eidos -- the Centre in Metaphysics of the University of Geneva

conference on inferential internalism

17th to 18th June 2008, University of Fribourg, Miséricorde, Room 2122


conference-description

For the full thematic conference-description: pdf (10 p.)

Inferential Internalism is, on a rough characterization, the claim that an inferred belief isn't justified, unless the reasoner rationally takes a stand on the question whether her premises provide her with an adequate reason for her conclusion. Concerning the question whether Inferential Internalism should be accepted or not, important considerations pull in different directions. On the one hand, regress- or circularity arguments seem to show that such a requirement on inferential justification is either incoherent or at least impossible to satisfy for human reasoners, so that scepticism about inference ensues. On the other hand, the connection between the notion of justification and that of responsibility renders the claim that the subject need not have a view on her reasons suspect. The aim of the conference is to discuss the prospects of reconciling these considerations. In particular, the question which versions of Inferential Internalism fall prey to the regress objections and which not, if any, is to be addressed.

The question whether to accept Inferential Internalism raises for the exemplary case of inference a number of fundamental issues in current epistemology. These include at least the following:

  1. basic justification: Are there cases where justification obtains, in spite of the fact that the thinker has no justified view on such questions as whether the belief-formation is reliable, the reasons adequate, and so on?
  2. the nature of norm-guided belief-formation: What distinguishes norm-guided belief-formation from mere belief-formation? Is it that in the former but not in the latter the thinker's cognitive grasp of the norm plays some psychological role in the belief-formation? And, if yes, what role, and what kind of cognitive grasp? Is the cognitive grasp constituted by explicit or implicit higher-order belief or merely by a stable disposition to form first-order beliefs according to certain patterns?
  3. responsibility and justification: Is it right that the connection between justification and responsibility supports requirements to the effect that the reasoner must have a justified attitude towards the grounds of her beliefs? Or are there less demanding ways to behave in an epistemically responsible manner?

At the conference these issues will be discussed as they arise for the specific case of inference and inferential justification. Some specific problems for Inferential Internalism are developed and discussed, e.g. the regress appealed to in traditional inductive sceptical arguments and the regresses alluded to as versions of the ``Lewis-Caroll-Problem''. Alternatives to Inferential Internalism are tested for their capacity to do justice to the responsibility-justification connection.

 
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