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**From Appropriate Emotions To Values**

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## FROM APPROPRIATE EMOTIONS TO VALUES\*

### § 1 INTRODUCTION

There are at least three well-known accounts of value and evaluations which assign a central role to emotions. There is first of all the emotivist view, according to which evaluations express or manifest emotional states or attitudes but have no truth values. Second is the dispositionalist view, according to which to possess a value or axiological property is to be capable of provoking or to be likely to provoke emotional responses in subjects characterised in certain ways. Third, there is an epistemology of values that is sometimes invoked by the naïve realist. If the naïve realist is one for whom evaluations are made true by the possession by objects of monadic, mind-independent axiological properties, then one natural question is: What sort of cognitive access do we have to such properties? These value properties, the realist may say, are properties we come to know of by virtue of our emotions. Emotions, he may say, present value properties to us. One variant of this view is the claim that values are the "formal objects" of emotions. Closely related to these claims is the view that our emotions are appropriate to value properties, or not. Indignation and injustice, it is sometimes said, are related in one or more of these three ways.<sup>1</sup>

In what follows I sketch a fourth account of evaluations and values which employs a notion central to the dispositionalist theory, that of possible emotional responses, and a notion central to the epistemology of the naïve realist, the category of (in)appropriate emotional responses. The account to be given is cognitivist, like the second and third account and unlike the first, emotivist, account. But, unlike the dispositionalist account, it does not reduce value properties to natural properties; nor does it wholly analyse the former in terms of the latter. Unlike the epistemology and semantics of the naïve realist, the account to be given does not allow for monadic mind-independent axiological properties. Emotions, I shall suggest, are indeed sometimes appropriate and sometimes inappropriate. But they are, in the first place, appropriate or inappropriate to natural objects and processes and to the natural properties and features of natural objects. Emotions are not, to begin with, appropriate responses to values. For to be valuable is just for certain emotional responses to be appropriate. Appropriateness, I shall suggest, is to be understood in terms of justification. Emotions are justified by perceptions, memories and non-axiological beliefs. They also justify axiological beliefs.

I first introduce some of the distinctions, notions and theses to be employed in the analysis, at some length (§ 2). I then formulate the analysis in two steps, by saying something about what it is to master an evaluative concept (§ 3), and by giving an account of the truth-conditions of one central type of evaluation (§ 4). I consider some objections to the account (§ 5), in particular the objection that it is circular, since the concepts of appropriateness and justification employed are themselves evaluative concepts. Finally, I consider some advantages of the analysis and some possible developments, in particular its relations to response-dependence theories and to verificationisms, both realist and anti-realist (§ 6).

### § 2 PRESUPPOSITIONS: EMOTIONS, VALUES, JUSTIFICATION

#### *Emotions*

What are emotions? I shall assume, I hope uncontroversially, that within the varied class of episodic affective phenomena there is a stable four-way distinction between (1) drives or instincts such as hunger, (2) sensations or feelings, such as a pain in my left foot, (3) moods, such as certain forms of anxiety or jubilation, and (4) emotions. Drives and sensations or feelings require no cognitive bases. Moods may be considered to require no cognitive bases or, alternatively, to require only very indeterminate bases, or indeed to be simply non-localised sensations. Emotions, however, require more or less determinate cognitive bases such as perceptions, memories, anticipations and occurrent beliefs. If Sam regrets his impolite behaviour yesterday, his episodic emotion is based on his memory or belief that he behaved impolitely. I assume that the most basic types of memory and perception are

non-propositional and that some emotions are based on such non-propositional cognitive states. Whereas regret requires a propositional object, admiration need not. Sam's admiration of Maria's gait may simply be based on his perception of the way she moves.

Feelings, emotions and moods are all episodes or occurrences. They may be distinguished from sentiments—those deeply rooted dispositions the manifestations of which are emotions and other types of affective states. A sentiment, such as hatred of Continental philosophy, is often called a motive. To say that someone acts out of or from vanity or hatred of Continental philosophy is to attribute to him a sentiment or motive. Sentiments come in all shapes and sizes. They have at least the variety of episodic emotions since any such emotion corresponds in principle to a possible sentiment. But since every sentiment manifests itself in a variety of different ways, the multiplicity of sentiments is greater than that of emotions. The love of the nationalist for the nation he persists in personifying is a sentiment. A person's affective relation to exemplars, leaders, role models and (anti-)heroes is a type of sentiment. So, too, is his relation to the interiorised exemplars and models we call self-images.

Affective phenomena and sentiments are, it is safe to say, to be distinguished from intentions, wantings and volitions. The cognitive bases of the latter are propositionally structured, future-oriented and bear on possible actions. Emotions, in contrast, need not have propositional bases, are often directed towards the past, and need not bear directly on action or behaviour. Episodic preferences, for example, like preferences, their dispositional counterparts, may bear on objects, states of affairs or options, and these may lie in the past or in the future. Whether or not we think that it is better (more rational) to live according to the principle of sunk costs it is a fact that many of our emotions are directed towards the past.

Finally, it is plausible to claim that intentions and wantings presuppose emotions and sentiments provided these are allowed to embrace such "cool" sentiments as what psychologists call "concern" (*Bedeutungsgefühle*). For emotions and sentiments fix the range of variation of a subject's intentions and wantings and so, too, of his behaviour. Other things being equal, Barry's hatred of Continental Philosophy is more likely to manifest itself in the desire to do it down, criticise or hinder it than in the desire to award its proponents honorary doctorates or to build bridges.

#### *Evaluations*

What is an evaluation? In what follows I shall have in mind truth-bearers or predications which are contingently true or false and which employ a thin evaluative predicate such as "good," "bad," "worse than," "better than" or any of the numerous predicates the applicability of which entails, other things being equal, that one of the thin axiological predicates applies (on other types of evaluation, see § 6 below). Examples of predicates entailing thin axiological predicates are: "cowardly," "elegant," "courageous," "generous," "beastly," "priggish" and "shoddy." The corresponding thick axiological concepts stand in sharp contrast to the most basic type of normative concepts such as those expressed by "ought" and "may." These latter expressions, I shall assume, take action-predicates to form new predicates. They are about doables and tell us what ought (not) to be done.

A first contrast between axiological predicates and such normative expressions can be formulated as follows: that whereas the former family contains the relational predicates "\_\_\_ better than \_\_\_" and "\_\_\_ worse than \_\_\_" there is no corresponding relational, normative predicate in ordinary language. In particular, there is no such thing as a comparative ought-to-do. Were there such comparative oughts in the legal domain, then the legal system would be unwieldy. There are, it is true, predications of the form "My promise to F is more binding than my promise to G." But "is more binding than" is not the relational counterpart of "ought," as can be seen by comparing their terms. A second contrast emerges if we consider the presence in the axiological family of both thin predicates such as "good" and the large and varied class of thick axiological predicates such as "cowardly" and "kitsch" that entail one of the thin predicates. The family of concepts to which belong the concepts of what ought to be done and of what may be done contains only thin concepts. To be kitsch or sentimental is, other things being equal, to be a bad thing (whatever other axiological properties the object that is kitsch or sentimental has). This may be due to the fact that "kitsch" stands to "bad," and "courageous" to "good," as does "red" to "coloured," that is to say, as de-terminate to determinable. But this is only one, albeit perhaps the simplest, way of understanding such entailments. In any case, there do not seem to be any lower-

order normative properties which entail thin normative properties in anything like the same way. If we assume that thick axiological properties are determinates of thin axiological properties, then the point might be made by saying that there are no determinate normative properties. The only qualification that needs to be made here is that there are indeed ethical, moral, cognitive, aesthetic, technical, prudential and economic oughts. But it is obvious that the resultant tree of normative concepts exhibits a branching structure which is very much less complex than that exhibited by axiological properties.

A third and final contrast between axiological and normative proper-ties emerges if we consider the relations each family of properties has to natural properties. Since the account of value to be given is not a naturalistic account, I shall assume that no axiological property can be identified with any bundle of natural properties. But it is quite plausible to assume that possession of some thick axiological property entails possession of certain determinate natural properties. To be courageous is, amongst other things, to know fear and overcome it. One type of injustice involves behaviour which can be characterised as treating people who are relevantly similar and in relevantly similar contexts in different ways. To be unfree is, amongst other things, to be constrained. And the different types of constraint can be characterised in natural terms. For abortion to be good, bad or ethically indifferent it must be identifiable in natural terms. The vice of *ressentiment* can be characterised in large measure in terms of a complex psychological description.

Do predications about what ought (not) to be done entail predications of natural properties? If Sam ought to do a certain deed then it must be within his power or he must believe that this is the case. But apart from this entailment there seems to be nothing in the normative sphere that is comparable to the varied entailments from thick axiological properties to natural properties. Nevertheless, there is one important type of link between normative predications and natural properties. There are predications which justify—even if they do not entail—normative predications. We ought not to drive fast on the Autobahn because human life is valuable. But here the property being appealed to is precisely an axiological property. If normative predications which are justifiable are justifiable in the first instance by reference to axiological claims, and if the possession of natural properties is relevant to justifying axiological claims, then normative predications do indeed link up with the natural world. But only indirectly, only *via* values, and the link is that of justification not that of entailment. Thick axiological properties, on the other hand, link up directly with natural properties.

It will be apparent that the assumptions so far introduced about emotions and values, on the one hand, and about intentions or wantings and norms, on the other hand, are made for one another. Emotions and sentiments stand to intentions as do values to norms. Just as our emotions and sentiments prescribe the range of our desires and intentions, so, too, our evaluations fix the range of normative claims we endorse. But we can as little read off directly a man's desires from his sentiments as we can read off the normative claims he endorses from a knowledge of his values. Emotions are more basic than desires, values are more basic than norms; emotions are not desires, values are not norms. Similarly, it seems plausible to assume that the accounts given of emotions and of thick values are made for one another. Our access to the natural properties presupposed by thick axiological properties involves just those perceptions, memories and non-evaluative beliefs which can serve as the cognitive- bases of our emotions.

#### *Prima facie Non-Inductive Justification*

At the heart of the account to be given in §§ 3–4 lies a type of justification which is defeasible, non-inductive and, in certain important cases, non-doxastic and non-propositional. Although it is widely accepted that there is defeasible, non-inductive justification, it has seemed to many philosophers, from Kant to Davidson and McDowell, that the relation of justification must connect only items that are truth-bearers (sentences, propositions, beliefs, judgements etc.). This is not the place to argue that this assumption is wrong. But it is important to say something about just what the appeal to non-propositional justification involves and about its extension to cases where what justifies or is justified is neither propositional nor doxastic.<sup>11</sup>

Suppose that Sam sees a large, salivating dog, its hairs standing on end, baring its teeth and moving towards him rapidly. I assume that simple seeing *of* things, their features, events, is to be distinguished from seeing *that* things possess certain features. Seeing that involves beliefs and

concepts, simple seeing involves neither. If Sam forms a belief to the effect that a large, salivating dog is baring its teeth and moving towards him rapidly and if he forms this belief on the basis of his perceptual experiences (and not, say, on the basis of testimony) then the following cases can be distinguished.

First, Sam's perceptual experiences are veridical: there is a large, salivating . . . dog in his visual field and it, its traits and the events bound up with these are visually differentiated for him. His belief is true. Not only does he see a large, salivating (etc.) dog but he sees the dog as a dog, he sees it as salivating, moving rapidly towards him, and so on. Some philosophers assume that seeing *as* necessarily involves conceptualisation. I do not. I shall assume that in the present case Sam enjoys a rich non-conceptual perceptual content.

Secondly, it may be the case that Sam's perceptual experiences are not veridical. There is no creature in his visual field. But it is with Sam as though he were seeing a dog which is salivating, moving rapidly towards him, and so on.

Thirdly, there are clearly a number of possible intermediate cases. For example, the case where what Sam sees as a dog which is salivating and moving towards him is in reality a fox which is salivating, moving rapidly towards him, and so on.

I shall say that in the second case Sam's perceptual experience, which is a hallucination, *prima facie* justifies his belief, which is false. Sam's belief in the first case is of course also justified. The type of justification involved links Sam's perceptual experience and his belief. The former is not propositional, the latter is. Similarly, I shall say that Sam's experience as of rain justifies his belief that it is raining. The type of justification involved is defeasible. If Sam becomes aware that a film-crew is watering the area he is looking at as part of a film, this will defeat the initial justification. Finally, the sort of justification involved is not inductive. In the two situations I have introduced Sam does not form the belief that it is very likely that it is raining or that it is very likely that a salivating dog is moving towards him. Although he might have done.

It will be useful to have a term to describe the difference between (a) the case where Sam's perceptual experience as of a large, salivating dog is a perception of a large, salivating dog and (b) the case where it is not. Since, by hypothesis, Sam's experience is not a belief, we cannot distinguish between the two cases in terms of true and false beliefs. I shall say that in case (a) Sam's experience fits its object. Perception of a real duck as a duck, unlike perception of a real duck as a rabbit, is perception which *fits* its object. Fit, then, as I shall here understand it, presupposes veridicality.

#### *Justified Fear*

Suppose, now, that Sam, on the basis of his fitting and hence veridical perception of the dog, feels fear. We said that emotions require bases. There are at least three possible bases for Sam's fear.

(1) Sam feels fear on the basis of his perception of a large, salivating dog which he sees as a large, salivating dog (veridicality, fit).

(2) Sam feels fear on the basis of his belief that a large salivating dog is moving towards him, a belief that is based in its turn on his veridical and fitting perceptions (truth, veridicality, fit).

(3) Sam feels fear on the basis of his belief that a *dangerous*, large dog is moving towards him, a belief that is based on his belief that a large, salivating dog is moving towards him, which in its turn is based on his veridical and fitting perceptions (truth, veridicality, fit).

In (2) and (3) the immediate basis of Sam's fear is a belief, whereas in (1) the basis is a perceptual content. In (3) Sam's belief contains a thick axiological predicate, "dangerous" whereas his belief in (2) bears only on purely natural properties of the dog; it is a non-axiological belief.

Enemies of non-conceptual perceptual content assimilate (1) to (2). Many philosophers writing about the bases of emotions claim that Sam's fear must be based on a belief that contains an axiological concept, for example the concept of danger. I suggest that all three cases, (1)–(3), occur. That emotions can be based on axiological beliefs—pity for victims of canine phobia, sadness due to a tragedy—is uncontroversial. I reject the assimilation of (1) to belief of any kind. A common argument in favour of such an assimilation goes as follows: "It is not Sam's perceptual experience as of a large, salivating dog that justifies his belief. Perception, if it is not propositional, cannot justify anything, does not belong to the space of reasons. If anything justifies Sam's belief it is his beliefs about the way

things look.” The argument confuses dispositions and episodes. It is uncontroversial that, if challenged about his belief, Sam might respond by pointing and saying “That looks like a large, salivating dog.” But it does not follow from this innocuous observation about Sam’s ability to do this that Sam cannot move, in a perfectly, rational and eminently comprehensible way, from his perception as of a large dog to his belief.

I shall assume that Sam’s perception as of a large, salivating . . . dog justifies his fear. Since neither of the two terms of the justification relation here is propositional, and since many philosophers believe that where there is justification then at the very least that which is justified must be propositional, it is perhaps preferable to introduce the cognate term ‘motivation’ for the relation between Sam’s perceptual content and his fear. Sam’s perceptual content, we might then say, motivates his fear. The perceptual content may be wholly delusory. Sam’s fear may not be fear of anything at all. The situation resembles that in which Sam’s delusory perception as of rain justifies his belief that it is raining. The main difference is that in the latter case Sam’s perceptual experience justifies his belief. In the former case his perceptual experience motivates his emotion.

The view that non-conceptual perceptual content can motivate affective responses will be rejected both by those who doubt the existence of the former and by those who find the notion of non-propositional justification incoherent. As far as the doubt is concerned, it is worth noting the existence of psychological studies which distinguish and investigate emotional responses based on perceptual and those based on reflective processes, for example in certain types of amnesia and in cases of Alzheimer’s disease.<sup>iii</sup> One source of the doubt is the undeniable fact that, for many emotions, for example, fear, both a propositional and a non-propositional base are possible. But this is not always the case. Disgust and enjoyment are normally bound up with sensory states. Indeed disgust seems to be primarily bound up with visual and tactile experience, rather than, say, auditory experience.

Although some versions of the analysis to be given (in §§ 3–4) will survive rejection of non-conceptual perceptual content, the view that emotions can be based on perception and that such perception is not always concept-involving provides the most plausible way of shaking the widespread conviction that emotions are always based on beliefs with axiological content.

Just as determinate types of perceptual experience justify some perceptual judgements and fail to justify others, so too determinate types of perceptual experience and determinate types of non-axiological belief motivate some emotions and fail to motivate others. Just as perception as of clear skies does not justify the belief that it is raining but rather beliefs incompatible with this, so too perception as of small, distant dogs on leashes does not, by itself, motivate fear. Some types of perceptual experience can defeat *prima facie* motivations.

If perceptual experience justifies perceptual beliefs, if emotions are motivated by perceptual experience and by non-axiological beliefs, what justifies axiological beliefs?

#### *Justified Axiological Beliefs*

Suppose Sam believes that the dog is dangerous. What if anything justifies this? Sam’s belief that the dog is dangerous is justified by his fear provided this fear satisfies certain conditions. Suppose Sam’s fear is perception-based. Then his fear justifies his belief that the dog is dangerous if it is motivated, for example, by perception as of a large, salivating . . . dog or by other easily imaginable perceptions of this type. The task of determining just which types of perceptual content motivate which types of emotion is, of course, not an easy one. Suppose Sam’s fear is based on a non-axiological belief. Then the relevant types of conceptual content will be more or less loosely tied to perception; they may involve a lot of back-ground knowledge and inferences, for example. The claim that emotions —both those based on perception and memory, and those based on non-axiological beliefs justify evaluations is without any doubt the most controversial of the extensions of the scope of the relation of defeasible, non-inductive justification introduced here. Not only does it run counter to the prevailing assumptions already mentioned about the possible terms of the relation of justification, it is incompatible with the widespread view that the base of every emotion must contain an evaluative predicate. On this view, only what is conceived of as being dangerous or as possessing some other negative value property can be feared, only what is believed to be admirable can be admired. Many of the arguments against this view are analogues of the arguments against the claim that to see is always

to judge and apply concepts.

Thus the view often enjoys a certain plausibility in virtue of failing to distinguish between the *occurrence* of judgements to the effect that something is dangerous and the ability to apply such an evaluative concept. I here assume only that emotional responses can occur on the basis of perceptions and non-axiological judgements. It may well be true that many of the more sophisticated emotional responses could not occur in subjects who did not already master a variety of evaluative predicates. In the same way, it seems highly likely that certain types of perceptual content could only be enjoyed by subjects who already master certain conceptual capacities. From this it does not follow that enjoyment of these types of emotional experience or perceptual content must involve actualisation of these capacities.

The view is also implausible as an account of the emotions of young children and fails to do justice to emotions which are regularly based on perception and on non-axiological beliefs. An example of the former is the already mentioned emotion of disgust, based, for example, on the perception of dirt. An example of the latter is provided by irritation provoked by the discovery that someone likes Continental Philosophy.

The view that emotions are inseparable from evaluations is often presented as a claim about the identifiability of emotions: an emotion is what it is in large measure because of the evaluations with which it is bound up. More generally, it is often claimed that an emotion is what it is in large measure because of the bases with which it is bound up. On such views, what is qualitatively distinctive about emotions, once their bases have been identified, are the different types of emotional sensations they involve. Against these assumptions, I shall assume that there are qualitatively distinct types of emotional experience which can be distinguished relatively independently of their bases. This view of emotions is perhaps most plausible for emotions such as maternal love, erotic jealousy, *ressentiment*, grief, and disgust.

If the least controversial candidate for the role of terms of the relation of defeasible, non-inductive justification is provided by belief-couples, then the four extensions of the scope of this relation introduced here all involve at least one non-doxastic and concept-free term. In order of increasing controversy value they are:

perceptual content justifies non-axiological belief;

perceptual content justifies emotions;

non-axiological belief justifies emotions;

emotions justify axiological beliefs.

A fifth, related, case is provided by the relation of justification between a motive or sentiment and an intention, as when Barry’s hatred of Continental Philosophy motivates his intention to write a letter to *The Times*. A sixth case, by the relation between this intention and the writing of the letter.

### § 3 VALUE CONCEPTS

What is involved in mastering axiological concepts? A full answer to this question involves giving an account of the semantics of evaluations. But we may begin by briefly leaving semantics aside. There is a view about the individuation of many natural, ordinary-language predicates which can profitably be extended here, provided the presuppositions already introduced are accepted.

According to this view, to master the meaning of a predicate like ‘tree’ (but not, for example, ‘politician’) is to master two things. First, it is to master a number of combinatorial and inferential properties of the predicate. Second, it is to master a large, open-ended class of possible transitions from different types of perceptual experience to uses of the predicate. The transitions in question must all have the property that the experiences furnish *prima facie* justifications for the predications employing the predicate. Since (dispositional) grasp of what justifies application of a predicate also

involves some grasp of what defeats such justifications, the latter, too, contributes to mastery of the predicate.

It is obvious enough how such an account might be extended to provide an account of our grasp of axiological predicates, if we bear in mind the extensions of the notion of a *prima facie* justification in § 2. Here the crucial type of experience will be emotional. To understand an axiological predicate is to be familiar with the range of emotional experience which stands in relations of *prima facie* justification to uses of the predicate. Of course, the situation in the case of axiological predicates is much more complex than in the case of simple natural predicates. First, because the account of the meaning of axiological predicates may be thought to presuppose the account given of natural predicates, in addition to being modelled on it. Many types of emotional experience have perceptions as their cognitive bases. Thus both these bases and these emotions will belong to the relevant classes of justifiers. Second, as already noted, to understand thick axiological predicates involves grasping the connections between these and certain natural properties.

A slightly less ambitious version of this account remains open to the foe of non-conceptual perceptual content: the mastery of evaluative predicates still involves mastering the transitions from emotions to such predicates, he may say. But the relevant bases will be provided only by non-axiological beliefs.

On the assumption that some such account is possible, we may wonder what its scope could be. At this point we run into *the multiplicity problem*: how do the different types of emotion match up with the different types of evaluative predicate?

The different types of link between emotions and axiological predicates fall into four distinct categories: one-one, one-many, and many-one and many-many correspondences. The first such category has tended to dominate philosophical discussion. The epistemology of naïve realism about values alludes to this category when it says of some emotion that it presents or has as its formal object this or that determinate-value property and that this or that value property can only be presented by this or that emotion.

The most familiar example is provided by the relation between the emotion or sentiment of approbation and goodness. But this venerable example resembles a philosophical artefact more than anything else. Approval and approbation are attitudes indicated by the speech act of commending. They do not seem to be emotions, although they are perhaps invariably connected with positive emotions (which are also perhaps indicated by the act of commending). If we try to specify the emotion which has the goodness of an act or object as its object we immediately run into difficulties, one symptom of which is the frequent reference in the literature to “a pro-attitude.” The emotions of pleasure or of liking are plausible in certain cases. Good wines and good food please. But does the goodness of an heroic act, of a woman struggling against the onset of cancer, please? A more traditional candidate is the love-“good” pair. But the proper, natural object of love is a person. Not wine or food, not even Château Margaux or Irish oysters. And if it is true that love of a person, as opposed to admiration of a person (or indeed as opposed to any other emotion directed towards a person), is not love in virtue of this or that property of a person, then love turns out to be completely unsuitable to play the role of the justifier for uses of the predicate “good.” (It is worth noting that the difficulty of specifying the emotion which corresponds to goodness may well be the source of the idea, alluded to above, that approbation cannot be identified except by its association with the thought that something is good<sup>iv</sup>)

Curiously, there is no such problem in the case of the relational counterpart of “good,” “better than,” which provides us with our second possible case of a one-one correspondence. Both episodic preferring and its dispositional counterpart, the sentiment called “preference,” justify predications containing the predicate “better than.” An equally plausible candidate for one-one emotion-predicate links is provided by the next case, which comprehends a vast number of transitions.

Perhaps the simplest type of emotion-value correlation is provided by couples of emotions and what Christine Tappolet (1996) calls “affective values” such as disgust-disgusting, bore-boring, fear-fearful. These three axiological predicates might be taken to mean “regularly provokes disgust, boredom or fear.” But couples such as admire-admirable, prefer-preferable, hate-hateful, contempt-contemptible, despise-despicable, enjoy-enjoyable, abominate-abominable, detest-detestable and—a favourite of Bertrand Russell’s—love-loveable, do not allow of such an interpretation. For something

to be admirable is not, or not just, for it to be such that it does, could, or would provoke admiration. For something to be prefer-able to something else is not, or not just, for it to be such that it is, could, or would be preferred. To be admirable is to be such that admiration would be justified. For one option to be preferable to another is for preference of the one over the other to be justified. Indeed if we assume that to be better than just is to be preferable to, then our second example of a one-one link, prefer-better, turns out to belong here. It is perhaps because to be preferable to is to be better than that the behaviour of “better” differs from that of “good” in the way already noted.

To grasp what it is for something to be “F-able” (for example, “admirable”), where “F” is used to ascribe an emotion (for example, admiration), is often to master the justificatory transition from the emotion mentioned to application of the predicate. But, of course, since each emotion of the right type is associated with a large number of heterogenous bases, perceptual and doxastic, familiarity with these is also required for someone to master the predicate.

There are a number of other more or less plausible examples of one-one connections. The hideous horrifies, the comic amuses, ugliness displeases, the sublime amazes or astonishes and terrifies, gaffes embarrass and so on. But although there are many plausible one-one connections between emotions and axiological predicates, there are also one-many, many-one and many-many correlations. And the task of distinguishing between these is more than a merely lexicographical task.

Is indignation not as appropriate to injustice as to certain forms of cruelty? Michael Kohlhaas’s reaction to injustice was acute pain. Rechtsgefühl is not just one emotion. Is admiration not appropriate to many virtues? What negative attitude is appropriate to *ressentiment*? Suppose that consistency, avoidance of contradiction or knowledge are cognitive values. What emotions, if any, are appropriate to these? Respect? Love? Admiration? Misuses of language and linguistic rule-breaking provoke manifestations of Sprachgefühl, but the relevant emotions and feelings can vary enormously, from irritation to choleric indignation, uneasiness and disgust. Ungrateful behaviour, like that of the boor, merits some negative emotion. But which? And is there only one such emotion in each case?

The suggestion has been that for many a thick axiological predicate one or more type of emotional experience counts as the paradigmatic justifier of the application of the predicate, just as the bases of the emotional experience justify these. The relations of justification between emotions and applications of axiological predicates belong to what individuates possession of axiological concepts. In the case of one-one correlations between emotions and evaluative predicates, it seems plausible to claim that (dispositional) grasp of the predicate’s representational (as opposed to its inferential) role involves just the transitions from the emotion to applicability of the predicate. But where the links are one-many or many-one an account of possession of the relevant concept becomes much more complicated.

#### § 4 VALUE PROPERTIES

If something like the above account of axiological concepts is correct, then perhaps it can be strengthened to yield an account of what it is for an evaluation to be true, what it is for something to possess a thick axiological property, without assuming with the naïve realist that there are mind-independent monadic axiological properties.

The first step is to provide an analysis of the notion of an appropriate emotion making use of the notion, already introduced, of a justified emotion. Let *x* be an emotion whose base, *b*, is either a conceptual *representation* containing no axiological concept of a natural object, *y*, and of its natural properties, or a perceptual presentation of such an object. Let “justification” mean *prima facie*, non-inductive justification. Then,

- x* is an emotion appropriate to *y* and its natural properties F-H iff (1) *b* is a true or veridical (re)presentation of *y* and of its properties F-H, and (2) *b* is justified if it is a conceptual representation of *y* (or fits *y* if it is a non-conceptual presentation of *y*), and (3) *b* justifies *x*, and (4) no relation of justification or fit mentioned is defeated.

Three features of this account need to be highlighted. The emotional bases appealed to contain no axiological concepts. Secondly, appropriate emotions differ from justified emotions in that their bases

correctly present or represent the natural world. Thus the account incorporates an element of correspondence. The type of correspondence involved is that favoured by internalist accounts of (re)presentation: the perceptual contents and the conceptual representations mentioned are such that they can be veridical or true and such that they can be non-veridical or false. But an externalist conception of correspondence is also compatible with the rest of the account (and is, I believe, preferable, at least for perception-based emotions, because “seeing something” is veridical and “seeing that” is factive, and for the semantic values of those emotion words, such as “regret,” which behave in the same way.)<sup>v</sup> Finally, although the account applies only to the sort of conceptual representations found in beliefs and to perceptions such as simple seeings, it is not difficult to imagine how it might be extended to apply to both memory and anticipations.

The second, by now unsurprising step is the biconditional:

Something is valuable iff it is possible for it to be the object of an appropriate emotion.

This is a mere schema. But where one-one links between emotions and thick value-predicates are available the schema is easily fleshed out

y is dangerous iff fear of y is appropriate,

y is contemptible iff contempt for y is appropriate,

y is admirable iff admiration of y is appropriate,

y is better than z iff preference of y over z is appropriate, and so on.

In order to counteract the impression that analyses of this type apply at best to the ethical and aesthetic spheres and, within these spheres, to cases where the emotion-value link is lexicographically guaranteed (‘admire’ - admirable), consider the value of political legitimacy. Political institutions and systems are legitimate or not, or more-or-less legitimate. Like their members they are the object of varying degrees of confidence or trust; groups of people have confidence in them, believe in them, where this means more than any mere belief that, for example, belief *that* the institutions and their members are reliable in this or that respect. Confidence in and belief in are more than merely doxastic attitudes. They involve a variety of different affective attitudes: admiration, willingness to allow someone to represent you, even the affective relations involved in taking someone or an institution to be a model, exemplar or leader, and above all the absence of mistrust and of distrust (i.e., “confidence” and “belief in” often function as excluder-words). And they may be more or less justified. Understood in these terms, “confidence in” is a good candidate for the analysis of political legitimacy. For a political institution to be more-or-less legitimate is for trust placed in it to be more-or-less appropriate.<sup>vi</sup> But this is an account of the *value* of political legitimacy. Those who are not impressed by the distinction between values and norms introduced above may endorse what, from the present perspective, can be described as a normative—and even procedural—account of legitimacy. By itself, this rules out the present account of legitimacy in terms of justified “confidence in.” An intermediate view would allow that beliefs about which procedures are (likely to be) followed belong to what justifies “confidence in.”

As we have seen, however, when we consider the full variety of value predicates and of emotions it becomes obvious that in very many cases there is not exactly one type of emotional response that can be used to give an account of a given axiological property. In all those cases where a neat biconditional is not available, that is, where the emotion-evaluative predicate link is not a one-one link, we may still maintain two strands in the above analysis. If something has a particular thick axiological property then there is some emotion appropriate to it and its purely natural proper-ties. If some emotion is appropriate with respect to some object and its purely natural properties, then it has some thick axiological property.

What is the relation between the present account and the dispositionalist account according to which to be positively valuable is to be likely to induce a positive emotional response? It is clearly

possible to incorporate into our account the condition that an object, together with its natural properties, would or is likely to induce a certain emotional reaction. But there is a reason for thinking that a cognitivist account of evaluation should not incorporate such a clause. A datum that any such account of evaluation should take into account is the fact that emotional responses and evaluative language are continually being refined. In the realist’s jargon, values are discovered, different types of value-blindness are corrected. Nietzsche did for the disvalue which is *ressentiment* what wine-growers regularly do for gustatory values. Any account of evaluations which limits itself to the emotional dispositions (what in § 1 were called “sentiments”) of actual individuals, or at least to their first-order emotional dispositions, will fail to do justice to this datum.

There is, however, one class of emotion-value couples for which dispositionalism seems to provide an adequate analysis. Recall the distinction above between being boring, disgusting or fearful, on the one hand, and being admirable or hateful, on the other. Morphology is not always a reliable guide here—cf. “fearful” and “hateful”—and there are difficult cases, such as the property of being frightful. Similarly, it seems possible that “disgusting,” for example, is sometimes used to ascribe to an object the property of being such that disgust would be appropriate. But in many cases “disgusting” and “fearful” do simply attribute the property of regularly provoking or being likely to provoke disgust or fear. For all the examples belonging to this limited diet the dispositionalist analysis seems to be appropriate.

## § 5 OBJECTIONS

[Wittgenstein] shook his head over it. The definition [of Ewing: ‘Good is what it is right to admire’] throws no light. There are three concepts, all of them vague. Imagine three solid pieces of stone. You pick them up, fit them together and you get now a ball. What you’ve now got tells you something about the three shapes. Now consider you have three balls of or lumps of soft mud or putty—formless. Now you put the three together and mould out of them a ball. Ewing makes a soft ball out of three pieces of mud?<sup>vii</sup>

Perhaps the two most obvious objections to the above account, in addition to the already-mentioned objections to many of its presuppositions, are that it is, after all, contrary to the publicity, a naturalist theory and that, even if it is not a naturalist theory, it is circular.

The naturalist fallacy is the identification of axiological and natural properties. Does not the present account make a similar sort of identification? No. It accounts for axiological properties in terms of natural properties and properties which are neither natural nor axiological but belong to a third category, that of formal or topic-neutral properties<sup>viii</sup>. It is the formal relations of justification between emotions and their bases—perceptual contents and non-axiological beliefs—and between these bases and their justifiers which do all of the work in the present account. But, the objection continues, this is cheating. The relations of justification appealed to are not really a distinct component of the account. They are available to all the competing accounts, to the dispositionalist, to the naïve realist and even to the emotivist. Internal relations supervene on contingent facts; they come for free.

Suppose that internal relations do indeed supervene on external relations and on the possession by entities of monadic properties. It remains the case that the existence or obtaining of internal relations should not be confused with their being cognised. Now personal justification is essentially something of which the subject is aware. Such awareness is certainly not expensive. But it does not come for free. And the varieties of justification appealed to in the analysis above are varieties of personal justification. Such personal phenomena as perceptions, emotions and beliefs stand in the justification relations employed in the present account of appropriateness. And these are not to be confused with the terms of impersonal justification, truth-bearers such as sentences or propositions.

Not only does the present account avoid the naturalist fallacy, it preserves an analogy with the most famous claim of such anti-naturalists as Moore, that goodness is indefinable. On the present account at least the thick value properties are analysable. But a mysterious simple does occur in the analysis: justification.

The objection that the present account is circular is a natural enough objection. As Williams put it “The notions of appropriateness, correctness and so forth . . . cry out for examination; and they

wear on their front the fact that they are in some part evaluative.”<sup>xix</sup> Wiggins concedes that the account he gives of appropriate emotions in the course of elaborating a “sensible subjectivism” is circular but “benignly” so since, amongst other things, his modification of traditional subjectivism is not part of the project of giving a full analysis of evaluative terms but part of the project of elucidating these.<sup>x</sup>

Now there is clearly a close relation between ‘appropriate’ and such obviously evaluative terms as ‘becoming’, ‘seemly’, ‘befitting’, ‘merits’, even ‘decorous’ and ‘decent’. Consider the related concept of desert as it occurs in the claim of the retributionist to the effect that certain deeds merit punishment or in the claim that a deed deserves a reward. These claims seem to mean that one sort of behaviour (or event: non-intentional reward or punishment) is appropriate to, is justified by, another sort of behaviour. But desert is equally clearly an evaluative notion. And, worse, it is often claimed that justification is a normative or evaluative concept.

A first reply to this objection would be to concede the circularity but to point out that, if appropriateness and justification are indeed axiological or normative notions, the relevant values or norms are *cognitive* values or norms. This would then make it possible to argue that the present account is an account of non-cognitive values in terms of cognitive values.

There is, however, a more ambitious reply which can be made to the objection, a reply which involves rejecting the charge of circularity *en bloc*. As a first step towards this reply, it will be useful to consider just what sort of value or norm justification might be supposed to be. The following are putative platitudes in the domain of cognitive values and norms, if anything is:

Justified beliefs are preferable to unjustified beliefs.

Knowledge is valuable.

Inconsistency is a bad thing.

Sincerity is a good thing.

One ought not to assert that *p* if one believes that not-*p*.

One ought not to predicate “\_\_\_ is a duck” of a rabbit in the context of a simple assertion

Now is ‘justifies’ an axiological predicate? The examples just given suggest that although it is better for something to be justified than not, being justified is not itself an axiological property, thick or thin. Consistency and knowledge are good things although they are not values. (Since only the last two platitudes in the list refer to doables, only they express *cognitive* norms (cf. § 1 above). The question that really interests us is whether justification, which is not something directly subject to the will, is a cognitive value.)

The suggestion that justification *is not* a cognitive value although it *has* a cognitive value may be illustrated by the following example. Suppose Sam’s perception justifies his belief. The relation between his perception and his belief is not an axiological relation. But it may well be the case that it is better for his belief to be justified than not.

The present suggestion concerns *prima facie* non-inductive justification. It resembles the suggestion made by Frege (and somewhat later by Husserl) about another type of justification, deductive justification:

Every law that states what is can be interpreted (*aufgefasst*) as prescribing that thinking ought to be in agreement with it and is therefore in this sense a law of thought (Frege, *Grundgesetze* 1893, XV)

In other words, there are theoretical and normative formulations of logical rationality. The former, logical laws, are laws of being true, of what is true, the latter are laws about how we ought to think. Frege clearly held that the former are not only distinct from but also prior to the latter. The laws of being true are “authoritative (*maassgebend*, decisive) for our thinking, if it wants to attain truth”

(XVI). Since the *Tractatus* it has often been thought that even if logic understood as an account of rules (inference, proof) does not wear the trousers with respect to logic as a semantic matter, nevertheless the latter can amount to no more than mere tautologies, that is, can have no theoretical content. But whether or not this is true of deductive relations, it is by no means obvious that it is true of other types of justification relations. (*Pace* the later Wittgenstein, for whom neither tautologies nor formulations of criterial relations have theoretical content, that is, a truth-value.) Certainly, in the case of the defeasible, non-inductive transitions from perception to assertion, from perception to emotion and from emotion to evaluation there is even less temptation to hold on to Frege’s Platonistic account of relations of justification than in the case of deductive rationality.

If something like Frege’s account of deductive rationality holds also for non-deductive rationality, if criterial connexions are like logical consequence in being primarily theoretical connexions, then the account of value presented here avoids one type of circularity. (Another accusation of circularity might focus on the role of true beliefs and veridical intentionality in the analysis given. In order to avoid this objection, the analysis is committed to the view that these relations are not normative. One ought not to assert duckhood of a rabbit, true, but that is because the concept *duck* does not apply to rabbits.)

Of course, any extension of Frege’s account would have to explain what it means to say that justification is a good thing. Frege himself, in the last quotation above, hints at how such an explanation might go. If our goal is truth—a better candidate might be: knowledge—then we ought to draw on logic. Similarly, we might add, we ought also to draw on the relations of defeasible justification. But the conditional should not be understood along the lines of common-or-garden hypothetical normative and axiological propositions. Validity and *prima facie* justification do not stand to truth or knowledge as most means stand to ends. They are essential parts of truth and knowledge. Utilitarianism, here as elsewhere, is not enough.

## § 6 ADVANTAGES, LACUNAE AND DEVELOPMENTS

### *Three Advantages*

One advantage of the present account is that in introducing justification into the analysis of value in three of its four clauses it does justice to an indubitable feature of value-talk. If assertion of an evaluation involves claims about what justifies what, then since such claims refer to standards and paradigms, evaluations inherit the controversy value attaching to such references. And indeed we expect value talk to be contentious. Talk about generosity, priggishness and shoddiness nearly always provokes controversy. The contrast with many empirical claims in ordinary language is striking: these should be justifiable but we do not normally expect our talk about the weather to be contested. Evaluative discourse, however, is essentially contestable and contentious. This feature is, of course, one of the main motivations behind the desire to give a cognitivist account of evaluative language. If evaluations are not truth bearers then our disagreements about evaluations become incomprehensible. Yet the two most influential forms of cognitivism, naïve realism and dispositionalism, throw no light on why evaluative claims are essentially contentious. Were they adequate analyses, talk about value and talk about the weather would be on a par.

A second advantage of the role awarded by the present account to justification, one closely related to the first, is that it does justice to another widely acknowledged feature of value-talk. Most such talk involves attempts to educate—to refine, to correct, to broaden, to deepen, to render consistent—the responses of an interlocutor who is suspected of over-looking, underestimating or simplifying this or that detail and so, too, of responses that are coarse, inadequate or blind. Aesthetic, ethical and political debate of any intensity invariably involves trying to get one’s interlocutor to see or describe a situation or a person in a certain way, to get him to feel in certain ways. In other words, it involves negotiating agreements about what evaluative predicates really mean and, simultaneously, negotiating agreement about their applicability.

A third advantage of the present account stems from the connexion between motivation or justification and the role of signals. It is widely accepted that one central function of emotions is that

of signaling or indicating what has a positive or negative value in the niche or milieu of creatures, both human and non-human. This is closely bound up with the functions of steering or guiding behaviour and of expressing affective phenomena. These three functions belong to the much wider class of automatic transitions between emotion and behaviour, between perception and behaviour and between perception and emotion. Now the present account suggests how “fear signals danger” is to be understood: fear signals the possibility that it is appropriate. And it would be in the spirit of the present account to say that uses of evaluative predicates grow out of the primitive phenomena of steering, indicating, expression and, more generally, of automatic transitions. If motivation is a primitive form of justification, indication is a primitive form of motivation.

#### *Lacunae*

The account presented has been an account of those contingent evaluations which contain thick axiological predicates and which make predications of such entities as people, things, their traits and related episodes and actions. But this means that at least three important types of axiological predication remain to be accounted for:

contingent predications of instrumental value or utility (example: that is useful); contingent predications containing attributive uses of “good” (examples: That is a good apple/text-book/wheeze);

and

axiological predications which, if true, are necessarily true (example: Pleasure is a good thing).

Of these omissions, the last is the most serious, since the present analysis has actually appealed to such predications. I said that possession of a thick axiological property entails possession of such thin properties as being good. That a person or deed has a certain thick axiological property is a contingent matter, as is the possession of the natural properties underlying the thick axiological property. That Sam’s deed is courageous is contingently true. But the claim that whatever is courageous is good is not contingent. Such claims are sometimes said to involve predications of intrinsic value. Further examples are provided by such platitudes as

Love is valuable.

Knowledge is valuable.

Pleasure is better than pain.

Health is better than illness.

It is better to be free than not.

Love is better than pleasure.

Cloth caps are better than baseball caps.

Similarly, fashionable reversals of traditional platitudes also belong here. For example, the thesis of the great American Nietzschean, Mae West:

It’s not the men in your life that count.

It’s the life in your men.

If we assume that the ultimate bearers of intrinsic value are always biological and psychological

entities such as people, animals and their psychological and vital traits, then there is one account available of attributions of intrinsic value which is close in spirit to the account given of contingent axiological predication. For love or pleasure to be good is for it to be the case that some positive emotion with respect to love or pleasure is justified. Clearly, the type of justification involved cannot be defeasible justification. Nor does the base of the positive emotion need to refer to anything but love or pleasure (or cases thereof, says the nominalist). If (as Brentano suggested) there is an affective analogue of the self-evidence that is sometimes said to be enjoyed by *a priori* truths, then that would furnish one promising candidate. That love is valuable would then mean that love of love is self-evidently justified, or more vulgarly, that love is loveable. As Joyce’s (*Ulysses*, “Cyclops”) formulation, “Love loves to love love,” indicates, this leads to a regress of sorts. But it is a regress as harmless as the regresses to which the concept of truth gives rise.

Although the present account of evaluations presupposes a sharp distinction between values and norms, it is obvious what an analogous account of norms would look like: for a piece of behaviour to be what someone ought to do is for his intention to justify (“rationalise”) the piece of behaviour. If, as suggested in § 1, emotions and motives (sentiments) underlie all intentions, then an account of what it means for an intention to justify an action will involve giving an account of how the underlying emotions and sentiments justify the intention. The simplicity and monotony of desires and intentions—which vary only in their objects, contents and intensity—does indeed contrast sharply with the variety of emotions. But justification of behaviour inherits all the complexity of justification of emotions (whether or not justification is transitive).

#### *Response-dependence vs. Realist verificationism*

The account in § 3 of the meaning of axiological concepts is in the spirit of a number of contemporary programmes—accounts of meaning in terms of assertibility conditions, criteria, functional roles and, in particular, of response-dependence accounts of a variety of concepts. The main difference concerns the central role attributed to non-inductive, non-doxastic, *prima facie* justification in the present account.

Response-dependence theories are theories of concepts. For a conceptualist the step from a theory of concepts to a theory of properties is a small one. So it is, too, for a philosopher who dispenses with senses and contents understood as modes of presentation- and allows only attitudes, sentences and singular propositions. For a realist who allows for senses and contents as well as a theory of properties, a theory of truth makers is one thing, a theory of content and sense another quite distinct, albeit in-separable, matter.<sup>x1</sup>

The concerns of response-dependence theorists and of such a realist meet in realist verificationism. Verificationisms can be classified by the type of theory of perception they espouse. This yields the verificationism of the direct realist (of direct realists who do and those who do not allow for content), of the indirect or critical realist, and of the phenomenalist. The distinction between friends and enemies of simple seeing is skew to this classification. Largely skew to both of these classifications is the distinction between verificationisms which are realist and those which are anti-realist about bivalence. Viennese verificationisms involved either phenomenism or critical realism but were not explicitly anti-realist about bivalence. Dummett’s verificationism is anti-realist and directly realist about perception but makes visual perception out to involve something intermediate between simple seeing and epistemic seeing (“proto-thoughts”). What, it may be wondered, is realist verificationism?

For the really realist verificationist bivalence rules and perceptual verification is direct, non-conceptual and of mind-independent particulars. An expression is propositionally meaningful iff it is true or false. “\_\_ is true” is a derelativised predicate. For something to be true is for there to be something which makes it true. Then, for the most basic types of atomic, ordinary language predications,

$\alpha$  makes  $p$  true iff (1)  $\alpha$  exists, and (2)  $p$ , and (3) it is possible that there is a perception which is of  $\alpha$  and fits  $\alpha$ , and (4) this perception defeasibly and non-inductively justifies  $p$ .

In other words, the truth-maker *relation* is to be explained in terms of possible perceptual verification.<sup>xii</sup> Here it is important that the perception referred to be non-conceptual. Otherwise meanings would be imported into the account of meaningfulness and the latter would be circular. Now such an account will not work for all types of atomic, ordinary language predications. It will not work for social predicates (“teacher,” “entrepreneur”) since these are not perceptually verifiable. (It is often thought that it cannot work for simple dispositional predicates.) Nor will it work for value predicates, for the same reason. But the semantics of evaluations given in § 4 can now be seen as an extension of the central strategy employed by realistic verificationism. The extension involves putting emotions to work in the same way in which perceptions function in the verificationist account of meaning. Just as perceptions justify applications of natural predicates so, too, emotions—together with their perceptual and doxastic but non-evaluative bases justify the application of evaluative predicates.

In anti-realist verificationisms, the perceptual possibilities and, more generally, the assertibility-conditions appealed to, are relative to subjects or communities. This is often what generates their anti-realist commitments. Similarly, in dispositionalist accounts of evaluations (and of colour talk) the dispositions appealed to are first-order possibilities and likelihoods open to natural objects and subjects or communities. But the possible perceptions to which the realist verificationist appeals are not so relativised. Nor are the possible emotions invoked in § 4. It is not impossible that an intermediate type of possibility, for example that peculiar to second-order dispositional properties (or indeed a new theory of the relation between modality and time), might turn out to yield an account of evaluations and other types of predication more appropriate than the accounts yielded by either of these two modal extremes.<sup>xiii</sup>

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#### NOTES

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<sup>i</sup> Cf. de Sousa 1987, 121f.

<sup>ii</sup> Cf. Pollock 1986, 37ff., 176ff.; for some important criticisms of applications of this type of justification, applications similar to those to be appealed to here, cf. Alston 1993, 32ff.

<sup>iii</sup> See, for example, Johnson and Multhaup 1992, 50-57

<sup>iv</sup> Cf. Wiggins 1987, 188.

<sup>v</sup> Cf. Mulligan 1995. I have often heard Barry Smith eloquently defend the view that genuine emotions inherit the object-dependence of their bases and are otherwise mere “emotional slop.”

<sup>vi</sup> Cf. Dunn 1990.

<sup>vii</sup> Bouwsma 1986, 41-42.

<sup>viii</sup> See Mulligan 1993.

<sup>ix</sup> Williams 1973, 225. Cf. Tappolet 1996.

<sup>x</sup> Wiggins 1987, 188.

<sup>xi</sup> On global response-dependence and realism, see Pettit 1991.

<sup>xii</sup> On the truth-maker relation analysed here, cf. Mulligan, Simons and Smith 1984.

<sup>xiii</sup> The history of appeals to appropriate emotions and to defeasible justification in Austrian philosophy—from Brentano and Meinong to Musil and Wittgenstein—and before that in Celtic philosophy—in Hutcheson and Reid—and in analytic philosophy—from Broad and Ewing to Wiggins—is a complicated one I hope to deal with elsewhere. Within analytic philosophy it is widely accepted that any account of evaluations and values must explain how these motivate action. Within Austrian philosophy a common reply to this challenge has it that all ethical values are, or are closely connected to, aesthetic values. Thus it is the emotional responses to aesthetic values which motivate ethical agents.

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