The Neuchâtel Workshop on Contemporary Metaphysics

There is a notion of a circumstantial truth or fact: one that is based in the circumstances. There is also a notion of an acircumstantial truth or fact: one that is not so based. Because these notions concern whether or not a truth is based in the circumstances, Mike Raven calls them basal notions. The project of his book in progress, In Light of the Circumstances, is to develop a theory of these basal notions and to explore their applications. This workshop will focus on themes related to Mike Raven’s research.

Introduction

Circumstantial/Acircumstantial Truths

Commentator: Andrea Lupo (University of Lugano)

Session 1 introduces the basal notions and surveys some of their potential applications. The notions may be illustrated by example. The Rhine River is a border between Switzerland and Germany. This truth is based on various socio-politico-historical circumstances. And so it is an example of a circumstantial truth. By contrast, that 2 is prime is an acircumstantial truth. While the numerals used to express this truth and the methods used to teach it depend on the circumstances, the arithmetical truth itself does not. Session 1 develops the distinction that these examples suggest. The distinction, however, may seem ripe for assimilation to more familiar distinctions, such as the analytic/synthetic, apriori/aposterori, and necessary/contingency. I argue against these attempted assimilations. This motivates developing a theory of basal notions on their own terms. Its interest will be justified by sketching some of its potential applications to various domains.

Background Readings. The most thorough introduction to the basal notions is in Raven (2023: §§1-3).

Break

Ground

Commentator: Stephan Kraemer (University of Hamburg)

Session 2 introduces a distinction between proximal and distal basal notions. A statement’s basal status concerns whether it expresses a circumstantial truth (falsehood) or acircumstantial truth (falsehood). But there is a further distinction among basal statuses. In the proximal sense, a statement’s basal status is determined by its own constituents and not by the basal status of any other statement. In the distal sense, a statement’s basal status is determined by the basal statuses of its grounds. And so the proximal/distal notions connect basality to ground. The proximal/distal notions are of special interest for their applications to the philosophy of logic, social metaphysics, and physicalism. This session will focus on developing the proximal/distal notions.

Background Readings. The proximal/distal notions are most thoroughly discussed in Raven (2023: §§4-5). Discussions of their applications include to: philosophy of logic (Raven 2020), social metaphysics (Raven 2022), and physicalism (Raven 2025b).

Lunch

Essence

Commentator: Kathrin Koslicki (University of Neuchâtel) or Antoine Taillard (University of Neuchâtel) or Marco Marabello (University of Neuchâtel)

Session 3 focuses on connections between essence and the basal notions. Essentialist truths often serve as examples of acircumstantial truths. This session will focus on investigating why essentialist truths are so apt for illustrating acircumstantiality. Perhaps the main reason is that essentialist truths characterize the identity of an item, which does not seem apt to vary with the circumstances. This may seem in tension with the appearance that some items seem to have identities that are circumstantial. For example, perhaps the identity of a socially constructed item is grounded in certain socio-historical circumstances. But perhaps the tension may be resolved by taking essentialist truths to be proximally acircumstantial while distally circumstantial. This session will focus on this and related issues. 

Background Readings. There’s not yet been any extended discussion of essence’s connections to basal notions in my own work or others’. But some brief, scattered discussions include: generative explanations of essence in Raven (2021: §5.3), the solution to the puzzle of social essences in Raven (2022), the status of logic in Raven (2020), and Fine (2005: §9).

Break

Modality

Commentator: Antoine Taillard (University of Neuchâtel) or Marco Marabello (University of Neuchâtel)

Session 4 focuses on connections between modality and the basal notions. Although Session 1 argues that the necessity/contingency distinction does not coincide with the acircumstantial/circumstantial distinction, there are still some apparent connections. In particular, while necessity does not imply acircumstantiality, acircumstantiality does seem to imply necessity. This is somewhat at odds with a familiar “worldly” conception of necessary truth as truth in all possible worlds. Truth in a possible world is relative to the worldly circumstances, and therefore circumstantial. So, acircumstantial necessary truths cannot be true because they are true in all possible worlds. This session will explore the kind of modality appropriate for such “world transcendent” necessities.

Background Readings. Again, there’s not yet been any extended discussion of modality’s connections to basal notions in my own work. But Fine’s (2005) discusses the connections at length. These discussions have inspired my own work. So, they are appropriate background readings. My work that at least tangentially discusses modality includes: arguing against assimilating acircumstantiality to necessity in Raven (2023: §3), discussing generative essences in Raven (2021: §5.3), and discussing a distinctive kind of social modality in Raven (2024: §5).

Artifacts

Commentator: Francesco Franda (University of Neuchâtel) or Pauline Souman (University of Neuchâtel)

Session 5 focuses on artifacts. The main connection to basal notions concerns their essences. I have explored a “dynamic” approach to the essences of artifact kinds. According to it, an artifact kind’s essence is a complex genealogy that combines what crafters intend instances of the kind to be for with what users of the kind use its instances for. It may not seem altogether clear whether such essences are fully circumstantial or fully acircumstantial. But it may be possible to regard them as partially both by invoking the proximal/distal distinction. The essence of an artifact kind may then be proximally acircumstantial while distally circumstantial. This session will explore this application.

Background Readings. The connection between basal notions and artifact is discussed in Raven (2025a: §4.1,§6).

Break

Social Metaphysics

Commentator: Emilie Pagano (University of Vienna)

Session 6 focuses on applications of basal notions to social metaphysics. One application concerns a puzzle for social essences. An Aristotelian inclination is that social essences, if there are any, are immanent in the circumstances. A Platonic inclination is that all essences transcend the circumstances. If there are social essences then these competing inclinations lead to contradiction. I have explored a solution that relies on the proximal/distal distinction. With the Aristotelian, social essences are distally circumstantial. With the Platonist, all essences are proximally acircumstantial. And so there is no single sense in which social essences are both circumstantial and acircumstantial. This session will focus on further exploring this solution.

Background Readings. The main reading is Raven (2022). Some tangential connections alluded to, but not explicitly discussed, are in Raven (2024).

For more information see:

https://www.unine.ch/philo/evenement/the-neuchatel-workshop-on-contemporary-metaphysics