Quodlibeta

Le but du cycle de conférences "Quodlibeta" est de présenter la philosophie à un public plus large. 

Les événements on lieu au IFAGE, à la salle IF408, les mercredi 14h15-16h00. 

Tous les événements ont lieu au IF 408 (Place des Augustins 19).

• Colin King (Providence), Logic and ontology in Aristotle’s Topics, octobre 4, 14.15-15.45
• Vincent Lam (Berne): Anthropocene, planetary boundaries and tipping points: interdisciplinarity and values in Earth system science, mai 10, 14.15-15.45
• Martin Lipman (Leiden): On time, standpoints and metaphysical relativity , avril 19, 14.15-15.45
• Klaus Corcilius (Tübingen): Practical Truth in Aristotle, 29 mars, 15.15-15.45
• Nick Huggett (UIC): Resolving the Problem of Time without circularity - a work in progress with Karim Thébault (Bristol), 15 mars, 14.15-15.30
• Christine Clavien (Genève): Shifting Responsibilities: an Ethical Challenge Posed by the Use of Reasoning Bypassing Interventions, 8 mars, 14.15-15.45

We, 4 October, IF 408 (Place des Augustins, 19), 14:15-15:45

The purpose of this paper is to clarify some logical and ontological features of the theory of predication in Aristotle’s Topics. At the heart of this theory lie items known as predicables – accident, genus, property, definition. This four-part typology of predicate-expressions is developed for a special purpose in the Topics: to provide a method of argumentative training for dialectical disputation (Top. A1, 100a). The predicables track what certain types of predicate signify; the relations into which they enter are the proper relations of their significata. To be clarified in this paper are how such relations yield logical rules in dialectic, and the status of such rules. I shall concentrate in particular on the rules of the genus. I address for the system of genus predication a central question for the entire system of predicables: how do we derive logical rules from the features of the item signified by a predicate, in this case: the genus?  In particular: How do we go from this particular item to rules which govern inferences between statements in which, presumably, the item itself is not mentioned?

Wednesday 10th of May, 14:15-15:45, IF 408 (Place des Augustins 19)

Earth system science (ESS) and modelling have given rise to a new conceptual framework in the recent decades, which goes much beyond climate science and modelling. Indeed, Earth system science and modelling have the ambition “to build a unified understanding of the Earth”, involving not only the physical Earth system components (atmosphere, cryosphere, land, ocean, lithosphere) but also all the relevant human and social processes interacting with them. This unified understanding that ESS aims to achieve raises a number of epistemological issues about interdisciplinarity. We argue that the interdisciplinary relations in ESS between natural and social / human sciences are best characterized in terms of what is called ‘scientific imperialism’ in the literature and we show that this imperialistic feature has some detrimental epistemic and non-epistemic effects, notably when addressing the issue of values in ESS. This paper considers in particular the core ESS concepts of Anthropocene, planetary boundaries and tipping points in the light of the philosophy of science discussions on interdisciplinarity and values. We show that acknowledging the interconnections between interdisciplinarity and values suggests ways for ESS to move forward in view of addressing the climate and environmental challenges.

Wednesday 19th of April, 14:15-15:45, IF 408 (Place des Augustins 19)

Does the world correspond to what it is like from the standpoint of a particular moment in time, or does it rather correspond to some overarching atemporal standpoint? I have come to believe that this is a false choice. The world harbors both temporal and atemporal standpoints, and comprises what things are like from each of these standpoints. In this talk, I briefly motivate this approach and discuss a general framework that helps us make sense of a world that harbors the incompatible facts that obtain relative to different standpoints. The framework also includes accounts of what it is for something to be a standpoint and what it is to adopt a standpoint in our representation of things. Although I illustrate the involved commitments with temporal examples, the framework is intended to be relevant to any case where something has a property relative to some entity.

 IF 408 (Place des Augustins, 19), 29 mars, 15.15-15.45

This paper offers a new interpretation of Aristotle’s account of practical truth as the agreement of “true practical reasoning” with “right desire". Four questions are posed: What is right desire? In which way can thinking that a particular thing or course of action is good be true? How can right desire and practical reasoning agree on the same object? Why does Aristotle speak of practical truth in the first place? The answers will situate Aristotle’s account of practical truth in his general teleology of the practical. The main philosophical claims are the following: (i) practical rationality, like all rationality for Aristotle, is fundamentally concerned with principles; (ii) practical truth is the conscious pursuit of a particular course of action as agreeing with the pursuit of an appropriate value in a given situation as that value’s appropriate embodiment. (iii) Aristotle conceptualises this embodiment as a kind if identity. (iv) Practical truth is the best result and achievement (ergon) of episodes of practical reasoning; however, it is neither the essence of practical rationality, nor otherwise a guiding concept in the architecture of Aristotle's philosophy of human affairs.

Wednesday 8th of March, 14:15-15:45, IF 408 (Place des Augustins 19).

Reasoning bypassing interventions aiming at influencing the behaviour of a target population are increasingly used by in power decisionmakers in the public or private sector. To justify the implementation of such an intervention, the ethical gold standard is to show that, despite its reasoning bypassing feature, the target population’s autonomy is respected. In this regard, one may show that the intervention is aligned with the objectives and preferences of the target population (shared preferences justification) and that the target population consents to the intervention (consent justification). I will argue that these are important ethical considerations but that they may blind us of further issues. To illustrate, I will highlight a mechanism of shifting responsibilities that is important to consider while evaluating the appropriateness of reasoning bypassing interventions.