-verbal communication will prove to outweigh the advantages.

Keywords: philosophy, teaching philosophy, online teaching, critical thinking

When schools were forced to be closed during the COVID-19 pandemic due to the threat of spreading the disease, the question of online teaching of philosophy on elementary, secondary, and university levels became a critical issue. Under these circumstances, in-person education was suddenly and abruptly changed to online education. This raises the question of how to employ the methods of online education adequately and effectively. Online education is a form of distance education (students and teachers are spatially separated), where the educational content is delivered via the internet.

From a temporal perspective, online education can be divided into synchronous (educational content is delivered and accessed at the same time – e.g. video call, chat, etc.) and asynchronous (educational content is first delivered by the teacher and accessed by the students later – e.g. e-mail assignments; Watts 2016). Synchronous online education can be combined with in-person education in which case it is a hybrid form of education (Raes, Detienne, Windey, Depeape 2020). Online education can be executed using mobile phones, smart phones, laptops, tablets, e-readers, PCs.

This article will focus on the issue of online teaching of philosophy on the level of secondary schools in general, and the issue of the appropriateness of online philosophy teaching in particular. I will defend the thesis that online philosophy teaching should be used only in exceptional circumstances (e.g. an epidemic). Under normal circumstances, online philosophy teaching should
only be used as a supplement to in-person education. In order to argue for this thesis, I will analyze several concepts fundamental for the context of the issue. First, I will analyze the character of philosophy and explain its role in education. Subsequently, I will analyze online education pointing to some of the main advantages and disadvantages of using it in the context of teaching philosophy. The comparison of these advantages and disadvantages will be used to justify the thesis that online teaching of philosophy should be used only as a supplement to in-person classes (hybrid system).

1. What is philosophy?
In order to determine how to best teach philosophy and how to employ online teaching, we have to first determine what philosophy is. Philosophy can be defined in several ways, what is a sign of different views about what philosophy is. One approach focuses on the nature of the questions that philosophy attempts to answer. According to Floridi (2013), we can distinguish between three kinds of questions: those that can be answered by empirical means, those that can be answered by logical-mathematical means, and those that cannot be answered in one of these two ways (or a combination of them) – Floridi calls these “open questions” and claims that philosophical questions are exactly of such kind.

According to Floridi and to Labuda (Floridi 2013; Labuda 2018: 375) philosophy can thus be understood as the answering of open questions through noetic resources possibly constrained by logical and empirical resources. It is a conceptual design that includes the identification of open questions and designing, proposing, and evaluating the relevant answers. Open questions are the not yet answered ones. Philosophy stems from astonishment, asks fundamental questions, and directs activity toward answering them. Philosophical questions differ from the empirical and logical-mathematical questions by virtue of being open. Empirical and logical-mathematical questions are principally closed, i.e. in principle, we know how to answer them “once we have the necessary and sufficient resources to formulate a correct answer” (Floridi 2013: 200). However, this does not mean that we always have the necessary and sufficient sources needed for the formulation of a correct answer. Expanding the empirical and logic-mathematical knowledge expands the availability of further knowledge of these fields. Floridi defines an open question to be a question 1) the answers to which are in principle open to further informed, rational, and honest disagreement; 2) which is fundamental, but not absolute; 3) which is closed under further questioning in the sense that there are ultimate questions whose answers are most influential in terms of a cascade of further question and answers to other related question within that network; 4) that cannot be answered solely by empirical and logical-mathematical sources; but 5) requires also further noetic sources to be answered1 (Floridi 2013: 215; Labuda 2018: 373). When formulating a question and the relevant answer, one also needs to pay attention to the context and level of abstraction. It is not possible to reduce philosophy to conceptual analysis as some authors have suggested (Wittgenstein 1984: 4.003, 4.0031, 4.112; Carnap 1934: §78; Carnap 1963: 55).

By answering practical open questions (e.g. How am I to act?) philosophy attempts to define the place of the issue at hand within the complex of the world and the reaction to some stimuli from

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1 What Michael Dummett calls philosophy’s source of information, what we already know, is according to Floridi a part of other noetic sources (Dummett 2010: 10; Floridi 2013: 211).
the world. In such a way, it attempts to examine a worldview and determine its rationality to
determine what the world is and what the relation between an object and the whole of experience
is (Muck 1968). In order to determine the proper position of humans in the world, it is necessary
to know the world. To teach philosophy is to help the students to answer open questions through
noetic resources (i.e. to learn conceptual design). It means to teach them to make use of their
abilities (i.e. analytic and critical thinking, interpretation of philosophical text) and competences
(i.e. to solve a philosophical problem, to present an argument) for this goal. Doing this, philosophy
contributes to the development of their personality.  

2. The role of philosophy in education
The role of education in general and also of philosophy is to contribute to personal development
of the students. This contribution can be achieved through four main functions of philosophical
education, which are intertwined with one another (Gałkowski/Każmierczak 2020: 232):

1) The students should learn about the history of philosophy as a part of the cultural heritage
and the process of answering the open questions.
2) Philosophy should familiarize the students with new aspects of experience and the world.
   This can help them to challenge some of their ungrounded prejudices that are formed as a
   result of simplified and simplifying preconceptions of reality.
3) It should stimulate critical and creative thinking of the students.
4) Philosophy should explain different ways of thought and approaches to issues/problems. It
   means the different methods used in philosophy, such as conceptual analysis,
   phenomenological method, existential account, etc.

Aiming at these four tasks, philosophy contributes to the development of students’ intellectual
abilities that provide them with a basis for thinking and acting later in their lives. Learning about
the history of philosophy and its various methods as well as uncovering new aspects of experience
and the world facilitates the development of critical and creative thinking that seems to be central
for personal development since they make critical evaluation of the motives of action and decision
making possible. “It also means that the method of teaching philosophy is at least as important as
the content, and even more important considered from a developmental perspective”
(Gałkowski/Każmierczak 2020: 232). Personal development also includes character formation
(Lerner/Fischer/Weinberg 2000: 15). Character can be defined as a dynamic system that includes
moral cognition, other related social-emotional capacities and skills, self-regarded capacities for
executive control and self-regulation, and discourse skills for responsive engagement and
orientation for principled moral change (Nucci 2019). Since character is a dynamic system, it can
be formed through education. “Good character education is good education” (Berkowitz 2017:
84). Character formation pertains to thought, feelings, and action. It is a formation in core values
recognized in all cultures, that constitute fundamental qualities such as caring/compassion,
virtuousness, fairness, responsibility, and respect for oneself and the others that characterize a good

\[ \text{The explanation will be given in the next chapter.} \]
human being (Lickona 1996: 93; Nast 2020: 12). Lickona and Nast formulated eleven principles for effective character formation that all school employees contribute to (Lickona 1996; Nast 2020).³ Well-formed character contributes to pro-social and responsible behavior. Character formation is facilitated by critical thinking, but not exclusively by that. It also requires further elements supporting the development of volitional abilities. Development of critical thinking is also facilitated by creative writing (Edberg 2018), and by group discussion. Writing philosophical essays teaches the students to organize their thoughts in argumentation scheme (Cunningham 1985). The development of critical thinking proceeds from individual examination of argumentation to a dialogical examination of argumentation at the level of secondary schools (Kuhn 2018). Purposeful training of argumentation also develops the capability for correct argumentation and norms of it (Kuhn, Zillmer, Crowell, Zavala 2013). Argumentation training should prepare for argumentation, the formation of arguments, and their defense. The pragma-dialectical approach to the reconstruction of argumentation, that includes counter-considerations (where pro considerations override the counter considerations although the counter considerations have been taken into account) seems to be a suitable strategy (Juthe 2019)⁴. The students’ character formation is facilitated by personal development, particularly by perfection of their abilities and skills. Personal development within the educational context is also dependent on the mode of education (in-person or distance education), on the methods used, as well as on the influence of the student’s home environment and culture.

³ Lickona formulates the following 11 principles of effective character formation: 1. Character education promotes ethical core values as the basis of good character. 2) “Character” must be comprehensively defined to include thinking, feeling and behavior. 3) Effective character education requires an intentional, proactive and comprehensive approach that promotes the core values in all phases of school life. 4) The school must be a caring community. 5) To develop character, students need opportunities for moral action. 6) Effective character education includes a meaningful and challenging academic curriculum that respect all learners and helps them succeed. 7) Character education should strive to develop student’s intrinsic motivation. 8) The school staff must become a learning and moral community in which all share responsibility for character education and attempt to adhere to the same core values that guide the education of students. 9) Character education requires moral leadership from both staff and students. 10) The school must recruit parents and community members as full partners in the character-building effort. 11) Evaluation of character education should assess the character of the school, the school staff’s functioning as character educators and extent to which students manifest good character.” (Lickona 1996)

Nest proposed these principles in a modified form: “1. Core values are defined, implemented and embedded into school culture. 2. The school defines “character” comprehensively to include thinking, feeling, and doing. 3. The school uses a comprehensive, intentional, and proactive approach to develop character. 4. The school creates a caring community. 5. The school provides students with opportunities for moral action. 6. The school offers a meaningful and challenging academic curriculum that respect all learners, develops their character, and helps them succeed. 7. The school fosters student’s self-motivation. 8. All staff share the responsibility for developing, implementing, and modeling ethical character. 9. The school’s character initiative has shared leadership and long-range support for continuous improvement. 10. The school engages families and community as partners in the character initiative. 11. The school assesses its implementation of character education, its culture and climate, and the character growth of students on a regular basis.” (Nest 2020)

⁴ Pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation was invented and developed by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (van Eemeren/Grootendorst 1984). They not only pay attention to the logical structure, but also to the pragmatic factors of argumentation, in this they follow J. L. Austin’s theory of speech acts. They consider an analysis of a dispute with different opinions. The primary aim of interlocutors of a dispute is to resolve it. The discussants will defend its standpoints in an argumentative discussion. They will achieve the perlocutionary effect. In their book, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst develop guidelines for the analysis of argumentative discussions, making unexpressed premises and rules for a code of conduct for rational discussions explicit.
3. Online education

Online education is the employment of distance method of education using digital technologies (e. g. PCs, tablets, or mobile smartphones) or online-programs. The students can either follow the lesson on their own or in smaller groups. They can also be divided into smaller groups, such as joining rooms on “MS Teams”. The teaching of philosophy should facilitate the students’ personal development, to them help improve their critical and creative thinking. The road to this goal leads through the training of argumentation. This training is significantly facilitated by reading philosophical texts, in which one can uncover the argumentation of the authors. This requires intellectual effort. The question is whether online education makes this task easier, harder, or impossible to achieve. Online education employs digital media that young people also use in their free time. As Gałkowski and Kaźmierczak put it:

The reference point for a young person is no longer a book or a school class, but a TV set, computer, tablet or smartphone. Such devices create, as it were, a natural environment for young people, catering for their intellectual and spiritual development. Young people spend at least several hours a day in front of their computer monitors or looking at the screens of their smartphones. (Gałkowski/Kaźmierczak 2020: 234)

The use of digital media by young people bears the danger of leading to shallow thought, to the efforts to gain short information connected with visual perception (Gałkowski/Kaźmierczak 2020: 235-238). Shallow thought is focused on particular facts, events, and images. Deep thought is abstract. Critical and creative thinking is abstract thinking developed through the examination of reasons for arguments and the support of critical and creative thinking by creative writing. The training of argumentation as a way to critical thinking can take place within discussion groups as well as through online education. The digital medial supported discussion can be different and therefore may lead to different outcomes. Critical thinking can be classified as higher level thought (Geertsen 2003). According to Bloom’s taxonomy, higher level thinking skills consist of analysis, evaluation (assessment of argumentation), and creativity (synthesis of conclusions, arguments). The lower level thinking skills consist of memory, understanding, and application (Bloom 1956; Valentová, Brečka, Tureková 2021: 859).5

4. The advantages and disadvantages of online education

Online education has its advantages as well as disadvantages, the importance, and impact of which can be influenced by several factors. Online education using digital technologies can also mediate a discussion leading to critical thinking. One possibility is to organize a discussion on online social networks. It is important to attempt to create a cognitive engagement among the participants, which reflects gained knowledge of higher level (Garrison, Anderson, Archer 2001: 11).6 Employment

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5 For the purposes of this paper, the higher-level thinking and its respective abilities are understood as equivalent with deep thought, and the lower-level thinking and its respective abilities are understood as equivalent with shallow thought.

6 The authors propose four phases of the practical examination in online education: 1) triggering event, 2) exploration, 3) integration, and 4) resolution. It is however necessary to keep in mind that these phases are a part of asynchronous online educations, since the technical means of their time were not yet suitable for synchronous distance education.
of reciprocal peer tutoring, where students take turns in their roles, used in discussions on online social networks can also lead to an increase of higher level thought (Zulkifli, Halim, Yahaya, Van der Meijden 2020). The move to higher level thinking is influenced by a more frequent examination of previous knowledge. This means that the increase of critical thinking can be achieved by both in-person and online education. Important here is the training in argumentation, which can be executed by both types of education, as well as hybrid education, if it facilitates acquisition of critical thinking skills. Even though many of these studies were conducted on the level of higher education, its conclusions are proportionally applicable also in secondary schools. In order to compare in-person and distance education, it is important to compare their advantages and disadvantages and apply them to the teaching of philosophy in secondary school environment employing synchronous online education.

A.) Advantages of online education in comparison to in-person education in secondary school environment:

1) It is the only possible way of education during lockdown caused e.g. by endemic or pandemic diseases.
2) Attendance is possible for students from several areas/countries. This is not typical in secondary school context.
3) The ability to attend education while working.

Advantages 2) and 3) are mostly applicable to students engaged in distance education on university level, where distance education was first developed.

B.) Disadvantages of online education in comparison to in-person education in secondary school environment:

1) Prolonged exposure weakens abstract thought via the primacy of images (Galkowski/Każmierczik 2020: 236-238). The same view is also maintained by Cladis, who supports it by his own teaching experience, significant set of literature (Cladis et al. 2020), as well as a study with more than 300 participants undertaken in one college (Dartmouth College 2016).
2) Weakening of social contacts (Primack et al. 2017; Galkowski/Każmierczik 2020: 236–238), joined with possible negative experiences with social media (e.g. negative health outcomes as increased hypertension, cardiac failure, increased depressions; Primack et al. (Garrison, Anderson, Archer 2001: 8–13). They also proposed descriptors characterizing the individual phases 1) evocative, i.e. inductive, it is a conceptualization of the problem, 2) inquisitive, i.e. divergent, represents the search for relevant information, 3) tentative, i.e. convergent, represents the construction of a possible solution, 4) committed, i.e. deductive, it is the process of concept assessment, deductive testing of the validity of the solution. To each phase they also proposed an activity to achieve the phase’s goal. Phases 3) and 4) represent thinking of higher level (Garrison, Anderson, Archer 2001: 13–16). This method, however, is outdated in its limitation to asynchronous online education. In a modified form, it can also be used in synchronous online education, especially through discussion. This is elaborated in detail by other authors (e.g. Kienstra, Karskens, Imants 2014).
2019; Shensa et al. 2020), that also leads to the weakening of higher level thought. This occurs when the students engage in digital education at home for long periods of time.

3) Online education does not allow for a reading connected with play, dramatization, or drawing, nor for joint reading (Hrkút 2021, 36-38).

4) The possibility to use non-verbal motivational strategies is also limited when using education on online social networks (Hrkút 2021, 44-47).


6) Weak influence on character formation (Hignasari, Wijaya 2020).

The disadvantages of online education are more visible in its long-term employment joined with the overuse of images and short texts. This leads to the preference for concrete thinking as opposed to abstract thinking. Another disadvantage consists in the absence of real-life presence, that weakens the students’ socialization and character formation. This formation is especially needed in elementary and secondary schools. Since it is almost impossible to mediate character formation through online education, when a child is learning from home, an increased involvement of parents is essential (Hignasari/Wijaya 2020: 228–244). It is similar to a situation when a parent has to regularly leave his/her family for long periods of time due to his/her work. Such regular and prolonged absence from home weakens his/her influence on the character formation of his/her children. At the same time, character formation is one of the goals of philosophy teaching. Mitigation of some of these disadvantages is possible through a preferential usage of discussion groups, be it with tutoring or without. Discussion can be also used for the formation of critical thinking in online or hybrid education of philosophy.

5. Comparison of advantages and disadvantages

During a lockdown, the only possibility to continue education may be to use online education. However, this should, I claim, be done only temporarily since the negative effects of online education are significant and long-lasting. The article analyzed the issue of online teaching of philosophy and addressed the question of the appropriateness of teaching philosophy online. The significant positive effect of online education in secondary schools is the possibility to continue education in the time of lockdown during an epidemic or pandemic. Improvement of students’ critical and creative thinking should be one of the most important benefits of philosophy teaching. Other roles of philosophy teaching support this goal that facilitates the formation of students’ character. The most significant negative effect of online education is the weakening of abstract thought, that is necessary for the training of critical thinking as one of the important points in philosophy teaching. One of the biggest disadvantages of online education is desocialization that can also contribute to the development of mental disorders. Long-term regular online philosophy teaching also weakens students’ emotional and volitive traits that are necessary for the formation of their character and personal development. In addition, online education does not allow for adequate employment of various strategies of in-person philosophy teaching, such as dramatization, drawing, play, non-verbal communication, etc. For these reasons, online teaching of philosophy becomes unfavorable. The disadvantages of online philosophy teaching are too
serious and thus cannot be outweighed by its advantages. I have defended the thesis that online philosophy teaching should be regularly used only in exceptional circumstances (e.g. an epidemic or pandemic). Under normal circumstances, online philosophy teaching should only be used as a supplement to in-person education. In order to argue for this thesis, I have analyzed several concepts (philosophy, the role of philosophy in educational process, online teaching) that are fundamental for the context of the issue. Then I compared the advantages and disadvantages of online philosophy teaching, that justified the thesis. Philosophy should support the personal development of the students. In this context, the training in argumentation leading to the acquisition or deepening of critical thinking (which is an expression of deep or higher-level thinking) proved to be central to philosophy teaching. Online education should therefore only be used when there is no other way to continue education, or as a supplement to in-person education.

Translated by Ján Baňas

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ARGUMENTATIVE SKILLS: A SYSTEMATIC FRAMEWORK FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING

Anne Burkard
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
sanne.burkard@uni-goettingen.de

Henning Franzen
Humboldt-Gymnasium Berlin
h.franzen@humboldtschule-berlin.eu

David Löwenstein
Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf
loewenstein@hhu.de

Donata Romizi
Universität Wien
donata.romizi@univie.ac.at

Annett Wienmeister
Freie Universität Berlin
annett.wienmeister@fu-berlin.de

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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a framework for fostering argumentative skills in a systematic way in Philosophy and Ethics classes. We start with a review of curricula and teaching materials from the German-speaking world to show that there is an urgent need for standards for the teaching and learning of argumentation. Against this backdrop, we present a framework for such standards that is intended to tackle these difficulties. The spiral-curricular model of argumentative competences we sketch helps teachers introduce the relevant concepts and skills to students early on in their school career. The focus is on secondary schools, but the proposal can also be of use for learning and teaching in universities, especially in introductory classes.

Keywords: informal logic; critical thinking; standards for argumentative skills; argument; argument reconstruction

1 Names are listed in alphabetical order. This text was written in the context of one of the working groups of the DFG-network “Argumentieren in der Schule” (Argumentation in Secondary Schools). The authors would like to thank all group members. A German translation of this paper is available at www.philovernetzt.de. [“DFG” is short for German Research Association, the Editors.]
Introduction
Philosophy and Ethics classes pursue a number of important goals. Furthering argumentative skills is undoubtedly among them. But how can these skills be fostered in a systematic way? In this essay, we propose an answer to this question. We suggest furthering argumentative skills by way of precise spiral-curricular standards. In section 1, we review curricula, school books, and other materials from the German-speaking world to show that there is an urgent need for such standards for the teaching and learning of argumentation. Our focus is on secondary schools, but the findings can also be of use for learning and teaching in universities, especially in introductory classes. In section 2, we begin to present our proposal in more detail. We wish to emphasize, however, that the proposal is in many ways still a draft. The framework is informed both by research in argumentation theory and by practical experience in schools. As such, it has already been revised and improved several times, but it can and should be developed further on the basis of practical experience and theoretical reflection.

1. Desiderata for the Teaching and Learning of Argumentation
It is largely undisputed that the development of argumentative skills is both a central goal of teaching in ethics and philosophy as well as of education generally. Accordingly, furthering argumentative skills is given great importance in the curricula and examination requirements for these fields, as well as in the German-language discourse on the teaching of philosophy. Evidence suggests that teachers also attach great importance to imparting argumentative skills. In a survey of philosophy and ethics teachers, almost 85% of the 71 respondents agreed that the ability to formulate and examine arguments were among the most important skills for students to obtain from philosophy and ethics classes (see Löwenstein, Martena, Burkard, Gertken 2020: 103–105).

Nevertheless, fostering such competences gradually and systematically can present difficulties for many teachers, especially with regard to younger learners whose competence development in this area is just beginning. Among other things, one can often observe that argumentative skills are assumed rather than systematically developed in lessons which involve argumentation, especially by teachers who are new to the job. The so-called PLATO method for the analysis of philosophical

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2 We also refer here to comparable school subjects with names that differ depending on the federal state or canton, such as “Werte und Normen” [Values and Norms] in Lower Saxony, “Philosophie / Pädagogik / Psychologie” [Philosophy / Pedagogy / Psychology] in the canton of Bern, or “Lebensgestaltung-Ethik-Religionskunde” [Life-Ethics-Religion] in Brandenburg. In Austria, philosophy and ethics education comprises, on the one hand, part of the subject “Psychology and Philosophy” and, on the other hand, the subject “Religion” as an alternative to religious education, which was introduced as a school pilot project in 1997 and has just become a compulsory substitute subject for religious education from the school year 2021/22 onwards.


4 For Germany, see e.g. the “Einheitliche Prüfungsanforderungen für das Abitur Philosophie” (KMK 2006: 5f.) and Berlin's Ethics curriculum (Senatsverwaltung für Jugend, Bildung und Familie Berlin 2015: 6, 12f.). For Austria, see the curriculum “Philosophie und Psychologie. Für Gymnasium und Realgymnasium” (Bundesgesetzblatt 2016), the old curriculum for the school pilot project in Ethics (Bundes-ARGE Ethik 2017), and the draft of the new curriculum for Ethics in connection with the upcoming introduction of Ethics as an alternative compulsory subject to religious education, starting in the school year 2021/22 (Bundesministerium Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung. Bundes-ARGE Ethik 2020). In the following, we will speak of the “old” and “new” Ethics curricula in Austria, for simplicity's sake. For Switzerland, see e.g. the framework curriculum for Matura schools (EDK 1994: 84) and the curriculum for Philosophy as a supplementary subject in the canton of Bern (2017).
texts, for instance, requires much more detailed guidance than is commonly given, particularly regarding its third and fourth steps – “set forth the text’s reasoning” and “evaluate the viability of the arguments”. Methodological guidance for the evaluation of the viability of arguments is typically underdetermined in this respect: “Are the premises convincing? Are the definitions correct? Are the concepts appropriate? Has anything important been neglected?” (Wittschier 2010: 113–115, 214, our translation). School books also often feature exercises that invite students to discuss various questions without providing a definition for "argumentation" that is in any way different from the everyday use of the word. If, however, specific and systematic argumentative competences are lacking, there is a risk that the argumentative exchange remains superficial, conceptually fuzzy, merely additive, and potentially faulty. Even if the subject matter in question is exciting, students often find argumentation itself to be a fruitless endeavor. One leaves the lesson none the wiser. The class is unlikely to make any progress with regard to the content of the philosophical issues. Methodological progress is even less likely. This frustrating experience can lead to a perception of philosophical discussions as largely arbitrary and fruitless (see also Burkard 2018: 117).

Competences do not arise out of nowhere, especially not during a single lesson. In this vein, it may, at first glance, seem advantageous that argumentative competences are mentioned in the lesson plans of various subjects, for instance German, Math, Social sciences, and foreign languages. Accordingly, argumentative skills would not only be furthered in Philosophy and Ethics lessons but also in the context of many other subjects. At a second glance, however, one must consider that in the absence of a systematic foundation for argumentative competences, students are ill-equipped to develop them across a range of subjects and over an extended period. Argumentative abilities need to be developed systematically and by means of a spiral curriculum (see for instance, Althoff 2016b: 9). They must be “broken down” into specific sub-competences and skills, which can be acquired, practiced, applied, and reflected upon at different levels. These systematic foundations are primarily to be found in the domains of applied and informal logic as well as argumentation theory. Thus, they fall primarily within the purview of philosophy.

However, so far, curricula for Philosophy or Ethics have only formulated rather general goals. They (often only roughly) set forth achievement levels for argumentative competence but fail to

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6 See e.g., Budke/Meyer 2015 for an overview of the importance of argumentation in various school subjects. The Austrian curriculum for Mathematics (“Unterstufe”, i.e. for lower classes) states, e.g.: “The following basic mathematical skills are to be developed: [...] argumentation and precise work, in particular: precise description of facts, properties and concepts (defining); working with a conscious application of rules; justifying (proving); working with logical modes of reasoning; justifying decisions (such as the choice of a specific path towards a solution or a form of representation.” According to the curriculum for the first living foreign language, teachers should promote the ability to "recognize [the] main conclusions in clearly written argumentative texts” and to "write [texts] in which arguments for or against a certain point of view are given [...] and explained" (see the relevant curricula in: Bundesgesetzblatt 2016, all translations ours). These formulations are even more specific than those found in the curriculum for Psychology and Philosophy (also in: Bundesgesetzblatt 2016) or in the new curriculum for Ethics (Bundesministerium Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung. Bundes-ARGE Ethik 2020).
7 The fact that ethics and philosophy classes can establish the systematic foundations for argumentative competences for various school subjects is true insofar as they can teach the basic concepts of the theory of argumentation and establish a general understanding of justificatory reasoning. Nevertheless, the term “argumentative competences” is used in different subjects with different orientations, which differ, in part, from the competences presented here.
specify how and through which intermediate steps these are to be achieved. Even in curricular requirements that do specify (sub)competences, the requirements and the necessary intermediate steps for the development of the abilities in question remain underdetermined. Concrete standards must be set and (sub)goals for competences must be operationalized as a basis for the systematic and progressive furthering of argumentative skills, also by means of exercises that practice, apply, and reflect upon the relevant (sub)competences.

In Germany and Austria, commercial teaching materials and articles in practice-oriented journals are only occasionally suitable to close this gap. In Germany, an analysis of the relevant school books for the lower secondary level in various federal states shows that they are not designed for the systematic and progressive furthering of argumentative abilities and often make use of a vague or everyday concept of argument (see Burkard 2021). When the term “argument” is used at all, books often apply it in a manner synonymous with “reason” or “justification” instead of introducing the three-part argument concept that is especially relevant for philosophy – where arguments are understood as connections between statements such that one or more of these statements, the premises, justify, or at least purport to justify, another statement, the conclusion. If this fundamental structure is not brought into view, a systematic examination of different reasoning structures and evaluative criteria for individual argumentative elements or errors can hardly take place. Although there are instances of a three-part conception of arguments in some of the books that were analyzed, this alone is insufficient. In one such instance, the concept receives an extensive introduction in the first chapter, only to be never used again in the remainder of the book. Accordingly, the volume lacks any additional exercises for furthering argumentative abilities in a targeted way (see Hack/Sänger 2013). In another school book, relevant terms such as “thesis”, “argument”, and “conclusion” are introduced in such a way that they cannot be reconciled with their standard uses in philosophy (see Rösch 2014: 28). The same book also lacks materials that could serve to systematically and progressively promote relevant argumentative skills.

In the most popular Austrian school books, the three-part conception of arguments only appears in connection with formal logic, for instance in the presentation of syllogistics. When these books

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8 For Germany, see e.g. the curriculum for Practical Philosophy (Ministerium für Schule und Weiterbildung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 2008: 15, 24f., 31), the curriculum for Ethics at secondary level I in Baden-Württemberg (Ministerium für Kultus, Jugend und Sport Baden-Württemberg 2016: 11f.) and the curriculum for the subject Values and Norms at secondary level I (Niedersächsisches Kultusministerium 2017: 15, 37f.). For Austria, see the curriculum for Psychology and Philosophy (Bundesgesetzblatt 2016) as well as the old (Bundes-ARGE Ethik 2017) and the new curriculum for Ethics (Bundesministerium Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung. Bundes-ARGE Ethik 2020). The explanations in various Swiss curricula also remain very general. E.g., relevant basic skills for the subject of Philosophy in the canton of St. Gallen are outlined only as follows: “Be able to present complex relationships with conceptual clarity and stringent logic” and “Analyze and consider philosophical texts with regard to form and content” (Lehrplan für das Gymnasium im Kanton St. Gallen 2008: 168, our translation); see also the curricula given in fn. 4.

9 For Germany, see e.g. Ministerium für Schule und Berufsbildung Schleswig-Holstein 2016: 17, and Senatsverwaltung für Jugend, Bildung und Familie Berlin 2015: 14f. Among the Austrian curricula for Philosophy or Ethics classes, the most detailed description of argumentative skills can be found in the old version of the curriculum for Ethics: “Arguing and judging: - Making a well-founded (complete and conclusive) judgment in an argument; - Connecting personal opinions with arguments supporting other positions and - Arguing interactively; - Reflecting on argumentation processes and one’s own ways of thinking” (Bundes-ARGE Ethik 2017: 5, our translation).


11 See Burkard (2021) for more detailed discussion of the examples given in this paragraph, as well as other examples from school books, different teaching materials, and curricula.
do deal with the nature and structure of arguments (which is rarely the case), formal logic (its history and forms) remains dominant over applied and informal logic as well as argumentation theory. In one such book, one finds only a very short section on “Argumentation Theory” at the end of the chapter on “The Logical and Logic”. This section, after the introductory sentence “There are, however, many arguments that cannot simply be reduced to the standardized forms of logic”, offers only a list of potential fallacies (Liessmann, Zenaty, Lacina 2016: 41–43, all translations ours). This gives rise to the impression that formal logic is responsible for valid forms of inference while argumentation theory exists only to cover erroneous forms. This view is not only untenable in substance, but it also raises the question of the relative value of formal and informal logic for the teaching of philosophy in schools. Formal logic (rightly) has a prominent status in philosophy, much less so argumentation theory, which also includes informal reasoning. In reference to the teaching of philosophy in schools – especially in view of the limited time allotted to it – the question arises how sensible it is to teach syllogistic forms, types of statements, the square of opposition, truth tables, etc., while at the same time not even establishing the three-part conception of arguments.

Since Philosophy and Ethics classes in schools should above all be concerned with the education of young people who mostly do not plan to study philosophy, let alone become professional philosophers, it would be advisable to give more emphasis to real argumentation rather than to the merely theoretical knowledge of formal logic. At the same time, the necessary logical foundations should be put to use in furthering argumentative skills in a systematic way. In this context, it is especially important to maintain a close connection to exciting philosophical questions. That way, students can come to realize that even detailed logical analysis is not merely fiddling about but that it promotes real progress on the subject matter at stake.

2. Standards in the Teaching and Learning of Argumentation

We have seen various points at which standards for the teaching and learning of argumentation are much needed. In the following sections, we will present a draft of a framework for such standards which is intended to tackle these difficulties. This spiral-curricular model of argumentative competences is meant to help teachers introduce the relevant competences to students early on in their school career in a systematic way. To that end, argumentation is broken down into sub-competences (clearly often inseparable in argumentative practice), which are in turn divided into different levels. In this way, teachers are supported in gradually furthering complex argumentative competences among students.13

This section begins with an exposition of the competences and the four levels we use to partition their development as well as the background concepts involved therein. The following sections (3–7) describe the individual levels and present the specific individual competences and

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12 See, e.g., Fischill 2015: Section II.9.; Lacina 2014: Section 2.1; Liessmann et al. 2016: Section 1.4. A positive exception is the school book by Karl Lahmer (2017), often used in Austria, which has separate subchapters on logic (5.2) and on argumentation (5.3).

13 As part of an ongoing project within the DFG network “Argumentation in Secondary Schools”, illustrative exercises and explanations for all levels and sub-competences of the table are currently being formulated (forthcoming 2022 at www.philoveretzt.de).
background concepts. The appendix provides a summary table of this content and we recommend keeping this table available for reference while reading.

Argumentative competences can be broken down into single, interrelated sub-competences in many ways. For our purposes, we distinguish three core competences and then seek to illuminate their forms and interdependencies:

A. **Developing arguments**: Students develop their own arguments and formulate them in a clear and convincing manner.

B. **Interpreting arguments**: Students recognize and understand arguments in oral contributions, texts, and other media.

C. **Evaluating arguments**: Students evaluate the plausibility and justificatory power of arguments.

These general core competences include more specific subject knowledge and sub-competences at different levels. At each of these levels, however, the competences in question remain closely related. Their interrelation is expressed, inter alia, in the background concepts which are listed separately at every level as they occur in each of the three competences in different ways. These concepts refer, for instance, to specific forms and properties of arguments (for example the validity of arguments or the structure of arguments by analogy), which play a role in the development of one’s own arguments (A) as well as in the interpretation and evaluation of the arguments of others (B and C). These background concepts therefore cut across all core competences rather than denoting a fourth such competence with equal status. Therefore, they are not represented by the alphabetically subsequent letter “D” in our summary table but rather by an “X”. Being able to master and apply these concepts is, of course, a competence itself. However, this competence is not manifest next to but rather within the core competences, and typically in all three of them. For example, the ability to apply the concept of *modus ponens* is manifest in the interpretation, evaluation, and development of arguments of this form. The following sections therefore always relate the concepts to the specific sub-competences in question.

The systematic distinction of core competences A, B, and C, in addition to the background concepts, X, provides a sequence for teaching and learning only in a very limited sense: in order to evaluate an argument, it must first be understood, that is, interpreted. B is therefore a necessary condition for C. But the three core competences essentially depend on one another. For example, the principle of charity requires that the evaluation of arguments also factors into their interpretation (see section 4). The distinction between the three core competences proposed here is therefore essentially open to various teaching approaches and methods for developing the interrelated sub-competences and skills of each level. Nevertheless, we do suggest a sequence for teaching the competences progressively through the distinction of the aforementioned levels I – IV. The content and skills of the more basic level are generally presupposed and further developed in those that follow.

The order of the levels is not based on age groups or class levels but rather on the logic of the relevant argumentative competences and on the students’ previous experience. The levels are therefore labeled as follows:
I. Beginner
II. Basic
III. Intermediate
IV. Advanced

Of course, while the most complex matters are not suitable for ten-year-olds, some entry-level competences may be. This is one of the advantages of our proposal: it is adaptable to many different contexts in schools and elsewhere. Nevertheless, we can suggest the following as a rough guide for school teaching. If Philosophy or Ethics lessons are offered at the lower secondary level, levels I and II can be covered until the end of the final year of lower secondary education, and, depending on the type of school and the particular group, even parts of level III. Level III should be suitable for classes at the upper secondary level as well as at least some parts of level IV, depending on the particular group and the character of the school subject. If Philosophy or Ethics lessons begin in upper secondary school, the beginner and basic levels can of course be introduced much more quickly than at lower grades.

Those are all the elements that build the systematic framework for our standards. In the following sections 3–7, we add content to this structure. Individual elements will be designated with abbreviations drawn from their respective positions in the summary table.

The content itself is largely common knowledge within philosophy and receives excellent treatment in the extensive introductory literature on (philosophical) argumentation. We will therefore refer to specific passages in the literature only occasionally, and especially in those cases in which there are relevant differences not only in presentation but also in the way the content in question is conceived.\footnote{This means, among other things, that the inference rules of classical logic are not referenced individually while prominent non-deductive inference forms are, since e.g., analogical inferences are conceived of quite differently by different authors (see sections 6–7).} For general information, we recommend a few introductory texts: in English, Bowell & Kemp (2015), Govier (1988), Lyons & Ward (2018), and Rosenberg (1995); in German, in particular the two essays by Betz (2016) and Brun (2016) from the Neues Handbuch des Philosophie-Unterrichts (Pfister/Zimmermann 2016) as well as Brun/Hirsch Hadorn (2014), Pfister (2013), and Pfister (2020).

3. Level I: Beginner
The primary goal of an argument is to convince oneself or others that a statement is true, or at least that it is well-founded. Sometimes we argue directly for certain statements. At other times, we explore the possible implications of statements, that is, we argue for conditionals (for instance, “If determinism is true, then we have no free will”). At level I, students are introduced to this conception of arguments and some further fundamental aspects of the development, interpretation, and evaluation of justifications and arguments. Some basic distinctions play an important role here: for example, the one between declarative statements and other linguistic utterances as well as the one between statements which are being justified and those which serve as their support. Since
moral questions play an important role in the teaching of philosophy and ethics, this is also where we introduce the distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive statements (especially normative ones). This distinction prepares students, among other things, for an examination of the is-ought fallacy, which is addressed at level II.

In order to develop the core argumentative skills of level I, it seems natural to begin by conveying some basic knowledge. Students must first learn to distinguish declarative statements from other utterances (X.I.1). Unlike questions, cries for help, or commands, statements are used to claim what is or is not the case. Statements can be either true or false, independently from our knowledge. The next step is to convey the ability to distinguish statements which form the body of an argument from other statements in which, for instance, a mere assertion is made (B.I.1). Students thus understand the basic structure of justifications within the context of the primary goal of argumentation: if one wants to convince oneself or others of the truth of a statement, it is necessary to support this statement with at least one other statement. In so doing, we provide a justification for the statement. That is, we claim that the statement is true because (an)other statement(s) is/are true. The mere assertion thus becomes a justified statement, the so-called conclusion. Any further statements used for justifying this conclusion are called premises. With this distinction between premise(s) and conclusion (X.I.3), students possess the basic knowledge needed to understand what an argument is (X.I.2, B.I.2), namely a justification of a statement (the conclusion) by one or more different statements (the premise(s)). An argument, therefore, consists of three elements: the conclusion, the premise(s), and the supporting or justificatory relationship between the two. As we use an argument to claim that one statement is true because one or more other statements are true, we infer the statement in need of justification from the justifying statements. (This supporting relationship is discussed in more detail from level III onwards.)

Relations of justification can sometimes be easily identified by means of specific words, so-called argumentation indicators. Words such as “because”, “since”, and “due to” indicate a justification. Words such as “consequently”, “therefore”, and "thus" refer to the statement that is to be justified, that is, the statement whose truth is meant to be supported by the justifying statement(s). Students develop the competence to justify their own statements, using words that indicate an argumentation (A.I.1).

At this basic level, it is also advisable to introduce a further distinction within the group of statements, namely the aforementioned distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive, and, in particular, normative statements (X.I.4, B.I.3). Normative statements include statements that something should or should not be the case, for example in moral terms.15 For such statements, some philosophers use the concept of correctness rather than that of truth. This goes back to the view that normative statements do not make assertions about the world the same way as descriptive statements do and, that normative statements cannot be true or false. However, we can bracket this controversy here. In ordinary language, after all, we can call normative statements such as “Killing is wrong” true or false rather unproblematically. Partly on this basis, we will also characterize

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15 For school teaching, this is the most prominent form of normativity, so it is our focus here. However, the remarks can just as easily be applied to other areas, such as aesthetic or epistemic normativity. The group of non-descriptive statements includes normative, evaluative, and prescriptive statements, although the particulars of these categories and their relationships to each other are understood differently (see, e.g., Henning 2019: 29–35).
normative arguments in terms of the truth of the premises supporting the truth of the conclusion. All the same, teachers are of course free to introduce an additional distinction between “truth” and “correctness” here. We intend to keep our proposals neutral with respect to questions of metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. Where we may fail at this, we trust our charitable readers to suitably adapt our ideas.

Knowledge of statement-types and a basic understanding of argumentative structures are vital for the development of one’s own arguments as well as for the interpretation of arguments put forward by others. At this level, in addition to introducing students to ways of recognizing and using arguments in texts and conversations, we also introduce a first form of evaluating arguments. Since it can be assumed that the students already have intuitive access to the content of the justifications that are provided, it makes sense to first consider the relevance of this content in its respective context. Students thereby acquire or deepen their ability to decide whether a statement or argument made is relevant to the topic at hand (C.I.1).

4. Level II: Basic

Once students have been introduced to some background knowledge and the basic skills of argumentation, these are deepened at level II. They learn to present and reconstruct arguments in standard form as well as to examine arguments in view of their completeness. Furthermore, they learn to recognize some fallacies.

Acquiring the ability to reconstruct arguments in standard form (X.II.1) is fundamental to the development, interpretation, and evaluation of arguments.16 With respect to the core competence of interpreting arguments, we propose a two-step process. The first step consists in converting statements from contributions that contain complete arguments into standard form (B.II.1). In so doing, statements are identified as premises and conclusions (including intermediate conclusions), usually in the form of a list with the appropriate designations. An argument with two premises and one conclusion, for instance, would take on the following standard form:

1. Statement (premise 1)
2. Statement (premise 2)

3. Statement (conclusion)

There are various equally suitable conventions in use to designate premise(s) and conclusions, for instance, a list with “P1” and “C” instead of the remarks in brackets or three points rather than a line to indicate the conclusion (see, for instance, Henle, Garfield & Tymoczko 2012; Tetens 2006). Graphic representations in the form of diagrams or maps can also be helpful here, whether with boxes (filled with individual statements) or connecting arrows (for supporting relationships). Both individual arguments can be presented in this way – as an alternative to the standard form (see Harrell 2012: 32) – as well as relationships between several arguments – as an extension of the

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16 Valuable tips on reconstructing arguments in standard form can be found in Betz 2016: sect. 5.3; Brun 2016: 262-267; Brun/Hirsch Hadorn 2014: Section 8.2; D’Agostini 2010: ch. 4; Govier 1988: ch. 2, 23f.; Tetens 2006: ch. 6.
In a second step, students reconstruct arguments in standard form from text passages that contain incomplete arguments (B.II.2, B.II.3). In this way, they become familiar with the need for completeness in argument reconstructions (X.II.3) and understand that superfluous premises must be removed while an implicit conclusion as well as implicit or missing premises must be added (X.II.4).

The requirement of completeness does not only apply to the interpretation of the arguments of others but also the development of one’s own arguments. By performing complete reconstructions of their own arguments, students improve their clarity and precision (A.II.1). This also makes it easier for them to write texts with a clear argumentative structure (A.II.2), which in turn makes it as easy as possible for others to reconstruct the arguments according to their intended, complete structure.

The sub-competences of the interpretation of arguments flow quite naturally into the sub-competences for evaluating arguments, in which the requirement of completeness also plays a special role. Until this point, students have evaluated whether a statement or an argument is relevant for a certain topic only in an intuitive way (C.I.1). Now, in a first step forward, they evaluate whether a given argument is relevant to a given statement and, if so, whether the argument either supports, criticizes, or remains neutral with respect to that statement (C.II.1). In a second step, they learn to evaluate an argument with regard to its completeness and possible redundancy (C.II.2). Only then can passages with incomplete arguments be reconstructed into complete arguments by adding premises, as mentioned above.

In this context, students must understand and take to heart the principle of charity (X.II.2). In general, the principle states that an argument should be interpreted and reconstructed in the strongest way possible, given the wording and the context of the discussion in which it is embedded. All interpretive decisions that render the argument unnecessarily implausible should be avoided. This includes efforts to arrive at an adequate formulation of the content as well as the complete reconstruction of the argument, in which all and only the relevant premises are included. (We expand on this aspect from level III onwards.) Relevant premises that remain implicit should be added, provided that the person making the argument can be presumed to accept them (X.II.4). Among other things, a charitable interpretation can prevent a reconstruction of an argument as a so-called straw man argument, that is an argument which can be easily refuted but no longer corresponds to the argument originally put forward. The stronger one reconstructs an argument on behalf of its proponents, the more convincing a possible criticism will be.

Once students have become familiar with the requirement for completeness in arguments, it is appropriate to introduce a distinction between two types of criticism (C.II.3): on the one hand, criticism of the contents of the premises and, on the other hand, criticism of the form of arguments (for instance, that they must be complete). The second type of criticism is explained in more detail from level III onwards (see section 6.1), when deductive and non-deductive arguments, as well as fallacies, are addressed. The fundamental concepts of (deductive) validity and soundness of arguments (X.III.2) can also be introduced already at this point. In any case, at level II, it is already possible and appropriate to familiarize students with certain fallacies and other argumentation errors. This applies in particular to those errors that concern the relevance of the premises for the
conclusion and the completeness of arguments, for instance, the ignoratio elenchi (missing the point), the petitio principii (begging the question, assuming what is to be demonstrated) and the is-ought fallacy (C.II.4), all of which we will briefly characterize here.17

The ignoratio elenchi is closely related to the straw man argument described above. In the case of this error of argumentation, a different conclusion is justified than was originally at issue. This error also sets in when, instead of properly refuting the premise of a given argument (see also section 5), this premise is incorrectly reproduced, such that the new argument fails to hit its target. Such an argument is therefore not relevant to the subject or the thesis in question, after all.

The other two errors of argumentation, the petitio principii and the is-ought fallacy, concern the completeness of an argument, each in their own way. In the case of a petitio principii, the conclusion to be justified is either explicitly or implicitly presupposed by one of the premises. In a formal sense, a circular argument is not a problem, because everything follows from itself. What is problematic, however, is that the truth of the conclusion is presupposed by the premise in question, which nullifies the justificatory function of the premise for the conclusion. Those who are not already convinced by the conclusion will also reject the premise in question. The other premises, for their part, are not sufficient to infer the conclusion.

An argument that contains an is-ought fallacy is incomplete in a different way.18 This mistake occurs when a normative conclusion is inferred from purely descriptive premises. This means that purely descriptive statements about what is the case are used to infer, for example, what ought to be the case or whether it is good. The normative content of the conclusion, however, is precisely what remains to be justified by the premises. Without at least one relevant normative premise the argument cannot make this leap. In this sense, it is incomplete. An is-ought fallacy can be easily amended by adding a suitable normative premise. Then, of course, this added premise can be closely examined and possibly refuted. Being able to add normative premises which otherwise would have remained implicit and thereby to allow for their explicit and critical discussion is a very important competence, which results from a combination of the sub-competences presented at this level.

5. Optional Branching Point: Arguing within a Discussion

After students have acquired the basic skills for the development, interpretation, and evaluation of individual arguments at level II, these competences can be enriched with more specific elements, which, among other things, deepen their ability to argue within a discussion context. After all, single arguments are always embedded in discussions in which various questions and further

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18 The is-ought fallacy is sometimes also referred to as the naturalistic fallacy. However, this wrongly suggests that normative conclusions would only be problematic if they were drawn from descriptive statements, e.g. about natural facts. Regardless of the content of the premises, however, any transition from purely descriptive premises to normative conclusions is problematic. The designation “is-ought fallacy” is imprecise as well, since it suggests that only the inference from purely descriptive premises to ought-statements is problematic, whereas this also applies to inferences to evaluative and prescriptive statements (see fn. 15). However, we stick to this established name as an umbrella term here.
arguments are being negotiated. In this regard, we rely on a helpful overview of this topic by Gregor Betz (2016). The relevant competences (see sections 5.1 and 5.2) can be incorporated quite flexibly at various points. For instance, they can

1. either branch out directly from level II without touching upon the contents of levels III and IV, or
2. be fully discussed only in connection to levels III or IV, or even
3. be divided between levels III and IV, without being more closely connected with the other contents of these levels.

Overall, we find the third option to be somewhat more feasible than the first two, given that the relevant single competences for arguing within the context of a discussion exhibit various levels of complexity themselves. In particular cases, however, the other two options may be better. The appendix subdivides the relevant competences between levels III and IV. From level II onwards, it also includes references to these competences in order to clearly demarcate this branching out within the logic of argumentative competences without unnecessarily overcomplicating the table. By explaining the specific individual competences in this separate section, however, we follow their thematic connections more closely.

5.1 Coherence and Overview

The first step for arguing within the context of a debate revolves around the concepts of contradiction, consistency, and coherence (X.III.7) and can be found at level II within our proposal. There it may, for instance, be connected with the topic of the (deductive) validity of arguments, in which accepting the premises and rejecting the conclusion would represent a contradiction (see Sections 6.1, 6.3).

Students improve their competences in developing their own arguments by dealing with potential contradictions in the totality of the statements and arguments they have made (A.III.3). They develop new arguments with a special focus on examining potential tensions and dissonances and, when possible, resolve them if they actually arise.¹⁹

These skills also play a role in the interpretation of the arguments of others: students evaluate the extent to which a certain argument coheres with other arguments, for example, with those which their proponent has already endorsed (C.III.3). This further develops the competences of interpretation and reconstruction covered in level II. For instance, when applying the principle of charity (X.II.2), students learn to consider the broader argumentative context in order to avoid careless attributions of contradictions and instead explore alternative avenues of interpretation.

In addition, at this stage students develop the ability to identify the central theses of longer texts and discussions, to recognize individual arguments for or against them, and to reconstruct them in their own words (B.III.3). Students do not only work on simple pro-con lists but reconstruct individual elements from these lists as arguments with their own internal structure.

¹⁹ This also plays a special role in philosophy and ethics education in general (see, e.g., Barz 2019; Burkard et al. 2018; Henke 2015).
5.2 Mapping and Diagnosis

The second step is classified in level IV in our proposal and includes a more detailed analysis of the relationships between arguments (X.IV.4), especially of the support- and the so-called attack-relations\(^{20}\) which are defined as follows (see for instance, Betz 2016: 189):

- An argument supports another argument if and only if the conclusion of the supporting argument corresponds exactly to one of the premises of the supported argument.
- An argument attacks another argument if and only if the conclusion of the attacking argument corresponds exactly to the negation of one of the premises of the attacked argument.

With these conceptual tools, students can practice interpreting first shorter and then also longer texts and discussions in such a way that they not only distill the arguments for and against a specific thesis (B.III.3) but also create so-called “reason hierarchies” or “debate-maps” (B.IV.3). That is, among other things, they can practice distinguishing “first-level” arguments for or against a core thesis from the “second-level” support and objections related to them, etc. Visualizations are quite suitable for this purpose, whether on posters or with the aid of specialized software (see for example https://argdown.org/).

This mapping competence is closely linked to another competence within the field of evaluation (C.IV.3). In the light of possible indirect connections between different arguments, students now also evaluate to what extent a new argument in a debate context is suitable to indirectly strengthen or weaken a certain central thesis or position. They also consider other mediated relationships that can arise between arguments. For example:

- the indirect strengthening of a thesis or of an argument, for instance by countering an objection to it,
- the indirect weakening of a thesis or an argument, for instance by criticizing arguments that support it,
- the possible circularity of chains of supporting arguments – also in contradistinction to the *petitio principii* (X.II.5).

Such insights also affect the core competence of developing one’s own arguments. Students can now reflectively formulate and express their arguments in such a way that they, for instance, indirectly support their own statements and arguments or that they indirectly criticize competing statements or arguments (A.IV.3).

\(^{20}\) The warlike imagery of the term “attack” is anything but unproblematic (see e.g., Cohen 1995). We retain the established technical term for this attack relation due to a lack of better alternatives. Still, we would like to point out that it concerns attacks on statements and not on persons (see the argumentation error ad hominem) and that such attacks, i.e., arguments against specific premises of other arguments, are an indispensable part also and particularly of the common search for knowledge in friendly, constructive discussions.
6. Level III: Intermediate
At the intermediate level III, previously developed competences are extended to more fine-grained elements of the analysis of arguments. The focus here lies on becoming able to more precisely evaluate the strength of single arguments regarding their form. Furthermore, this level focuses on incorporating these competences in the interpretation of arguments put forward by others as well as in the formulation of one’s own arguments. In addition, further competences from the domain of argumentation in a debate context can be integrated here (see Section 5, esp. 5.1).

6.1. Specifying the Strength of Support in Arguments
The starting point for the steps taken here is the rather intuitive concept of the completeness of arguments and their reconstructions which the students have worked with so far (X.II.3). Now we will take a closer look at what “completeness” consists in. We will therefore clarify the impression students already have that certain premises guarantee a certain conclusion. Students understand that what matters here is the form of the argument and the rules that underlie the inferences (X.III.1). Thus, evaluating the plausibility of single arguments is closely tied to the evaluation of the plausibility of arguments with the same structure. Given this background, the concept of completeness is now refined by way of two new concepts:

1. (deductive) validity (X.III.2) – understood as the property of an argument such that the conclusion must be true provided that all premises are also true since there is no structurally identical argument whose premises are true but whose conclusion is false.\(^{21}\)
2. non-deductive strength (X.III.3) – understood as the property of an argument to not be (deductively) valid, but to create a strong transfer of plausibility from the premises to the conclusion through its argumentative structure.

In the context of teaching, these abstract categories referring to the forms of arguments and principles of inference should be conveyed in connection with concrete examples. It may also be appropriate to ask students to extract the abstract categories from the examples given below. They are accordingly divided into examples of deductive (section 6.3) and non-deductive forms of arguments and inference rules (section 6.4). However, in presenting these argument forms in separate subsections, we do not propose any order for teaching and learning of deductive and non-deductive inferences. Level III conveys the most common and fundamental forms of inference. Level IV (advanced) addresses more complex ones. To begin with, however, section 6.2 provides a general background by relating the above considerations to the three core argumentative competences our framework is meant to further.

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\(^{21}\) On this basis, the notion of soundness can also be introduced, understood as the property of an argument to be both (deductively) valid and to have only true or plausible premises. In this context, some German texts also use “Schlüssigkeit” (see e.g., Rosenkranz 2006; van Riel & Vosgerau 2018) or “Beweiskräftigkeit” (see e.g., Strobach 2011). The term “validity” is also called “Schlüssigkeit” in some texts (see e.g., Tetens 2006). As long as the terms are appropriately determined and do not cause confusion, various labeling decisions are of course unproblematic.
6.2 Argument Forms and Argumentative Competences

The new content of level III revolves around the familiarization with specific forms of arguments which relate to corresponding background concepts. In what follows, we explain how these forms of arguments are central to all three core competences.

In interpreting arguments, students acquire the ability to recognize the relevant deductive and non-deductive inference rules for arguments and to reconstruct them accordingly (B.III.1, B.III.2). That is, they learn to detect the structures of these inferences more easily and become better at formulating premises in the reconstruction of an argument in such a way that the inference rules are more clearly recognizable (building on B.II.1), for instance by adding implicit premisses (building on B.II.2)

In evaluating arguments, students acquire the ability to assess those arguments more precisely which exhibit a form which either corresponds to the relevant deductive or non-deductive inference pattern (the positive case) or deviates from it in characteristic ways. In this latter, negative case, one can speak of deductive fallacies or weak non-deductive inferences (C.III.1, C.III.2).

These competences in evaluation are, in turn, closely connected to the competences in interpretation presented above. For if an argument seems to involve a fallacy, one must, according to the principle of charity (X.II.2), consider the broader context and seek alternative possible reconstructions which make the argument more plausible than its perhaps simply inaccurate wording suggests. In the presentation of the forms of inference in the following sections, we use the keyword “charitable reconstruction” to mention relevant aspects which students may consider in their interpretations. In addition, when we introduce a fallacy, we also provide a suitable example in which the corresponding premises are clearly true but the corresponding conclusion is clearly false.

In developing arguments, students acquire the ability to reflectively apply the relevant deductive and non-deductive reasoning principles in their own arguments (A.III.1, A.III.2). That is, they learn to make use of their knowledge of the justificatory power of a given argument form when finding their own arguments and to elucidate this structure, whether orally or in writing, in such a way that the persuasive power of their arguments is clearly strengthened (building on A.II.2).

6.3 Deductive Inferences

The deductive inferences of level III can be divided into two groups. The first group includes conditionals (“if-then-sentences”) and the necessary and sufficient conditions expressed therein (X.III.4). The distinction between these two types of conditions is therefore as central here as the notion of a conditional itself and the different ways in which conditionals can be expressed (for instance, “if” vs. “only if”). Included here are both the simple, propositional form (“if p, then q”) and the commonly encountered universally quantified form, the general conditional (for instance, “Everything that is F is G”) (X.III.5). Accordingly, at this point, students grasp three particular inference rules (1–3) along with the fallacies associated with them (4–5). Through the interplay of universal instantiation and modus ponens, one can reconstruct, among other things, those arguments in which general moral principles are applied to specific cases. These rightly play an important role in philosophy and ethics classes, often under the name of “practical syllogism” (see
Althoff 2016a, among others).

1. **Modus ponens**: “if p, then q” and “p” entail “q”.
2. **Modus tollens**: “if p, then q” and “not q” entail “not p”.
3. **Universal instantiation**: What is true for everything is also true for some arbitrary individual, for instance: “everything that is F is G” entails “if a is F, then a is G”.
4. **Affirming the consequent**: “if p, then q” and “q” does not entail “p”.
   
   Example: “When I sleep, I lie down. I lie down. But I do not sleep. (I read and lie on the sofa.)”
   
   **Charitable reconstruction**: Is the affirmed condition merely necessary or is it also sufficient? If the latter, it is a valid modus ponens and not a fallacy.
5. **Denying the antecedent**: “if p, then q” and “not p” do not entail “not q”.
   
   Example: “When I sleep, I lie down. I do not sleep. But I lie down. (I read and lie on the sofa.)”
   
   **Charitable reconstruction**: Is the negated condition merely sufficient or is it also necessary? If the latter, it is a valid modus tollens and not a fallacy.

The second group comprises disjunctions and exclusive disjunctions, that is, statements with an inclusive or exclusive “or” (X.III.6). Here, too, we consider various linguistic expressions (for instance, “either” does not necessarily have an exclusionary effect) and we consider valid inferential principles (6–7) as well as false inferences (8–9).

6. **Disjunctive syllogism**: “p or q” and “not p” entail “q”.
7. **Exclusive disjunctive syllogism**: “p or q, but not both” and “p” entail “not q”.
8. **False alternative (also: incomplete disjunction)**: Arguments with disjunctions as premises are only convincing if the disjunction mentions all relevant or possible cases. If not, the disjunction is incomplete. This is, however, not a criticism of the validity of the argument itself, that is, not a fallacy in the narrow sense, but a criticism of the premise in question.
   
   Example: In the case of the disjunctive syllogism, for example: The argument, “Either I will become rich or I will become grinding poor. I will not become grinding poor. Thus, I will become rich.” is flawed because it assumes an incomplete disjunction. In addition to “I will become rich” and “I will become grinding poor,” there are other options.
   
   **Charitable reconstruction**: Have the additional options, which would also have to be inserted into the disjunction, not been mentioned elsewhere?
9. **False exclusive disjunctive syllogism**: “p or q” and “p” do not entail “not q”.
   
   Example: “Either Mom or Dad come to pick you up. Dad comes to pick you up. Still, it is not true that Mom does not come to pick you up. (Both come.)”
   
   **Charitable reconstruction**: Is the “or” statement really appropriately reconstructed as an inclusive disjunction? If an exclusive disjunction is appropriate, then the conclusion is a valid exclusive disjunctive syllogism.

In light of these examples of valid inferences (1–3, 6–7), the general notion of (deductive) validity
(X.III.2) mentioned in Section 6.1 becomes much more tangible for students. The examples above are well suited to accompany the notion of deductive reasoning as prime examples. They do this, inter alia, by providing a particularly clear illustration of how accepting the premises in question while simultaneously rejecting the conclusion would lead to a contradiction.  

### 6.4 Non-deductive Inferences

We have grouped three non-deductive inferences here at level III because they are both frequent and accessible. They can be taken up and taught in any order. Similarly, they can be flexibly supplemented by other argument patterns which are sufficiently relevant but not too complex. For each of the three non-deductive inference patterns, we also mention suitable avenues of criticism which go beyond the simple and uninformative remark that they are invalid.

10. **Generalization,** understood as the inference from specific to general statements (X.III.5), in simple variants, for instance from “the known / investigated things of kind F exhibit property G” to “everything that is F is G”.  
   **Possible criticism:** for instance: (a) The unknown / unexamined things of kind F differ from the known / examined ones in a way relevant to property G. (b) We had categorically excluded everything that is not G from being F, but maybe that was wrong? (Example: We had categorically excluded everything non-white from being a swan.)  

11. **Inference to the best explanation** in a simple form, for instance, understood as the inference from “p” and “q is the best explanation for p” to “q”.  
   **Possible criticism:** There is another, better explanation for “p”.  

12. **Argument by analogy** in a simple form, for instance, understood as the inference from “p is the case in domain A” and “the domains A and B are analogous, such that the state of affairs p in A corresponds to the state of affairs q in B” to “q is the case in domain B”.  
   **Possible criticism:** Domains A and B are disanalogous in relevant respects. Or: In the analogy between these domains, the state of affairs p in A does not correspond to the state of affairs q in B.

In light of these examples of strong non-deductive inferences, the general notion of the non-deductive strength of arguments (X.III.3) mentioned in section 6.1 becomes much more tangible for students. The examples listed here are well suited to accompany the notion of non-deductive strength as prime examples.

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22 This is not only a further development of the notion of (deductive) validity by means of the notion of contradiction but at the same time also the basis for the development of an independent notion of logical consistency (X.III.7). This is the basis for a further competence in the evaluation of arguments in a debate context (C.III.3, see section 5.1).  
24 See, e.g., Bowell & Kemp 2015: 167–169; Govier 1988; Lyons & Ward 2018: Section 4.5, 257–259; Pfister 2013: Section 3.7; Pfister 2020: ch. 15; Walton et al. 2008: 10, 207, as well as the more complex variants in level IV.  
25 See, e.g., Brun & Hirsch Hadorn 2014: 294–299; Govier 1988: ch. 10; Löwenstein 2015; Lyons & Ward 2018: Section 4.4; Pfister 2013: Section 3.5; Tetens 2006: ch. 15; Walton et al. 2008: ch. 2, as well as the more complex variants in level IV.
7. Level IV: Advanced

Level IV closely follows level III in terms of content and structure. Here, too, background concepts in the form of important deductive and non-deductive forms of reasoning play an important role, especially in that they expand upon the three core argumentative competences of developing, interpreting, and evaluating arguments. These relationships were presented in detail in section 6.2 for level III and are much the same in level IV. Accordingly, we begin by presenting the deductive inference rules that are grouped here (section 7.1), followed by the non-deductive argument forms, again in connection with related fallacies and errors of argumentation (section 7.2). In addition, further competences in argumentation within a debate context can also be integrated here (see section 5, esp. 5.2).

7.1 More complex Deductive Inferences

Level IV’s more complex deductive inferences can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of the inference rules 13–16. They often occur together and should therefore ideally be taught together (the interaction of 15 and 16, for example, covers numerous classical syllogisms).

13. Transitivity: “if p, then q” and “if q, then r” entail “if p, then r”.
14. Contraposition: “if p, then q” entails “if not q, then not p”.
15. Universal transitivity: “Everything that is F is G” and “Everything that is G is H” entail “Everything that is F is H”.
16. Universal contraposition: “Everything that is F is G” entails "Everything that is not G is not F”.

In addition, other forms of statements are distinguished and applied with regard to widespread principles of reasoning: conjunctions and biconditionals as well as existentially quantified propositions and the general distinction between existential and universal quantifiers (X.IV.1). Accordingly, and in addition to the above group, we propose to discuss the inference rules 17–20 as well as related fallacies (21). That being said, one can also include other forms of inference here, thus building a bridge to classical logic at the introductory university level.

17. De Morgan’s laws: (a) “not (p and q)” entails “(not p) or (not q)” and vice versa. (b) “not (p or q)” entails “(not p) and (not q)” and vice versa.
18. Constructive dilemma: “p or q”, “if p, then r” and “if q, then r” entail “r” (analogously with additional disjuncts).
19. Universal constructive dilemma: “Everything that is F is G or H”, “Everything that is G is I” and “Everything that is H is I” entail “Everything that is F is I” (analogously with additional disjuncts).
20. Duality: (a) “It is not the case that everything that is F is G” entails “There is something that is F and not G” and vice versa. (b) “All that is F is G” entails “It is not the case that there is something that is F and not G” and vice versa.
21. Fallacies with existentially quantified propositions: for instance: (a) “There is something that is F” and “There is something that is G” do not entail “There is something that is F
and G”. (b) “For everything that is F, there is something that is connected to the former by the relational property G” does not entail “There is something that is connected to everything that is F by the relational property G”. *Example* for (b), which occurs in a very simple variant of the Cosmological Argument (“All events have a cause. Therefore: there is a cause of all events.”): “All people have parents. But it is not the case that there is a parent of all people.” *Charitable reconstruction:* Are there any other considerations that play a role in justifying the conclusion?

### 7.2 More complex Non-deductive Inferences and Further Errors in Reasoning

The non-deductive inferences assembled here are not a close-knit group, just like the inferences at level III (see section 6.4). They can therefore be taught in any order as well as selectively and may even be supplemented by other forms of inference. In the following, we also mention appropriate tools for a targeted criticism of arguments of the respective form.

#### 22. Generalization in more complex forms

*Generalization* in more complex forms, for instance, as arguments by analogy of the form “The known / examined things of kind F exhibit property G,” and “The set of known / examined things of kind F and the totality of things of kind F are structurally analogous,” to “Everything that is F is G”. Alternatively, as arguments by analogy in a more complex form (see below) or with further statistical analysis. *Possible criticism:* for instance, see argument by analogy below.

#### 23. Inference to the best explanation in more complex forms

*Inference to the best explanation* in more complex forms, for instance, as the inference from “p” and “in the explanation of p, criteria K are relevant” and “q is, given the criteria K, the best explanation for p” to “q”. *Possible criticism:* for instance: (a) There is another, better explanation for the fact that p, in light of criteria K. (Ideally: Namely ...) (b) For the fact that p, the criteria K are not relevant. (Ideally: The relevant criteria are instead ...)

#### 24. Argument by analogy in more complex forms

*Argument by analogy* in more complex forms, for instance, as the inference from “(S) The domains A and B are structurally identical with respect to aspect Z”, “p,” and “If (S), then p is true if and only if q is true” to “q”. *Possible criticism:* for instance: (a) The domains A and B are not structurally identical at all with respect to aspect Z. (Ideally: This structural difference is shown by ...) (b) If the domains A and B are structurally identical with respect to aspect Z, then it is not the case that p is true if and only if q is true. (Ideally: Rather, p would be true if and only if ...)

#### 25. Arguments from authority / expertise

*Arguments from authority / expertise* for instance, as the inference from “S claims that p” and “whether p is true belongs to domain B” and “S is a pertinent expert / authority for domain B” to “p”.

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26 See the footnote on simpler variants in level III.  
27 See the footnote on simpler variants in level III.  
28 See the footnote on simpler variants in level III.  
29 For example: (S) Mice and humans are very similar (structurally the same) in terms of their relevant physiological characteristics. p: The new drug is effective in mice. If (S) then: If p, then the new drug also works in humans. Thus: The new drug also works in humans.  
Possible criticism: for instance: (a) Whether p is true does not belong to domain B. (Ideally: It rather belongs to the following area...) (b) S is no expert / authority for domain B at all. (c) There are too many other relevant experts / authorities for domain B who do not claim that p.

Next to these argument patterns, we also suggest covering other fallacies and more complex errors of argumentation at this level. These can also be selected and arranged in several ways and they can be supplemented with other forms of inference – or even be selectively included earlier (for instance, simple variants of *ad hominem* in levels III or even II).

26. *ad hominem.*[^31] A criticism of a person making an argument does not entail a criticism of the argument they proposed.

*Advanced consideration:* This is also the case with arguments from authority / expertise (see above): In this case, one can certainly criticize the expertise / authority of S (variant (b), possibly (c), above), but this does not thereby impact upon the person who presented the argument (which relies on somebody else as an expert / authority).

27. *post hoc, ergo propter hoc.*[^32] One can by no means conclude that event A is the (or a partial) cause of event B simply from the fact that A took place before B.

28. *Fallacy of Equivocation.*[^33] The use of an ambiguous expression in an argument in which (a) the inference to the conclusion depends on the expression in question being used with a uniform meaning for all premises, but (b) that expression is used with different meanings in the different premises.

**Concluding Remarks**

The systematic framework for the development of argumentative skills proposed here is an answer to the tension described in section 1. On the one hand, the teaching of argumentative skills is seen as an important task of education in philosophy and ethics. As stated at the outset, these objectives are to be found both in the research literature on the teaching and learning of philosophy and in the national and federal curricula. On the other hand, neither curricula nor teaching materials in the German-speaking world offer sufficient guidance for systematically furthering these skills in the classroom. This is precisely where the framework for fostering argumentative skills presented here, with its precise, progressively designed standards, comes into play. These standards for developing, interpreting, and evaluating arguments can support teachers in systematically guiding learners to develop argumentative competences. The competences at the introductory and basic levels can already be taught from the beginning of secondary school onwards. Since the levels are designed systematically rather than with respect to age-groups, however, the same standards can also be used for higher grades in schools or at the introductory university level.

The specific implementation of these standards in teaching and learning can take many forms;

[^31]: See, e.g., Govier 1988: 108–112, also on the relationship between *ad hominem* and arguments from authority.


further inquiry into this matter is beyond the scope of this article. Concrete exercises to illustrate the standards as well as accompanying handouts for students are currently in development within the DFG-network “Argumentieren in der Schule” (Argumentation in Secondary Schools). The draft presented here can and should be continuously tested and revised further, both by means of such additions as well as by practical implementations and trials. Its touchstone, however, is the integration of the practice of developing, interpreting, and evaluating arguments into the engagement with philosophical questions and texts in interplay with further teaching objectives. Even the trickiest logical analyses in the classroom are not intended as a mere game, but students must experience them as illuminating contributions to answering genuine philosophical questions.34

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34 We would like to extend sincere thanks to Dominik Balg, Jürn Gottschalk, Eva Hinternesch, David Lanius, Hanna Lucks, Annika von Lüpke, Laura Martena, and Katharina Schulz as well as two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback on drafts of this text, and to Ian Polakiewicz for help with the English version.
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| III. | A.III.1 | Students reflectively use simple deductive inferences (modus ponens, modus tollens, exclusion principle, disjunctive syllogisms) in their own arguments.  
A.III.2 | Students reflectively use simple non-deductive inferences (e.g., generalizations, analogies, inference to the best explanation) in their own arguments.  
A.III.3 | Students develop their own arguments in a reflective way so that they cohere with their own arguments/statements.  
Possibly A.IV.3. (see below) |
| B.III.1 | Students identify simple deductive inferences (see left) in arguments at hand and reconstruct them appropriately.  
B.III.2 | Students identify simple non-deductive inferences (see left) in arguments at hand and reconstruct them accordingly.  
B.III.3 | Students interpret texts and discussions in such a way that they identify a central thesis as well as the individual arguments for and against this thesis (pro/con list).  
Possibly B.IV.3. (see below) |
| C.III.1 | Students evaluate support relationships in arguments in deductive inferences (see left) and identify faulty inferences in this context (mistaking a necessary condition for a sufficient condition or vice versa, false alternative, false exclusive disjunction).  
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Possibly C.IV.3. (see below) |
| X.III.1 | argument form, inference rule  
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X.III.3 | non-deductive strength of support relationships  
X.III.4 | conditionals, sufficient condition, necessary condition, modus ponens, modus tollens  
X.III.5 | general vs. specific statement (also: conditional), universal specification  
X.III.6 | disjunction, exclusive disjunction, false alternative (also: incomplete disjunction), false exclusive disjunction  
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Possibly X.IV.6. (see below) |
| IV. | A.IV.1 Students reflectively use more complex deductive inferences (e.g., chain inferences, contrapositions, dilemma inferences, De Morgan’s laws, dual quantifiers) in their own arguments.  
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B.IV.2 Students identify more complex non-deductive inferences (see left) in arguments and reconstruct them accordingly.  
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C.IV.1 Students evaluate support relationships in arguments in more complex deductive reasoning (see left) and identify faulty inferences in this context.  
C.IV.2 Students evaluate support relationships in arguments in more complex non-deductive inferences (see left) and identify faulty inferences in this context (e.g., disanalogy, better explanation).  
C.IV.3 Students evaluate to what extent an argument within a debate context is likely to indirectly strengthen or weaken other arguments / positions (also in more complex phenomena, e.g., circular chains of arguments).  
C.IV.4 Students identify more complex fallacies and errors of reasoning (e.g., *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, equivocation, *ad hominem*, ...).  
X.IV.1 other propositional forms: conjunction, biconditionals, existential propositions, universal and existential quantifiers  
X.IV.2 criteria and aspects of analogies and disanalogies (structures of domains, structural equality and inequality)  
X.IV.3 criteria and aspects of the evaluation of explanations, the need for explanations  
X.IV.4 argument-relationships (support, attack)  
X.IV.5 more complex fallacies and errors of reasoning (e.g., *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, equivocation, *ad hominem*, ...) |
|---|---|
| A.IV.2 Students reflectively use more complex non-deductive inferences (e.g., more complex variants of the forms of inference covered in Level III, arguments from authority) in their own arguments.  
A.IV.3 Students develop their own arguments reflectively in such a way that they are suitable to support other arguments/statements of their own and, if necessary, to critique other, competing arguments/statements.  
B.IV.2 Students identify more complex non-deductive inferences (see left) in arguments and reconstruct them accordingly.  
B.IV.3 Students interpret texts and discussions in such a way that they work out the various support and attack relationships of the arguments and theses among each other (hierarchy of reasons, debate map).  
C.IV.2 Students evaluate support relationships in arguments in more complex non-deductive inferences (see left) and identify faulty inferences in this context (e.g., disanalogy, better explanation).  
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Country Report: Flemish Community – The Dawn of Philosophy Education in Flanders

Griet Galle, Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Belgium
griet.galle@kuleuven.be

General information about the Flemish Community and its educational system

The Belgian education system consists of three levels: (1) elementary school, which includes nursery school (ages 2.5-6) and primary school (ages 6-12), (2) secondary school (ages 12-18), and (3) higher education (ages 18+). Education (but not school attendance) is compulsory up to age 18. Because of the active freedom of education in Belgium, schools are free in the way they teach their pupils (Claes, Henkens, Simons, Wittens 2020: 24, 30).

Since 1989, almost all aspects of Belgian education policy fall under the competence of the governments of three communities: the Flemish Community, the French Community, and the German-speaking Community (Claes et al. 2020: 36). In this report, I shall concentrate specifically on philosophy education in the Flemish Community, focussing on Dutch-language schools both in Flanders as well as in the bilingual (French-Dutch) Brussels-Capital Region. (For philosophy education in the French Community, see Herla 2020 in the previous volume of this journal.) The Flemish government formulates attainment targets, which describe what students have to learn. Due to freedom of education, these attainment targets do not describe how (using which methods and didactical approaches) students have to learn.

In the Flemish Community, schools belong either (1) to ‘official education’ established by the government (e.g. ‘GO! schools’, established by the Flemish community) or (2) to ‘free education’, set up by a private organisation and consisting almost entirely of catholic schools (catering to 72 % pupils in secondary education) (Claes et al. 2020: 13–17).

Secondary education consists of three stages, each spanning two years. In the second and the third stage, there are four forms of education: (1) general (aso, 37.6 % pupils in the third stage, prepares for higher education), (2) technical (tso, 32.2 %, prepares either for higher education or both higher education and the labour market), (3) artistic (kso, 2.5 %, also prepares either for higher education or for both higher education and the labour market), and (4) vocational (bso, 27.7 %), which prepares for the labour market (Onderwijs Vlaanderen 2021). From the second stage onwards, pupils have to choose a specific study-field, such as Latin-Mathematics, Building and Wood Sciences, or Tourism. Currently, the Flemish community does not organise central exams but plans to do so in the future.

Past and current situation of philosophy in primary education

In nursery and primary schools, philosophy is not embedded in a structural manner, yet there are a few scattered initiatives for philosophizing with children led by enthusiastic school directors, teachers, and parents. Some Teacher’s Training programmes for nursery and primary education contain either an optional or a mandatory (part of a) course in guiding a philosophical conversation with children. Sometimes a philosophical conversation leader is invited to a class to lead a discussion. University College Odisee sets up small-scale projects to stimulate critical
thinking and philosophizing in schools, for example, about nature, science, and technology, or media communication. Educational organisations that promote sustainable development or (world) citizenship in schools use philosophical thinking as one of their methods.

**Past situation of philosophy in secondary schools**

**Philosophy as an optional course**

Until 2021-22, philosophy has never been part of the curriculum implemented by the government. Since 1974, it has been organised as an optional subject in a few schools, under the names ‘Contemporary Philosophical Currents’ (1974-1992), ‘Philosophical Currents’ (1993-2004), and ‘Philosophy’ (from 2005 onwards) – mainly in aso- and kso-schools. ‘Optional’ enables two choices: some schools decide to organise philosophy as a subject in the part of the curriculum that they can freely fill in, but pupils are obliged to take the subject; in other schools, pupils can freely choose among several electives, of which philosophy or philosophizing is one. In 2019-20, 38 schools offered philosophy as a subject, and, in addition, some schools organised projects on philosophizing. The learning plans, compiled in the 1990s, had a thematic approach but encouraged teachers to also incorporate a historical dimension: mainly philosophical anthropology for the catholic schools and several sub-disciplines for GO! schools. As the learning plans are rather outdated and teachers are free to determine what they teach in an optional course, the plans are mostly not in use anymore (Galle 2020: 61–67).

**Philosophy as part of the subject ‘Cultural Sciences’**

From 2002-03 onwards, philosophy has been a part of ‘Cultural Sciences’, a subject that is organised only in the aso-study-field of Human Sciences. With ca 4,500 fifth-year pupils (predominantly girls) receiving three hours per week of philosophy over about half a year, this was the most widespread form of philosophy education until 2020-21. The learning plans for Cultural Sciences in the catholic schools contain the following themes: ‘what is philosophy’, ‘man and society’, ‘science and technology’, and ‘good and evil’. Some teachers of Cultural Sciences have studied philosophy, but most have a degree in another area of the humanities or the social sciences. As a result of educational reforms, Cultural Sciences has been replaced by other subjects, among which is philosophy (cf. infra), starting in 2021-22, in the third year (and in 2023-24, in the fifth year) (Galle 2020: 67–70).

**Current situation of philosophy in secondary schools: Philosophy as a mandatory subject in study-fields concerning man and society**

As a part of educational reform, new **attainment targets** for secondary education have been approved by the Flemish government in February 2021. Attainment targets for philosophy have been formulated for the first time in the history of education in Flanders. As these attainment targets are specific, they apply solely to particular study-fields, namely fields focusing on man and society. From the 2021-22 school year onwards, students in the aso-study-field of Human Sciences, the aso-study-field of Rudolf Steiner Pedagogy, and the iso-study-field of Social and Welfare Sciences (which prepares for higher education in the social, pedagogical, and medical domain) will follow either one or two compulsory hours of philosophy per week from the third
to the sixth year. Based on current student-numbers in these fields of study and adding up the number of students in all four years, it can be estimated that approximately 46,000 pupils will follow philosophy annually (Galle 2020: 71–73, Onderwijs Vlaanderen 2021).

The attainment targets stipulate that pupils learn to apply the basics of logic and argumentation theory as well as reflect on theories associated with the sub-disciplines of philosophical anthropology, ethics, and political philosophy. With regard to these sub-disciplines, they are expected to discuss philosophical concepts and theories, compare and interpret theories, and cultivate philosophical skills in order to learn developing a well-reasoned argument (skills such as asking philosophical questions, reading texts, arguing either in favour or against a view, criticising one’s own view, participating in a Socratic conversation, etc.). For pupils in Human Sciences, the sub-disciplines of ontology, epistemology, and philosophy of science are added, along with the requirement that attention is paid to the tradition of philosophy and that pupils learn to write texts with a philosophical dimension (Vlaamse Regering 2020, attachment 7: 51–56, 207–210). As the attainment targets specify only certain concepts (e.g. being and becoming, a priori and a posteriori, justice) and theories (e.g. monism and dualism, utilitarianism and deontological ethics, empiricism, and rationalism) that are to be taught and do not either isolate specific philosophers or prescribe particular methods, they offer a lot of freedom to the teachers for choosing their own topics and methods (Galle 2020: 72–73).

Schools of the ‘official education’ work with the attainment targets outlined above. The few schools that organise Rudolf Steiner Pedagogy write their own attainment targets, which are required to be equivalent to the official ones in order to be approved. Catholic schools use learning plans with objectives written by the umbrella organisation ‘Catholic Education Flanders’ and which order the content-based objectives according to the four Kantian questions. Compared with the attainment targets, these learning plans contain their own formulations, accents, and additional objectives, as well as suggestions related to themes, philosophers, and methods. For example, they make explicit that pupils are expected to connect philosophical questions, concepts, and theories to their own life world and society, and ask also that attention be paid to reflection on truth, on a happy and meaningful life, and on the future of society. They suggest that besides the traditional teaching methods, teachers may use dilemma conversation, thought experiment, debate, philosophical conversation, concept analysis, definition conversation, and close reading (Galle 2020: 74–76; KOV, 2020a, 2020b).

Three Flemish educational publishers have already compiled textbooks and accompanying teacher’s guides for the new subject of Philosophy and plan to publish additional textbooks for the higher years in the near future: Agora by publisher Van In, Filosofie and Filosofie Concreet by Pelckmans, and Antropia by Averbode. The textbooks are in workbook format (one version for Human Sciences and one for Social and Welfare Sciences) and have been put together by one or several teachers. All textbooks are organised thematically and combine theory and exercises, resulting in tasks such as applying philosophical ideas to various cases, participating in philosophical discussions either in pairs or in a group, carrying out thought experiments, and answering questions concerning a short philosophical text.

As the contours of this new subject of Philosophy are yet to be shaped within teaching practice, it is not currently clear which didactical approach will be dominant. Yet, indications
of a possible didactical approach can be found in the attainment targets, the learning plans, the textbooks, the training organised for teachers during the year 2020-21, and in the fact that some Flemish teachers have followed training in and have experience with philosophical conversation. I suspect that the eventual approach will be problem-oriented, with a strong link to pupils’ experiences, and that it will be thematic rather than historical (albeit with some historical lines). I foresee furthermore that learning about philosophical theories and training in philosophical skills will be integrated into the approach, with reading of excerpts from primary philosophical texts included (but not emphasised), and that there will be room for philosophical group conversations.

**Philosophical themes and skills in other study-fields concerning society**

The educational reform also includes specific attainment targets for philosophy in the fifth and sixth year related to other tso-study-fields in the domain of society and welfare: Defence and Security, Health Care, Education, and Guidance, as well as Wellness and Beauty. These targets, which will be introduced over 2023-24, concern philosophical anthropology and ethics. As these study-fields prepare not merely for higher education but also the labour market, the philosophical concepts and theories will be chosen in accordance with the study-field and will always be discussed in an applied way (e.g. analysis of ethical cases with regard to patient autonomy). Here, too, students will need to acquire certain basic philosophical skills (Vlaamse Regering 2020, attachment 7: 56–55, 228–229). These targets will most probably be realised as a part of a mandatory course that is not solely devoted to philosophy (Galle 2020: 73–74).

**Philosophizing in citizenship education and philosophy as an optional subject**

In most schools of GO!, a new subject ‘Citizenship Education’ has recently been created in order to reach the new attainment targets on citizenship competences introduced by the government to respond to recent tensions in society. In the learning pathway for this subject (which consists of three competencies: philosophizing, value education, and sustainable living together), philosophical conversation plays a key role in teaching pupils to dialogue respectfully and to empathise with another viewpoint (Galle 2018: 131–132). One could see a parallel here with the subject ‘Philosophy and Citizenship’, offered within the French Community of Belgium (Herla 2020).

In most study-fields, philosophy is not a mandatory subject, but freedom of education implies that schools have the opportunity to set up optional philosophy classes. Some schools have included a subject or module ‘Philosophizing’ in the first grade or have added the subject ‘Philosophy’ to the curriculum of some study-fields.

In order to stimulate philosophy education, Ghent University organises the ‘Belgian Preselection of the International Philosophy Olympiad’, the University of Antwerp provides guest lectures on philosophy in secondary schools, and KU Leuven invites pupils of the sixth year to participate in a Junior College, which features teaching material, videos, and classes on themes such as truth, happiness, beauty, and science. Several educational projects of university colleges – which support teachers in learning how to lead a dialogue about sensitive topics, stimulate reasoning skills, or initiate a reflection on the nature of science – include philosophical
Factors that have influenced the position of philosophy as a school subject

The fact that in the past philosophy only occupied a minor place in school curricula can be explained by various factors. (1) Among the general public, philosophy has often been perceived as being too difficult and other-worldly. (2) As Flemish education is dominated by an instrumental-functional view on education, humanities subjects are usually valued less than the STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) subjects. (3) It has been argued that philosophy is already integrated in other subjects, which, in fact, is not the case. (4) Because the Belgian constitution safeguards the right to a moral and religious education at the expense of the community, all schools have to organise classes in levensbeschouwing, based upon one of the six officially recognised religions and/or upon non-confessonal ethics (zedenleer), which promotes free-thinking and atheistic-humanistic values. Philosophy is sometimes seen as a threat to these courses which currently engage pupils for two hours a week and occasionally also discuss philosophical themes. Fears that these courses would be replaced by philosophy have been fuelled by a proposal that has received a lot of media attention over the last few years: to replace the courses in levensbeschouwing with a subject that combines a neutral, scientific study of different life and world views (levensbeschouwingen) with moral education, ethics, and philosophy (Galle 2018: 122–125). GO! schools have recently been allowed to replace, in the third grade, one hour of levensbeschouwing with ‘Dialogue between Life and World Views’ (Interlevensbeschouwelijke dialoog), yet not by ‘Philosophy and Citizenship’ (as in the French Community) or by ‘Philosophy’.

Which factors could have influenced the fact that as a result of educational reform, philosophy has been successful in obtaining a structural place in the curriculum of some study-fields? (1) The association ‘VEFO’ (Flemish Network for Contemporary Philosophy Education), founded in 2002, has been aiming at more and better philosophy education in the Flemish Community. VEFO advocates the introduction of philosophizing with children and adolescents as a didactic method to be integrated in all primary- and secondary-school subjects. It demands introduction of philosophy as an autonomous subject in secondary education and training of (future) primary and secondary school teachers to become competent facilitators of a philosophical conversation. Over the last twenty years, VEFO has developed several initiatives: supporting research projects (e.g. concerning philosophical thinking in bso and tso), making contacts with policymakers in politics and education in order to promote philosophy education, participating in debates concerning the new attainment targets, supporting philosophy education by means of publications, arranging conferences and ‘intervisions’ (peer-led group reflections) among philosophy teachers, advising schools, communicating about philosophy education by means of a website (www.filosofieonderwijs.be), newsletters, and Facebook, as well as publishing opinion articles in Flemish media (Galle 2019).

(2) The arguments that have been employed to attempt to convince policymakers of the necessity of a mandatory course in philosophy mostly rely on the formative value of philosophy and philosophizing, such as the fact that it introduces pupils to the fundamentals of Western culture, stimulates a critical-reflexive attitude, and promotes several other skills. These
arguments moreover relate to the lifeworlds of adolescents, which feature existential questions, and to the heterogenous social context with its demand of democratic literacy. In addition, they point to educational context (for instance, to the fact that Flanders lags when compared with surrounding countries that organise philosophy courses and that philosophy could strengthen the study-field of Human Sciences). (3) Philosophers have been prominent in the social debate for the last few years, with regular opinion articles and interviews on TV. (4) Philosophizing with groups is becoming more and more popular. (5) As a consequence, there is a growing interest for philosophy in Flemish society (Galle 2020: 57–60).

**Current situation of teacher training in philosophy**

In order to obtain the ‘required certificate of competence’ to teach philosophy in the second and third stages of secondary schools, students are currently required to follow an educational master’s programme. Students with an academic bachelor’s degree in Philosophy and/or Moral Sciences (180 credits) follow the entire track of the educational master’s programme (105 or 120 credits), half of which consists of content-related (i.e., philosophy) courses and the other half of a teaching component. Students with a master’s degree in Philosophy and/or Moral Sciences only follow the teaching component (60 credits), which takes one year but may optionally be spread over two or three years. Half of the teaching component is theoretical and includes general didactics, didactics in philosophy, and a small educational research project; the other half is practical, with experimental lessons and internships, including a minimum of 40 hours of teaching practice in a class. Didactics of philosophy include theoretical courses on approaches to philosophy, attainment targets and learning plans, philosophical teaching formats, etc., as well as courses on guiding a philosophical conversation within a group.

Holders of an educational master’s degree in any field whatsoever (e.g. sciences, history) may obtain the ‘required certificate of competence’ to teach philosophy provided they have taken 30 credits of academic philosophy courses, follow the ‘Didactics of Philosophy’ course, and do a few hours of internship. Students who have studied Moral Sciences and have followed ‘Didactics of Non-confessional Ethics’ automatically obtain the ‘required certificate of competence’ for philosophy.

In order to teach a school subject, teachers do not necessarily need the ‘required certificate of competence’ in the subject concerned. If the school headmaster considers teachers to be competent, it is possible for them to teach a subject in which they have no or only limited academic training. As philosophy has almost never been taught in Flemish secondary schools in the past, some teachers with a background in philosophy have been teaching subjects such as Dutch, catholic religion, or non-confessional ethics. Conversely, new philosophy courses will often be taught by teachers who did not study philosophy, because such teachers could either obtain a full teaching assignment by opting to teach philosophy or because they were teaching one of the subjects that have been replaced by philosophy due to education reform. Hence it will be important to support teachers by providing training in philosophy and philosophy didactics and by supplying quality teaching materials and pedagogical guidance adapted to the specificities of the study-fields (Galle 2020: 77).
References
Country Report: The Teaching of Philosophy in Singapore Schools (Part 2)

Daryl Ooi, National University of Singapore
Darylooi90@gmail.com

Introduction
In the existing country report, Burik et al. (2020) provide a helpful overview of the teaching of philosophy in public schools in Singapore. This paper builds on their insights by highlighting some recent developments that suggest, in my opinion, reasons to be optimistic about future developments of philosophy in Singapore. I will focus on (S2) Philosophy within the standard curriculum, (S3) Philosophy as electives and enrichments, (S4), and the training of Philosophy teachers in Singapore.

From the outset, it would be useful to state that in Pre-University philosophy education in Singapore, ‘philosophy’ is often understood in at least two different ways: the development of philosophical skills (such as logic, critical thinking etc) and philosophical content (such as concepts, arguments, topics etc.).¹ Most philosophy programmes in Singapore teach both skills and content, though the emphasis differs according to the individual programme’s learning objectives. Consequently, when I note that schools teach philosophy, I mean that they teach at least one kind of philosophy education (skills and/or content).

Philosophy within the standard curriculum
As Burik et al. (2020) have pointed out, public schools in Singapore generally follow a standardized curriculum, and philosophy is not typically taught in most public schools. There have, however, been significant attempts to include some version of ‘philosophy’ in individual public schools, often through P4C (Philosophy for Children) programmes and techniques.² In this section, I focus on recent developments of ‘Philosophy’ in the curriculum of schools that offer the Integrated Programme (IP).

As noted by Burik et al (2020), some IP schools include the IB Diploma Programme as part of their curriculum, and students in these schools study ‘Theory of Knowledge’ (TOK, students in Years 5-6). In recent years, several of these schools have included subjects in Years 1-4 that teach philosophy. For instance, one school teaches an “elementary Theory of Knowledge (eTOK)” (Anglo-Chinese School (Independent) 2021) and another teaches ‘Philosophy,  

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¹ While there may be some shortcomings of distinguishing between skills and content (since there are often overlap, and demarcating the definitions are not always clear), a rough distinction such as this is useful in understanding the different focus schools place on philosophy.
² Let me provide several examples. Lim reports that as early as 1992, several primary and secondary schools began to adopt P4C (Lim 1993; Lim/Ho 2007: 4). In 2005, P4C was tested out in another primary school (Chang et al. 2007). Tan also points out that some schools offer P4C as part of their English lessons (Tan 2008: 115). See also (Koh et al. 2016; Tan 2017). Since 2006, one primary school has been carrying out P4C lessons for Primary 3 and 4 students (Woodlands Primary School 2020). Since 2013, another primary school has using P4C as a “key pedagogic approach” in their lessons (Huamin Primary School 2019). Since 2013, yet another primary school adopted P4C in English and Chinese classes (Singapore Teachers’ Union 2016).
Thinking and Knowledge’ (Methodist Girls’ School 2021).³

In addition, there are 13 IP schools which offer the A-Levels in Years 5-6 (Ministry of Education 2021). Several of these schools have included Philosophy as part of their Years 1-4 curriculum. For instance, one school offers a four-year Philosophy curriculum (Raffles Institution 2021: 45). Several schools offer Philosophy for Year 1-2 students (e.g., Nanyang Girls’ High School 2021). In some other schools, aspects of Philosophy are infused into their curriculum (e.g., Raffles Girls’ School 2021). Importantly, some schools focus on teaching Chinese Philosophy (e.g., CHIJ St’ Nicholas Girls’ School 2021a).

It is worth noting that one of the primary pedagogical approaches adopted by schools for the teaching of philosophy is through the Community of Inquiry Model.⁴

Philosophy as Enrichment

Outside of the standard curriculum, several IP schools teach Philosophy as enrichment programmes. Notably, one school began running a week long Philosophical Sabbatical (Temasek Junior College 2021). Under the Special Assistance Programme, several schools now teach Chinese Philosophy (e.g., CHIJ St Nicholas Girls’ School 2021b, Nan Hua High School 2021).⁵ Three schools also collaborate to offer a joint ‘Philosophy of Knowledge’ programme that incorporates ‘Eastern and Western Perspectives’ (Catholic High School et al. 2020: 14).

In recent years, there has been an increase in inter-school philosophy conferences on offer. The most prominent of which are: since 2004, the annual Inter-School Philosophy Dialogue (Loy 2018); since 2014, the Philobytes Inter-School Dialogue (Nanyang Girls’ High School 2019); and since 2018, The Hwa Chong Invitational Olympiad (Burik et al. 2020). Beginning in 2019, several schools have collaborated to run the PhiloJam Conference, where students from participating schools present papers on philosophical issues (PhiloJam 2021).

Teacher Training, Pedagogical Research and Global Standards

In the earlier days, much of the pedagogical training for philosophy teachers was informal.⁶ Australian practitioners were heavily influential in conducting workshops on P4C in Singapore since the 1980s (Burgh/Thornton 2019: 62–63; Lim 1994). One important strand of formal training has been supplied by the Singapore Teachers’ Union (STU). In 2003, they invited consultants from the Federation of Asia-Pacific Philosophy in Schools Associations to train local teachers (Lim/Ho 2007). In 2006, they hosted the international Philosophy in Schools Conference, where “experts and practitioners” from “Malaysia, Australia, the United States” and Singapore presented papers on this subject (Shanmugaratnam 2006).⁷ Teachers from Singapore were invited to present and participate

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³ It is worth noting that several private schools which offer an IB curriculum also offer some version of philosophy at the lower levels. For instance, one school teaches ‘Critical Thinking’ for students in years 3-4 (School of the Arts 2021, 6). Another school teaches ‘Classics’ and ‘Religious Studies and Philosophy’ (Tanglin Trust School 2020).
⁴ For instance, see (Fai et al. 2006, Lim 2006, Lim/Ho 2007, Chang et al. 2007, Singapore Teachers’ Union 2016).
⁵ Other schools have incorporated P4C and Chinese Philosophy into the teaching of the Chinese language (see Seet/Chang 2008, Singapore Teachers’ Union 2016).
⁶ Apart from the formal training of undergraduate and graduate degrees in philosophy.
⁷ In 1997, the National Institute of Education in Singapore hosted the 7th International Conference on Thinking –
Another important strand of pedagogy development can be seen in grassroots efforts by individual educators. For instance, philosophy educators have organized, presented, and participated in many P4C conferences. In 2011, Kristie Chen participated in the founding of ‘Philosophy with Children and Youth Network for Asia and the Pacific’ (PCYNAP 2013). Most recently, a pedagogical conference for local philosophy educators ‘Philosophy in Schools 2021’ was hosted online and philosophy educators were invited to share good pedagogical practices. The National University of Singapore offers a Teaching Internship module where students who are trained in philosophy are attached to schools. In this, philosophy graduates learn from practicing pre-university school teachers, and in turn, help teach students philosophy (National University of Singapore 2015).

Finally, it is worth noting that several research projects have been conducted over the years in order to contextualise and improve philosophical pedagogical approaches in Singapore (e.g., Chang et al. 2007; Raffles Girls’ School 2020; Lim 2006; Fai et al. 2006). While the results of these projects have generally been published in journals and presented at conferences, its uses have primarily been to improve pedagogy within the IP Curriculum.

**Conclusion**

Overall, as a curriculum subject in public schools in Singapore, Philosophy is primarily taught in Years 1-4 in IP Schools and in Years 5-6 in IB Programmes and in Junior Colleges (under ‘Knowledge and Inquiry’). Among the IP schools, there has been much activity in the form of enrichment programmes and inter-school conferences. Interestingly, many schools (including government primary schools) adopt the P4C and Community of Inquiry framework into the teaching of English, Social Studies, and Chinese.

What these findings suggest is that Philosophy is present in various forms across various kinds of schools in Singapore. Given the increase in recent momentum across IP Schools, and the Singapore government’s emphasis on Critical Learning in the 21st Century, there is a reason, I think, to be optimistic about the future development of Philosophy education in Singapore.

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8 For instance, at the 6th International Conference of the International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children: Learning to Think: Philosophy in the Classroom (Lim 1993), the 15th International Conference of the International Council of Philosophical Inquiry with Children, Redesigning Pedagogy International Conference 2017 (National Institute of Singapore 2017).

9 PCYNAP received support from UNESCO for their 2015 conference (Philippines National Committee for UNESCO 2015).

10 See Burik et. al. (2020). Note also that typically, Years 1-4 refer to students aged 13-16 and Years 5-6 refer to students aged 17-18, though of course, there are exceptions.

11 Government primary schools typically teach students aged 7-12.

12 There is some evidence that the value of teaching in Philosophy in schools remain a controversial topic of discussion among the Singaporean public (e.g., Gibran 2017; Loh 2017; Khoo 2021; Chow 2021).
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