eidos, the Genevan Centre for Metaphysics invites you to a workshop with Bob Hale, University of Sheffield.
Just as there are many ways things /could /be, so there are many ways things /couldn't/ be. This is a simple argument for the existence of impossibilities, inviting comparison with Lewis's notorious paraphrase argument. Taking off from this initial thought, we can go on to specify a notion of /ways for things to be/ in terms of properties. Then, of the ways for things to be, some are ways things could be, i.e. possibilities, and some are ways things couldn't be, i.e. impossibilities. Why should we think there are impossibilities? /Bad/ arguments for impossibilities are based on the idea that there are true contradictions. /Better/ arguments are based on the usefulness of impossible worlds in giving correct accounts of other logical phenomena, such as attitude ascriptions.
For all inquiries, please contact the organiser, Jessica Leech.
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This document last modified Thursday, 04-Dec-2008 14:03:31 CET |
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